On Fault-based Attacks and Countermeasures for Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems by Dominguez Oviedo, Agustin






presented to the University of Waterloo
in fulfilment of the
thesis requirement for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Electrical and Computer Engineering
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2008
c©Agust́ın Domı́nguez Oviedo 2008
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of
the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.
I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.
iii
Abstract
For some applications, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is an attractive choice be-
cause it achieves the same level of security with a much smaller key size in comparison
with other schemes such as those that are based on integer factorization or discrete log-
arithm. Unfortunately, cryptosystems including those based on elliptic curves have been
subject to attacks. For example, fault-based attacks have been shown to be a real threat
in today’s cryptographic implementations. In this thesis, we consider fault-based at-
tacks and countermeasures for ECC. We propose a new fault-based attack against the
Montgomery ladder elliptic curve scalar multiplication (ECSM) algorithm. For security
reasons, especially to provide resistance against fault-based attacks, it is very important
to verify the correctness of computations in ECC applications. We deal with protections
to fault attacks against ECSM at two levels: module and algorithm. For protections at
the module level, where the underlying scalar multiplication algorithm is not changed, a
number of schemes and hardware structures are presented based on re-computation or
parallel computation. It is shown that these structures can be used for detecting errors
with a very high probability during the computation of ECSM. For protections at the
algorithm level, we use the concepts of point verification (PV) and coherency check (CC).
We investigate the error detection coverage of PV and CC for the Montgomery ladder
ECSM algorithm. Additionally, we propose two algorithms based on the double-and-add-
always method that are resistant to the safe error (SE) attack. We demonstrate that one
of these algorithms also resists the sign change fault (SCF) attack.
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Cryptography refers to design principles, means and methods for rendering plain
information unintelligible to unauthorized parties. In the past, cryptography was
used only for secret communications between powerful security entities such as
military and intelligence agencies. Today, with the widespread use of computers
and the Internet, secure communications are more than a privilege; they are a
priority requirement even for the general public. In 1976, with the introduction of
public key cryptography by Diffie and Hellman [25], secure communications were
made practical. E-commerce and smart cards are examples of how cryptographic
applications have become a part of everyday life.
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) was independently proposed by both Miller
[67] and Koblitz [50] in 1985. Since then, ECC has been a subject of extensive re-
search and standardization efforts that have led it to be widely known and accepted.
Some of the ECC standards include: FIPS 186 [33], IEEE P1363 [42], ANSI X9.62
[5], and ISO 15946 [43]. Today ECC is an attractive choice because it achieves
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2 Introduction
the same level of security with a much smaller key size in comparison with other
methods such as integer factorization or discrete logarithm based cryptosystems.
Smaller key sizes generate smaller signatures, require less memory for storage, and
use less bandwidth for communications. Because of this, for devices such as smart
cards, personal digital assistants (PDAs), and mobile telephones, ECC appears to
be an attractive choice for providing the public key services required for secrecy,
authentication and non-repudiation purposes. In secrecy terms, ECC could provide
the key distribution privacy needed for symmetric algorithms. For authentication
and non-repudiation, ECC could be used to provide digital signatures.
Unfortunately, cryptosystems including those based on elliptic curves have been
subject to attacks. Cryptoanalytic attacks may reveal system vulnerabilities, which
then need to be addressed with countermeasures. Various researchers have empha-
sized the significance of cryptographic applications being resistant to side-channel
analysis (e.g., reconstruction of a secret key from analysis of timing [52], power
consumption signals [53], and electromagnetic emanations [2] during cryptographic
operations).
Another type of attacks that has received considerable attention is the fault
analysis attack. Introduced by Boneh et al. [15], this attack is based on produc-
ing malfunctions in cryptosystems to leak sensitive information (i.e., secret keys).
They have shown how some cryptographic schemes, such as the RSA and Rabin
digital signatures, are vulnerable to induced computational errors. Particularly,
for an implementation of RSA based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT),
they have demonstrated that with only two signatures of the same message (one
computed correctly and one produced after some fault), it is possible to efficiently
factor the modulus used. In order to avoid such attacks, they suggest verifying
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the correctness of computations in cryptographic applications. In 1997, based on
Boneh’s work, Biham and Shamir generalized this technique for any secret key
cryptographic algorithm proposed in the open literature [10].
Anderson and Kuhn reported a more practical fault attack just few months
after Biham and Shamir’s publication in 1997 [3]. It is based on producing faults
in instructions rather than in data. The underlying idea does not appear to be
new; in fact, it seems that this technique was used by amateur hackers on satellite
television smart cards [4]. It consists of applying a high frequency glitch into the
clock or power supply signals. Due to different delays in the processor’s internal
signal paths, this glitch might affect only some signals. Varying the timing and
duration of the glitch, the attacker can possibly enforce to execute different wrong
instructions which might compromise some sensitive information (e.g., a stored
cryptographic key). Recently, Kim and Quisquater [48] showed how general propose
microcontrollers can be targets of a so called double-fault attack, i.e., one attack
to the RSA signature generation and the other to part of the status register (i.e.,
zero flag). Their fault injection method is based on inducing a glitch which makes
a transient fault with a voltage spike. These glitches are used to corrupt data
transferred between registers and memory or to prevent the execution of the code.
They mount successfully this attack on a microcontroller computing the Chinese
remainder theorem (CRT) based RSA signature generation algorithm.
Skorobogatov and Anderson [84] introduced a new way to induce faults into a
single bit using a laser beam. This is called optical fault induction attack. They
used a low-cost laser in order to change the contents of any single RAM bit. Using
this with the principles of differential fault analysis, it is possible to mount an
inexpensive attack against many microcontrollers used today in constrained devices.
4 Introduction
Biehl et al. [9] extended fault-based attacks to cryptosystems using elliptic
curves [9]. They proposed two attacks. The basic idea behind the first attack
is to enforce, by a fault, a computation in a weaker group where solving the elliptic
curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) is feasible. Using this principle, they
show how it is possible to derive secret information (e.g., a secret key) from a de-
vice that computes the elliptic curve scalar multiplication (ECSM). They assume
that it is possible for an attacker to select the input point P or to induce a fault
in that point. The second proposed attack is known as differential fault analysis
(DFA) attack. In fact the latter is an extension of the attack presented by Boneh
et al. [15] for RSA cryptosystems. This attack assumes that the adversary knows
the implementation details, i.e., the underlying ECSM algorithm, the curve param-
eters, and the internal variables representation. Also, they consider that the result
of the error-free computation of an EC scalar multiplication Q = kP is known,
where scalar k is the secret. In this case if the attacker injects a single-bit fault
(i.e., bit flip) in a register that holds an ECSM partial result, and the faulty result
Q̃ is released, it is possible to reduce the exhaustive search space. If this process is
repeated varying the timing of the attack, then the scalar bits can be retrieved in
small blocks.
In order to resist the attacks presented by Biehl et al. [9], one can simply
verify that the output is on the valid elliptic curve. This process is known as
point verification (PV). However, this basic countermeasure is not sufficient for
two other fault based attacks: the safe error (SE) attack proposed by Yen and
Joye [91] and Yen et al. [92], and the sign change fault (SCF) attack presented by
Blömer et al. [14]. The former shows the vulnerability of algorithms that utilize
dummy instructions for making a uniform execution flow such as the double-and-
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add-always method (e.g., [23]). On the other hand, the SCF attack is applicable
to elliptic curves over prime fields, where a sign change in a point implies only
a change of sign of its y-coordinate. An interesting aspect of this attack is that
the elliptic curve operations do not need to leave the original group E(Fp). They
assume that the attacker can induce a fault that produces a sign change into an
intermediate point during the ECSM operation. After having a set of erroneous
results due to SCF attacks and the correct result Q, it is possible to recover the
scalar k for a input pair (k, P ).
As described above, fault-based attacks against cryptosystems are a real threat
and should be taken into account. Accordingly, the design of cryptosystems should
include some countermeasures against fault-based attacks. In this thesis we present
our work on fault-based attacks and countermeasures for ECC.
In general, fault attacks take advantage of errors that occur while a crypto-
graphic device is performing a private-key operation. Such errors may be induced
by a malicious adversary who has physical access to the device or may occur be-
cause of hardware failure. An adversary may derive sensitive information from the
incorrect output. Thus, error detection is an essential process from a security point
of view. In the case of ECC, PV has been shown to be an important countermeasure
against fault attacks. However, since there exist attacks where PV is not sufficient,
it is necessary to include other protections.
While error detection is a sufficient countermeasure for preventing fault-based
attacks, fault-tolerant characteristics enable a system to perform its normal opera-
tion in the presence of some faults. This will result in more reliable systems where
faults may occur due to natural causes such as, abnormal temperature, electro-
magnetic interference (EMI) or power supply changes. Error detection plays an
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important role in the context of fault-tolerant system design. In detecting system
failure it indicates the necessity for remedial actions.
1.1 Thesis organization
The organization of the remainder of this thesis is as follows: In Chapter 2, we
present a brief overview of finite fields and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC).
We also describe important fault attacks reported in the open literature for ECC.
Additionally, in this chapter we present the error detection strategies that are used
in this thesis. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 present the major research contributions of this
thesis.
In Chapter 3, we present invalid-curve attacks that apply to the Montgomery
ladder ECSM algorithm. An elliptic curve over the binary field is defined using
two parameters, namely a and b. We show that with a different “value” for curve
parameter a, there exists a cryptographically weaker group in nine of the ten NIST-
recommended elliptic curves over F2m . Thereafter, we present two attacks that are
based on the observation that parameter a is not utilized for the Montgomery ladder
algorithms proposed by López and Dahab [58]. We also present the probability of
success of such attacks for general and NIST-recommended elliptic curves. At the
end of the chapter, we give some countermeasures to resist this attack.
In Chapter 4, we present error detection and fault tolerance in ECSM by working
with EC scalar multiplication modules and without making changes in the under-
lying scalar multiplication algorithm. To that end, first we describe a number of
encoding techniques that rely on properties of elliptic curves. Thereafter, we give
error-detecting and fault-tolerant structures for ECSM based on re-computation
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and parallel computation. We show that it is possible to have fault-tolerant schemes
utilizing two ECSM modules. This contrasts with the three modules needed by the
well-known triple modular redundancy (TMR) based scheme. Then we give over-
head costs and experimental results for the probability of undetected errors.
Algorithm-level error detection in ECSM is presented in Chapter 5. First, we
analyze the error detection coverage of PV and coherency check (CC) for the Mont-
gomery ladder ECSM algorithm over the binary field. Then, we provide left-to-right
and right-to-left double-and-add-always ECSM methods that will resist an SE at-
tack. We show that the right-to-left version will also resist an SCF attack. Next,
we discuss the case where two faults could be injected in one run of the ECSM, the
first where sensitive information is used, and the second for skipping conditional
tests. Finally, we provide a countermeasure to this strong attack model.
Chapter 6 provides concluding remarks and future research work. In the bibliog-
raphy which begins on page 173, each reference ends with numbers that correspond
to the page number in this thesis where that reference appears.
1.2 Summary of research contributions
The main contributions in this thesis are as follows:
• New invalid-curve attack on the Montgomery ladder ECSM algorithm over
the binary field.
• Error detection in ECSM using repeated and parallel computation.
• Fault-tolerant ECSM using re-computation, parallel computation, and PV.
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• Analysis of error detection of the Montgomery ladder ECSM algorithm over
the binary field that reveals the advantage of performing an integrity check
(IC) of the input point P .
• New double-and-add-always algorithms that resist the SE attack. The right-
to-left version also resists the SCF attack.
Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we first present an overview of the mathematical background per-
taining to elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). The fundamental operation used for
ECC is the elliptic curve scalar multiplication (ECSM). We present this operation
and some algorithms used for computing it. We also provide an overview of recent
fault attacks on ECC. Error detection plays an important role as a countermeasure
against such attacks. Moreover, it is a basic task in the context of fault-tolerant
system design. Hence, we give some error detection strategies that are utilized in
the remainder of this thesis.
For a better understanding of the materials to be presented in the following
chapters, we give below some background related to finite fields and ECC. For
more on these topics, the reader is referred to the following references [51], [62],




Definition 2.1 An abelian group is a set G with a binary operation ∗ on G that
satisfies the following five properties:
1. The operation ∗ is closed (i.e., a ∗ b ∈ G for all a, b ∈ G).
2. The operation ∗ is associative (i.e., a ∗ (b ∗ c) = (a ∗ b) ∗ c for all a, b, c ∈ G).
3. The operation ∗ is commutative (i.e., a ∗ b = b ∗ a for all a, b ∈ G).
4. There exists an identity element e ∈ G called identity such that a∗e = e∗a = a
for any a ∈ G.
5. For every a ∈ G , there exists an inverse element a−1 ∈ G such that a∗a−1 = e.
Sometimes, we denote the group as a triple (G, ∗, e). An example of an abelian
group is the integers under the addition operation, with an identity element e = 0
and an inverse a−1 = −a. It could be referred to as (Z, +, 0). In cryptography the
used groups typically have a finite number of elements. The number of elements in
any group G is called the order of G, denoted as |G| or ord(G).
Definition 2.2 A finite group G is said to be cyclic if all elements of the group
can be generated by applying the group operation repeatedly to an element α ∈ G
which is denoted as a generator of the group G.
Definition 2.3 For a finite group (G, ∗, e), the order of an element a (denoted
ord(a) = b) is the smallest positive integer b such that a ∗ a ∗ · · · ∗ a︸ ︷︷ ︸
b times
= e.
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Theorem 2.1 Let G be a cyclic group of order n and d|n. Then G has φ(d)
elements of order d and φ(n) generators, where the function φ is called the Euler
phi function1 [66].
Fact 2.1 Some properties of the Euler phi function include:
1. If p is prime, then φ(p) = p− 1.
2. If m and n are relatively prime, then φ(mn) = φ(m) · φ(n).




i is the prime factorization of n, then φ(n) = n ·
∏j−1
i=0 (1− 1pi ).
By utilizing the group concept, we can define a field as follows:
Definition 2.4 A field F is a set of elements with two binary operators, denoted
as + and ·, which exhibits the following properties:
1. F is an abelian group under the operation +.
2. The non-zero elements of F form an abelian group under the operation ·.
3. The distributive laws apply (i.e., a·(b+c) = a·b+a·c and (b+c)·a = b·a+c·a
for all a, b, c ∈ F ).
A finite field is a field with a finite number of elements. It is referred to as
Galois field, named after its inventor, Évariste Galois (1811-1832). The finite or
Galois field with q elements is denoted by Fq.
Example 2.1 (a) The set of real numbers under multiplication and addition is a
field (infinite field). (b) Let p be a prime. The set {0, 1, . . . , p− 1} forms a finite
1φ(n) corresponds to the number of positive integers < n and relatively prime to n.
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field of order p under modulo-p addition and multiplication. It is commonly referred
to as prime field Fp.
Theorem 2.2 For p prime and m ≥ 2, there is a unique finite field of order pm,
denoted as Fpm . It is called the extension field of the prime field. A proof of this
theorem is presented by Golomb and Gong [38].
Definition 2.5 Let m ≥ 2. The field F2m is called characteristic-two finite field or
binary finite field. It can be seen as a vector space of dimension m over the field F2
which has only the elements 0 and 1. There are m elements (αm−1, αm−2, . . . , α1, α0)
in F2m such that each element a ∈ F2m can be represented in the following form:
a = am−1αm−1 + am−2αm−2 + · · ·+ a1α1 + a0α0, where ai ∈ F2.
The set {αm−1, αm−2, . . . , α1, α0} is called a basis of F2m over F2. Every element
in the field can be represented as a bit string of the form (am−1am−2 . . . a1a0). The
field addition is simply the bit-wise XOR operation, and the field multiplication
depends on the field basis chosen. The selection of a particular basis may depend
on the used platform (e.g., hardware or software). This choice frequently influences
implementation cost and the complexity of finite field computations. The two most
common types of bases used in conventional software and hardware applications are
polynomial and normal bases. Others, like dual, redundant and triangular bases,
are less commonly used but have some advantages in specific implementations. The
work discussed in this thesis uses polynomial basis.
In polynomial basis the elements of F2m are represented as linear combinations
of the set {αm−1, αm−2, . . . , α2, α, 1}, where α is a root of an irreducible polynomial
f(z) of degree m over F2. Polynomial basis is in many cases referred to as canonical
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Binary finite field Reduction polynomial
F2163 f(z) = z
163 + z7 + z6 + z3 + 1
F2233 f(z) = z
233 + z74 + 1
F2283 f(z) = z
283 + z12 + z7 + z5 + 1
F2409 f(z) = z
409 + z87 + 1
F2571 f(z) = z
571 + z10 + z5 + z2 + 1
Table 2.1: NIST-recommended binary finite fields and their reduction polynomials
or standard basis. For U.S. Federal Government usages, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) has recommended five binary fields along with
their corresponding reduction polynomials (see Table 2.1 [32]). It is important to
note two aspects of these polynomials. First, these polynomials are trinomial or
pentanomial. Second, the degree of the second leading term is a small number in
comparison with the extension degree of the binary field (i.e., m). Both aspects are
important in terms of efficiency of finite field operations.
Binary finite fields are very attractive to implementers due to their “carry-
free” arithmetic, and the availability of different representations of the field (i.e.,
basis and/or polynomial selection) which can be suited to and optimized for the
computational environment [11]. Some cryptographic applications, such as elliptic
curve cryptosystems, permit the use of either a prime field Fp or a binary finite
field F2m . For hardware implementation, in order to reduce the complexity of the
design, a binary finite field may be selected [1] [78].
Solving quadratic equations over F2m
Solving second-degree equations over F2m has a number of applications in ECC.
For example, to obtain the value(s) of y ∈ F2m that might satisfy an elliptic curve
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equation from a given x ∈ F2m . Also, it plays a crucial step in the context of
ECSM utilizing point halving [49]. In this thesis, some results from this subsection
are used in Chapters 3 and 5. For more details on this topic the reader is referred
to [8] and [18].
First, let us define two functions that are important for solving quadratic equa-
tions over the binary field, the trace and half-trace functions:








Definition 2.7 Let m be an odd integer. The half-trace function of an element







The trace and the half-trace functions are linear, i.e., Tr(α+β) = Tr(α)+Tr(β)
and Ht(α + β) = Ht(α) + Ht(β), for all α, β ∈ F2m . Also it can be shown that
Tr(β) = Tr(β2) = Tr2(β), Ht(β2) = Ht2(β), and Ht(β2) + Ht(β) = Tr(β) + β, for
all β ∈ F2m .
Let us solve an equation over F2m of the form M
2 + uM + v = 0. First consider





for u 6= 0, we can perform a change of variables M ←Mu that yields the following
simplified equation
M2 + M + w = 0, where w = v/u2. (2.1)
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Theorem 2.3 Let m be an odd integer. Equation (2.1) has a solution over F2m if
and only if Tr(w) = 0. In such a case one solution corresponds to z = Ht(w) and
the other to Ht(w) + 1.
Proof Let z be a solution of Equation (2.1). Obtaining the trace function of this
equation, we have
Tr(z2 + z + w) = Tr(z2) + Tr(z) + Tr(w) = 0.
This will be valid if and only if Tr(w) = 0. To show that z = Ht(w) is a solution
we can obtain that
z2 + z = Ht2(w) + Ht(w) = w + Tr(w),
in which case z is a solution as claimed. It can be easily verified that Ht(w)+1 also
satisfies Equation (2.1).
2.2 Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)
Definition 2.8 Let Fq be a finite field. An elliptic curve E over Fq is formed by
the points (x, y) that satisfy the following equation:
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x + a6, ai ∈ Fq. (2.2)
Equation (2.2) is referred to as the affine form of the Weierstrass equation. The
resulting set of points, plus an additive identity defined as the point at infinity
(O), together with a particular operation, denoted as point addition (]), form an
abelian group.
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Definition 2.9 Two elliptic curves are isomorphic over Fq if they have defining
equations which are the same under some admissible changes of variables.
2.2.1 Non-supersingular elliptic curves of characteristic two
From Equation (2.2) we can perform the following change of variables:
x = a21x1 +
a3
a1






with a1 6= 0 the resulting relationship is






where a′2 and a
′
6 are appropriate functions of a1, a2, a3, a4, and a6. Now we can write
a simplified affine Weierstrass equation for binary finite fields for non-supersingular
elliptic curves as follows,
y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b. (2.3)
Theorem 2.4 Let E and E be non-supersingular elliptic curves defined over F2m .
E and E given by the equations
E : y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b
E : y2 + xy = x3 + āx2 + b̄
are isomorphic over F2m if and only if Tr(a) = Tr(ā) and b = b̄. If the last conditions
are met, then there is an admissible change of variables (x, y) → (x, y + tx) that
converts E into E for some t ∈ F∗2m that satisfies ā = t2 + t + a.
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2.2.2 Elliptic curves of characteristic p > 3




























which can be rewritten as
y21 = x
3 + a′2x
2 + a′4x + a
′
6,









6 are appropriate functions of a1, a2, a3,







1 + ax1 + b,
for some constants a and b. Now we can write a simplified affine Weierstrass
equation for prime finite fields (p > 3) as follows,
y2 = x3 + ax + b, (2.4)
where a, b ∈ Fp, and 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0 (mod p).
2.2.3 Group law
Let P and Q be any two distinct points on E, which is defined by either Equation
(2.3) or (2.4). The rules for point addition are given as follows:
1. The point O is used as the identity element. For any point P , P ] O = P
and O ] P = P .
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(x, x + y) if E is defined over F2m ,
(x,−y) if E is defined over Fp.
3. Let P = (x1, y1) 6= O and Q = (x2, y2) 6= O, where P 6= ±Q. The point































(x1 − x3)− y1 if E is defined over Fp.
4. Let P = (x1, y1) 6= O and P 6= −P . The point doubling, R = P ] P = 2P =





































(x1 − x3)− y1 if E is defined over Fp.
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2.2.4 Group order and structure
Definition 2.10 The order of an elliptic curve E defined over Fq, denoted as
#E(Fq), is defined as the number of points in E(Fq).
Definition 2.11 The order of a point P ∈ E(Fq), denoted as ord(P ), is the small-
est positive integer e such that eP = O.
Using a result of Lagrange’s theorem from group theory [89], we can affirm that
the order of any point always divides the order of the group. As a result, if #E(Fq)
is prime, then the order of any point is #E(Fq) and it can be used as a generator.
For cryptographic applications, the order of a selected point P should be divisible
by a sufficiently large prime [42].
In order to learn more about the structure of the group E(Fq), it is important
to know the value of #E(Fq). The next well-known theorem gives us a bound for
this parameter.
Theorem 2.5 (Hasse’s Theorem). Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fq.
Then
#E(Fq) = q + 1− t, where |t| ≤ 2
√
q.
The exact value of #E(Fq) can be efficiently obtained using some point counting
algorithms such as the Schoof-Elkies-Atkin algorithm [11] for curves over prime
fields, or the Satoh-Skjernaa-Taguchi algorithm [77] for curves over the binary field.
Let Zn be a cyclic group of order n. The following theorem is about the group
structure of E(Fq).
Theorem 2.6 (Rück Theorem [75]). Let E be an elliptic curve over Fq. Then
E(Fq) is isomorphic to Zn1 × Zn2 where n2|n1 and n2|(q − 1).
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E over Coordinate system Points Correspondence
Affine (A) (x, y)
F2m Standard projective (P) (X,Y,Z) (X/Z, Y/Z)
(non-super- López and Dahab (LD) (X,Y,Z) (X/Z, Y/Z2)
singular) Jacobian (J ) (X,Y,Z) (X/Z2, Y/Z3)
Affine (A) (x, y)
Fp Standard projective (P) (X,Y,Z) (X/Z, Y/Z)
(p > 3) Jacobian (J ) (X,Y,Z) (X/Z2, Y/Z3)
Chudnovsky Jacobian (J c) (X,Y,Z, Z2, Z3) (X/Z2, Y/Z3)
Table 2.2: Examples of coordinate systems
Based on Theorem 2.6, E(Fq) can be either a cyclic group or the direct sum of
two cyclic groups. With #E(Fq) = n1n2, if n2 = 1, then E(Fq) is a cyclic group. If
n2 > 1, then E(Fq) is said to have rank 2 [40].
2.2.5 Coordinate systems
The elliptic curves obtained from Equations (2.3) and (2.4) with their respective
point addition rules are for affine coordinates (i.e., (x, y)). In order to reduce
computational cost, a number of projective coordinate systems (i.e., (X,Y, Z))
have been suggested in the literature. In Table 2.2 some of these systems with their
correspondence with the affine system are presented.
For each coordinate system, the total number of field operations is different
resulting in different time cost for elliptic curve point addition and doubling. Pre-
viously in Subsection 2.2.3, the EC group law using affine coordinates has been
given. Using relations between some other systems with the affine, it is possible to
obtain the point addition and doubling equations for those systems.
Standard projective (P) [64], Jacobian (J ) [42], Chudnovsky Jacobian (J c)
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[19], and López and Dahab’s (LD) [57] coordinate systems avoid the necessity to
compute one multiplicative inverse in each point operation. This is achieved at
the expense of more multiplications and storage space. The decision regarding
whether to use affine coordinate system or other is based primarily on implemen-
tation aspects such as the availability of memory for storing temporary values and
the relative performance of the field inversion and multiplication algorithms used
to implement the EC group operations. Table 2.3 shows the number of finite field
operations needed to perform point addition and doubling for each system [40] [22].
The symbols M , S, and I denote, respectively, the cost of finite field multiplication,
squaring, and inversion. These symbols are used for the remainder of this thesis.
2.3 Elliptic curve scalar multiplication (ECSM)
Definition 2.12 Let k be a positive integer and P be a point in E(Fq), then the
elliptic curve scalar multiplication (ECSM) is given as follows,
kP = P ] P ] · · · ] P︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
.
To carry out ECSM, it is necessary to perform point doublings and additions.
As described above in the EC group law, such operations require some finite field
arithmetic (i.e., multiplication, addition, squaring, and multiplicative inverse). The
dependency of ECSM on EC point doubling is explained below.
Let (kt−1 · · · k1 k0)2 be the t-bit binary representation of k. The scalar multipli-
cation kP can be computed as follows,









E over Point addition Point doubling
A+A → A 2M+1S+1I 2A → A 2M+1S+1I
P + P → P 13M + 1S 2P → P 7M + 5S
F2m LD+LD→LD 14M + 4S 2LD → LD 4M + 5S
(non-super- J + J → J 14M + 4S 2J → J 5M + 5S
singular) P +A → P 12M + 2S
LD +A → LD 8M + 5S
J +A → J 11M + 3S
A+A → A 2M+1S+1I 2A → A 2M+2S+1I
P + P → P 12M + 2S 2P → P 7M + 3S
Fp J + J → J 12M + 4S 2J → J 4M + 4S
(p > 3) J c+J c → J c 11M + 3S 2J c → J c 5M + 4S
J +A → J 8M + 3S
J + J c → J 11M + 3S
J c+A → J c 7M + 3S












] · · · ] (k12P ) ] (k0P ) . (2.5)
By factoring out 2 we obtain,
Q = 2 ((kt−12
t−2P ) ] (kt−22t−3P ) ] · · · ] (k1P )) ] (k0P ) .
Now we can repeat this operation until we have
Q = 2(2(· · · 2 (2 (kt−1P ) ] kt−2P ) ] · · · ) ] k1P ) ] k0P. (2.6)
The operations in Equations (2.5) and (2.6) can be performed utilizing the well-
known double-and-add method. To that end, Algorithm 2.1 implements the opera-
tions of Equation (2.6). This algorithm scans bits of scalar k from left to right (i.e.,
from the most significant bit to the least significant bit), one bit at a time. In every
2.3. Elliptic curve scalar multiplication (ECSM) 23
iteration, a point doubling is performed. Additionally, depending on the scanned
bit value, a point addition is performed. On the other hand, the right-to-left coun-
terpart of Algorithm 2.1 is illustrated as Algorithm 2.2. The operations in this
algorithm are performed corresponding to Equation (2.5). These algorithms use a
method that is commonly referred to as binary method [22]. The expected number
of point operations performed in Algorithms 2.1 and 2.2 is t point doublings and
t/2 point additions on average.
Algorithm 2.1. Left-to-right ECSM by
double-and-add
Input: P ∈ E(Fq), k = (kt−1 · · · k1 k0)2.
Output: Q = kP .
1. Q← O.
2. For i = t− 1 downto 0 do
2.1 Q← 2Q.
2.2 If (ki = 1) then
2.2.1 Q← Q ] P .
3. Return(Q).
Algorithm 2.2. Right-to-left ECSM by
double-and-add
Input: P ∈ E(Fq), k = (kt−1 · · · k1 k0)2.
Output: Q = kP .
1. Q← O.
2. For i = 0 to t− 1 do
2.1 If (ki = 1) then
2.1.1 Q← Q ] P .
2.2 P ← 2P .
3. Return(Q).
For ECC applications that use a projective coordinate system for point repre-
sentation, Algorithm 2.1 is usually preferred over Algorithm 2.2. The main reason
is that the point addition required in Algorithm 2.1 uses a fixed operand (i.e., P ).
This aspect permits the use of mixed coordinates for point addition, i.e., one point
to be added is given in some projective coordinate system, and point P in the affine
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system. As illustrated in Table 2.3, the use of mixed coordinates saves some finite
field multiplications.
Coron [23] has shown that algorithms with a non-homogeneous operation flow,
such as Algorithms 2.1 and 2.2, are vulnerable to a simple power analysis (SPA)
attack. As a countermeasure he proposed a method called double-and-add-always.
The idea is to add a dummy point addition operation whenever the bit scalar is
equal to zero during the main loop. The corresponding method is presented in
Algorithms 2.3 and 2.4 for the left-to-right and right-to-left versions, respectively.
The included dummy operation permits to have a uniform execution flow, i.e., one
point addition and one point doubling are executed in every iteration during the
loop. As a result, there is a performance penalty since the required point operations
are t doublings and t additions. Moreover, Yen and Joye [91] have observed that
algorithms with dummy operations might be susceptible to a special fault attack
Algorithm 2.3. Left-to-right ECSM by
double-and-add-always
Input: P ∈ E(Fq), k = (kt−1 · · · k1 k0)2.
Output: Q = kP .
1. Q0 ← O.
2. For i = t− 1 downto 0 do
2.1 Q0 ← 2Q0.
2.2 Q1 ← Q0 ] P .
2.3 Q0 ← Qki .
3. Return(Q0).
Algorithm 2.4. Right-to-left ECSM by
double-and-add-always
Input: P ∈ E(Fq), k = (kt−1 · · · k1 k0)2.
Output: Q = kP .
1. Q0 ← O.
2. For i = 0 to t− 1 do
2.1 Q1 ← Q0 ] P.
2.2 P ← 2P .
2.3 Q0 ← Qki .
3. Return(Q0).
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called safe-error (SE) attack. This is an example that in some cases a countermea-
sure against one attack may benefit another attack.
2.3.1 Montgomery’s ECSM method
Montgomery [68] presented a method to compute multiples of points for a special
type of elliptic curve over prime fields. His technique has been generalized to other
curves of cryptographic interests [58] [69] [17]. Utilizing a variant of the binary
method known as binary ladder [24], Montgomery’s idea is based on the fact that
the addition of two points can be obtained without the y-coordinates of such points
knowing the difference between them.

















We can write expressions for Li and Mi as follows,
Li = 2Li+1 + ki = Li+1 + Mi+1 + ki − 1,
Mi = 2Mi+1 + ki − 1 = Li+1 + Mi+1 + ki.





(2Li+1, Li+1 + Mi+1) if ki = 0,
(Li+1 + Mi+1, 2Mi+1) if ki = 1.
(2.7)
2Joye and Yen described this idea in the context of modular exponentiation.
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Now, let Q0,i = LiP and Q1,i = MiP be points for i ∈ {0, t−1}. Utilizing Equation





(2Q0,i+1, Q0,i+1 ]Q1,i+1) if ki = 0,
(Q0,i+1 ]Q1,i+1, 2Q1,i+1) if ki = 1.
(2.8)
Note that if Lt−1 = 1 and Mt−1 = 2 (i.e., Q0,t−1 = P and Q1,t−1 = 2P ), and we use
Equation (2.8) repeatedly for i from t− 2 to 0, then Q0,0 and Q1,0 will be kP and
(k + 1)P , respectively. The complete procedure that uses this idea is presented as
Algorithm 2.5. This algorithm is referred to as basic Montgomery’s ladder ECSM.
Let us use the word “basic” to distinguish this algorithm among others that do not
utilize the y-coordinate of the intermediate points Q0 and Q1 during the ECSM
computation.
Algorithm 2.5. Basic Montgomery’s ladder ECSM
Input: P ∈ E(Fq), k = (kt−1 · · · k1 k0)2 with kt−1 = 1.
Output: Q = kP .
1. Q0 ← P , Q1 ← 2P.
2. For i = t− 2 downto 0 do
2.1 If (ki = 0) then
2.1.1 Q1 ← Q0 ]Q1, Q0 ← 2Q0;
2.2 Else
2.2.1 Q0 ← Q0 ]Q1, Q1 ← 2Q1.
3. Return(Q0).
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This algorithm keeps the difference between Q1 and Q0 equal to P at any value of
i during the loop. Also, one point doubling and one point addition are performed in
every iteration which make this algorithm attractive against attacks such as timing
[52] and SPA [53]. Additionally, since it does not have dummy instructions, the SE
fault attack does not apply. Furthermore, due to the usage of all point coordinates,
it is possible to have an improved error detection using coherency check among
involved variables. We discuss this in Chapter 5.
An extension of the ECSM Montgomery idea for non-supersingular elliptic
curves over the binary finite field was presented by López and Dahab [58]. They
showed algorithms for both affine and projective coordinate systems. Let us present
some resulting expressions from lemmas given by López and Dahab [58]. Let
P0 = (x0, y0) and P1 = (x1, y1) be points that belong to the elliptic curve defined
by Equation (2.3). The x-coordinate of P0 ] P1, x2, can be obtained as follows:
x2 =







Suppose that P = (x, y) is the difference between P1 and P0, i.e., P1 − P0 = P .
If P is known, then the x-coordinate of P0 ] P1 can be obtained by the following
function:
















if P0 6= P1.
(2.10)
Additionally the y-coordinate of P0, y0, can be obtained from P = (x, y), and the
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x-coordinates of P0 and P1 (i.e., x0 and x1, respectively) as follows:
y0 =




Based on Algorithm 2.5 and Equations (2.10) and (2.11), Algorithm 2.6 implements
the affine version of Montgomery’s ECSM. During each interaction of the algorithm,
a point doubling and a point addition are performed without y-coordinate. This is
possible due to the difference of the two intermediate points, namely Q0 and Q1,
being known (i.e., = P ). After the final interaction the x-coordinates of Q0 = Q =
kP and Q1 = (k + 1)P are obtained, i.e., Q0x and Q1x . Using these values and P ,
the y-coordinate of the result is computed in Step 3. Note that in Algorithm 2.6
x(·) corresponds to the x-coordinate of the point given in the argument.
Algorithm 2.6. Montgomery’s ladder ECSM in affine coordinates
Input: P = (x, y) ∈ E(F2m), k = (kt−1 · · · k1 k0)2 with kt−1 = 1.
Output: Q = kP .
1. Q0x ← x, Q1x ← x(2P ).
2. For i = t− 2 downto 0 do
2.1 If (ki = 0) then
2.1.1 Q1x ← x(Q0 ]Q1), Q0x ← x(2Q0);
2.2 Else
2.2.1 Q0x ← x(Q0 ]Q1), Q1x ← x(2Q1).
3. Q0y = (Q0x + x) [(Q0x + x)(Q1x + x) + x
2 + y] /x + y.
4. Return(Q0x , Q0y).
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In Algorithm 2.6 the intermediate points and their related operations are in
the affine coordinate system. In applications where the multiplicative inverse is
relatively expensive, it might be more attractive to use a projective coordinate
system. To this end, López and Dahab [58] presented the projective version of
Algorithm 2.6. This particular algorithm represents an attractive option because
it gives a computational advantage over other algorithms that do not use pre-
computation such as that the binary [64] and addition-subtraction [42] methods.
Let P0 = (X0, Y0, Z0) and P1 = (X1, Y1, Z1) be points represented in the López
and Dahab projective coordinates system. Suppose that P = (x, y) is the difference
in affine coordinates between P1 and P0. Then, the Z- and X-coordinates of the
point doubling and addition can be obtained by the following functions:






0 if P0 = P1,
(X0Z1 + X1Z0)
2 if P0 6= P1.
(2.12)






0 if P0 = P1,
xZ2 + X0X1Z0Z1 if P0 6= P1.
(2.13)
Using these group formulas, it is possible to have an efficient algorithm to com-
pute the ECSM. Algorithm 2.7 presents the resulting method, where X(·) and Z(·)
correspond to the X- and Z-coordinate, respectively, of the point given in the
arguments. Similar to the algorithm of the affine system, point operations are per-
formed without Y -coordinates since the difference between Q1 and Q0 is known.
Here, after the last interaction the X- and Z-coordinates of Q0 = Q = kP and
Q1 = (k + 1)P are obtained, i.e., Q0X , Q0Z , Q1X , and Q1Z . Using these values, the
affine representation of Q = (x2, y2) is computed in Steps 5.1-5.3. In comparison
with Algorithm 2.5, not handling the Y -coordinates helps to have fewer memory
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requirements and a faster method since some finite field multiplications are saved.
Algorithm 2.7. Montgomery’s ladder ECSM in projective coordinates
Input: P = (x, y) ∈ E(F2m), k = (kt−1 · · · k1 k0)2 with kt−1 = 1.
Output: Q = kP .
1. Q0X ← x, Q0Z ← 1, Q1X ← X(2P ), Q1Z ← Z(2P ).
2. For i = t− 2 downto 0 do
2.1 If (ki = 0) then
2.1.1 T ← Z(Q0 ]Q1), Q1X ← X(Q0 ]Q1), Q1Z ← T ,
2.1.2 T ← X(2Q0), Q0Z ← Z(2Q0), Q0X ← T ;
2.2 Else
2.2.1 T ← Z(Q0 ]Q1), Q0X ← X(Q0 ]Q1), Q0Z ← T ,
2.2.2 T ← X(2Q1), Q1Z ← Z(2Q1), Q1X ← T .
3. If (Q1Z = 0) then return(O);
4. Else if (Q0Z = 0) then return(x, x + y);
5. Else
5.1 T ← 1/(xQ0ZQ1Z ),
5.2 x2 ← xQ0XQ1ZT ,
5.3 y2 ← (x + x2) [(x2 + y)Q0ZQ1Z + (Q0X + xQ0Z )(Q1X + xQ1Z )] T + y,
5.4 Return(x2, y2).
2.3.2 Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP)
The ECSM is the base operation used for ECC. In fact, the elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem (ECDLP) is based on the difficulty of obtaining k given P and
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Q(= kP ) for some integer k and P , Q ∈ E(Fq). This principle has led to schemes
equivalent to DLP-based cryptosystems, such as: Diffie-Hellman key exchange [25],
ElGamal public key encryption [30], ElGamal digital signatures [30], and DSA [33].
In practice for the ECDLP to be intractable, it is important to select appropriate
domain parameters such as the finite field Fq where the curve E is defined, the curve
E itself, and the base point P . When the order n of the base point P is a large prime,
the fastest known algorithms to solve the ECDLP, namely the baby-step giant-step
[82] and the Pollard’s rho [73] algorithms, need O(
√
n) steps. Consequently, for
security purposes it is necessary that the size of the underlying finite field be at
least the double of the security level in bits. Security level of L bits is referred to
as the best algorithm for breaking the system that takes approximately 2L steps
[40]. For example, for achieving an 80-bit security level, the cryptosystem would
require an elliptic curve defined over a finite field Fq, where q ≈ 2160. With respect
to the selection of the elliptic curve E, some types of curves should be avoided for
cryptographic applications since the ECDLP can be reduced. These curves include
supersingular curves [65], anomalous curves [76] [80], and curves over F2m for some
non-prime values of m [34] [36] [61].
If the order of the base point P does not contain at least a large prime fac-
tor, then it is possible to use an extension for ECC of the Silver-Pohlig-Hellman
algorithm [72] to solve the ECDLP as presented in Algorithm 2.8. This algorithm
reduces the problem to subgroups of prime order. Let n be the order of the base




i , where pi < pi+1. Suppose that
Q = lP , where P, Q ∈ E(Fq) and l ∈ [0, n− 1]. This algorithm obtains during the
outer loop, the value of l mod pi
ei for each 0 ≤ i ≤ j − 1. With these values l mod n
can be uniquely computed using the CRT. It is important to note that at Step
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1.3.2 one EC discrete logarithm needs to be computed. However, this operation
is in a subgroup at the most of order pj−1. It can be performed with the fastest
known algorithms for ECDLP such as the Pollard’s rho algorithm with an expected
running time of O(
√
pm), where pm is the largest prime divisor of ord(Pi).
Algorithm 2.8. Silver-Pohlig-Hellman’s algorithm for solving the ECDLP




i , where pi < pi+1.
Output: l mod n.
1. For i = 0 to j − 1 do
1.1 Q′ ← O, li ← 0.
1.2 Pi ← (n/pi)P.
1.3 For t = 0 to (ei − 1) do
1.3.1 Qt,i ← (n/pt+1i )(Q ]Q′).
1.3.2 Wt,i ← logPi Qt,i. {ECDLP in a subgroup of order ord(Pi).}
1.3.3 Q′ ← Q′ −Wt,iptP.
1.3.4 li ← li + ptWt,i.
2. Use the CRT to solve the system of congruences l ≡ li (mod piei). This gives
us l mod n.
3. Return(l).
Example 2.2 Let E be the curve y2 + xy = x3 + 1 over the field F211 given by the
polynomial f(z) = z11+z2+1. Let us represent the elements of F211 in hexadecimal
form. Consider the point P = (0x10F,0x27A) whose order is n = 92 = 22 · 23. Let
Q = (0x1FB,0x2C6). We can use Algorithm 2.8 to obtain l = logP Q as follows:
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• During the first loop for i = 0 we can obtain l0 = l mod 22. We can find that
l0 = W0,0 + 2W2,0 = 1 + 2 · 0 = 1.
• For the second loop for i = 1 we determine l1 = l mod 23. It can be shown
that l1 = W1,0 = 18.
• Finally we have the following pair of congruences: l mod 4 = 1 and l mod 23 =
18. Solving using the CRT we have l = 41.
To resist the Silver-Pohlig-Hellman attack one can simply select an elliptic curve
E such that its group order, #E(F2m), is prime or almost prime, i.e., #E(F2m) =
hn, where n is a prime and h is small [40] (e.g., h ∈ [1, 4]). However, in Chapter
3 we will show how Algorithm 2.8 could be useful under an invalid-curve attack to
the ECSM algorithm based on Montgomery’s ladder.
2.4 ECC fault-based attacks
In 1996 fault analysis attack was introduced by Boneh et al. [15]. This attack is also
known as Bellcore and is based on fault injection in a device performing an RSA
or Rabin digital signature. Biehl et al. [9] proposed the first fault-based attack on
ECC. Their basic idea is to force, through a fault, a computation in a weaker group
where solving the ECDLP is feasible. They consider that the attacker can either
select or modify the input point P ∈ E(Fq) of the ECSM (i.e., P ← P̃ , P̃ ∈ Ẽ(Fq)).
A basic assumption for this attack is that the parameter a6 from Equation (2.2)
is not involved for point operations formulas. In this way, the computation could
be performed in a cryptographically less secure elliptic curve Ẽ(a1, a2, a3, a4,, ã6),
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which differs from the original elliptic curve E(a1, a2, a3, a4, a6) only in the curve
parameter a6. The relation between ã6 and P̃ = (x̃, ỹ) can be obtained from
Equation (2.2) as follows:
ã6 = ỹ
2 + a1x̃ỹ + a3ỹ − x̃3 − a2x̃2 − a4x̃. (2.14)
If the attacker can choose P̃ , then ã6 could be selected in a such way that the order
of Ẽ(Fq), #Ẽ(Fq), has small enough prime factors for solving the ECDLP in such
a group. For a given ã6, the point P̃ can be chosen by selecting values of x̃ and ỹ
that satisfy Equation (2.14). Let r be the order of P̃ , i.e., r = ord(P̃ ). Since the
computation is performed in Ẽ(Fq) instead of E(Fq), each ECSM computation with
P̃ can supply the value k mod r from kP̃ . Repeating this procedure with sufficiently
different chosen points P̃i could give us a unique solution for k using the CRT. The
same idea can be applied to the short versions of the Weierstrass equation (i.e.,
Equations (2.3) and (2.4)). If the curve operations do not consider parameter b,
then this attack can be mounted by selecting a point on a weaker curve Ẽ(a, b̃),
which differs from the original elliptic curve E(a, b) only in parameter b.
Ciet and Joye [21] have shown how to recover the secret key k by having an
unknown but fixed faulty input point P̃ . This is a more realistic scheme because,
excluding EC ElGamal encryption, in most EC cryptosystems the point P is prede-
termined and might be fixed. The attacker cannot select this point which is usually
stored in the memory of a device. Their fault model considers that only one coordi-
nate x or y is faulty. If it is assumed that the x-coordinate of a point P = (x, y) is
altered, the resultant point will be P̃ = (x̃, y). The scalar multiplication algorithm
computes Q̃ = kP̃ . The faulty result Q̃ = k(x̃, y) = (x̃k, ỹk), is over Ẽ(Fq) on which
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k + a1x̃kỹk + a3ỹk − x̃3k − a2x̃2k − a4x̃k.
Using Equation (2.2) for Ẽ we obtain
Ẽ : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x + ã6. (2.15)
Since P̃ ∈ Ẽ(Fq), it needs to follow Equation (2.15). Substituting its coordinates
(x̃, y) and grouping the terms with x̃ we have the following expression
x̃3 + a2x̃
2 + (a4 − a1y)x̃ + (ã6 − y2 − a3y) = 0.
By solving the above equation for x̃, we can have up to three different roots, where
one is the fault generated x-coordinate. If the point P is known (usually this
parameter is public), x̃ can be distinguished easily since it will differ from x just
for the faulty bits. Having P̃ and Q̃, the procedure described by Biehl et al. [9]
for obtaining k can be followed. Additionally, the authors consider other attacks
where the underlying finite field or the elliptic curve parameters are disturbed
by a fault. They assume that it is possible to inject a transient fault into these
parameters. For example, in a smart card system parameters are usually stored
in non-volatile memory (e.g., EEPROM) and they are transferred into RAM for
executing a specific algorithm. It is possible to induce an error in such data before
or during this transfer.
Antipa et al. [6] state the importance of checking whether the received point for
any EC key agreement and public-key encryption protocols are on the proper elliptic
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curve. Specifically, they show the vulnerability under this scenario of the one-pass
EC Diffie-Hellman protocol, the EC integrated encryption scheme (ECIES), the
one-pass ECMQV protocol and the EC digital signature algorithm. Some of these
protocols or algorithms are defined in standards such as ANSI X9.62, ANSI X9.63,
IEEE 1363-2000, ISO/IEC 15946-3, FIPS 186-2, and ISO 15946-2. They mention
the significance for implementers of taking into account point verification, even
when some standards do not mandate that. A possible countermeasure considered
by Antipa et al. [6] is to use other formulas for the addition law that use both
elliptic curve parameters, a and b. In fact, some standards such as IEEE 1363
[42] include group formulas for curves over F2m that involve both parameters (i.e.,
point doubling formula uses b while point addition uses a). In this scenario, the
invalid-curve attacks described by Biehl et al. [9] and Ciet and Joye [21] might not
constitute a threat.
It is important to note that the invalid-curve attacks presented by Biehl et
al. [9] and Ciet and Joye [21] apply to applications where parameter b is not used
for the group formulas. However for Algorithms 2.6 and 2.7, it is not the case since
parameter b is utilized. In Chapter 3 we present an attack that takes advantage of
parameter a not being used in these algorithms.
Biehl et al. [9], in addition to the invalid-curve attack, proposed an ECC dif-
ferential fault analysis (DFA) attack. Their work was an extension of the attack
presented by Boneh et al. [15] for RSA cryptosystems. They assume that the
adversary knows the details of the implementation, such as the parameters, the
utilized algorithm, and the representation of internal variables. They consider that
the attacker can precisely flip a bit in a register that holds a partial result during
the ECSM operation. They also assume that the attacker can determine that the
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fault was induced v iterations before the ECSM computation finished. Consider
a left-to-right algorithm where the scalar bits are processed from i = t − 1 to 0
(e.g., Algorithm 2.1). If v is small enough for doing an exhaustive search, then the
attacker can obtain the v least significant bits as follows:
1. Compute the normal ECSM, i.e., Q = kP .
2. Repeat the operation inducing a single bit-flip fault into a variable that holds
a partial result (e.g., Step 2.1 of Algorithm 2.1) at i = v − 1 to obtain Q̃.
3. For all v-bit integers d compute Q− dP and Q̃− dP.
4. Look for pairs of results that differ only in one bit. Biehl et al. [9] show that
the probability that more than one pair satisfies this condition is low. If only
one pair exists, then they are the original and the faulty intermediate results,
respectively. The associated value of d gives the v least significant bits of k.
The full value of k can be recovered by repeating Steps 1-4 for different (and
ascending) values of v and utilizing the known bits of the scalar.
One countermeasure against the attacks presented by Biehl et al. [9], Ciet and
Joye [21], and Antipa et al. [6] is to verify whether or not the output point lies on
the original elliptic curve. This process is often called point verification (PV). This
basic countermeasure is not sufficient for all cases. Blömer et al. [14] presented an
ECC fault-based attack called sign change fault (SCF) attack in which PV is not a
sufficient protection. This attack is based on changing the sign of an intermediate
point during the ECSM. It is important to note that this attack only applies to
cryptosystems that use elliptic curves over prime fields where the change of a point
involves only a change of the sign of the y-coordinate.
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An interesting aspect of the SCF attack is that the elliptic curve operations do
not leave the original group E(Fp) in contrast with those attacks described by Biehl
et al. [9], Ciet and Joye [21], and Antipa et al. [6]. Blömer et al. assume that the
attacker can induce a fault that produces a sign change into an intermediate point
Q′, such that Q′ ← −Q′ during the ECSM operation. They show the applicability
of this attack for applications utilizing conventional crypto co-processors. The SCF
attack can be mounted in some ECSM algorithms such as the non-adjacent form
(NAF) based ECSM by double-and-add (e.g., Algorithm 1 of [14]). In this case
the attacker needs to induce a SCF in the point Q′ during the execution of specific
steps (e.g., Steps 3 and 4 of Algorithm 1 of [14]). The error can be induced for
some unknown values of i during the loop. They show that having a number of
c = (t/m) log(2t) attacks on the same input pair (k, P ) and the correct result Q,
it is possible to recover the scalar k with a probability of at least 1/2, where t
is the length of NAF(k) and m is a parameter related with the amount of offline
work. Otto [70] has extended the SCF attack to other algorithms such that the
ECSM by double-and-add (Algorithm 2.1) and the basic Montgomery ladder ECSM
(Algorithm 2.5).
A straightforward countermeasure against an SCF attack is to use a version
of Montgomery’s ladder algorithm that does not use the y-coordinate for comput-
ing ECSM (e.g., [17]). Another countermeasure presented by Blömer et al. uses
a second elliptic curve whose order is a small prime number. This curve is uti-
lized to define a named “combined curve” that is used to verify the final result
to avoid this SCF attack. One disadvantage of this approach is that elliptic curve
crypto-processors might have fixed parameters (e.g., those recommended by NIST).
Hence, it might not be possible to redefine the curve parameters for having such
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a countermeasure. In Chapter 4 we present some structures that permit detection
of errors in ECSM without modifying the curve parameters. These are based on
re-computation and parallel computation. In Chapter 5, we present an algorithm-
level countermeasure against this attack that utilizes coherency check among the
involved variables.
Another fault-based attack that has received considerable attention is the safe
error (SE) attack proposed separately by Yen and Joye [91] and Yen et al. [92].
Even when the idea behind both attacks is in essence the same (i.e., attack during
dummy operations), the most important difference between them is their fault
models. Yen and Joye [91] assume that the attacker can modify the value of some
operand(s) stored in a register (i.e., memory-safe error). On the other hand, Yen
et al. [92] consider that the adversary can damage the computed result of some
operation (i.e., computational-safe error). In both cases algorithms with dummy
instructions can be a potential target (e.g., Algorithms 2.3 and 2.4).
These attacks were originally presented in the context of RSA signature gen-
eration. However, they can generally be extended to ECSM. For example, let us
consider the right-to-left ECSM by double-and-add-always algorithm (Algorithm
2.4). Assume that the attacker, during the main loop at i = l, can modify the
value of Q1 just after the computation of Step 2.1. If the scalar bit kl is 0, there is
a dummy instruction at Step 2.3 (i.e., Q0 ← Q0) that will not be affected for the
faulty value of Q1. In the next round, Q1 will be overwritten when Q1 = Q0 ] P
is computed. Accordingly, the final result will be correct even when a SE fault was
injected. In contrast, if kl = 1, the value of Q0 will be infected by Q1 at Step 2.3
(i.e., Q0 ← Q1). This is likely to produce an incorrect result. This scenario allows
an oracle attack, i.e., kl = 1 if the final result is faulty and kl = 0 otherwise. The
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last example was for a memory-safe error fault attack. However, it can be easily
extended to a computational-safe attack if the attacker changes the result of the
operation performed in Step 2.1 (Q1 = Q0 ] P ) and follows in similar way the
procedure described above. Note that SE attack depends only on the availability
of injecting a fault during loop iterations where a dummy instruction is computed.
One countermeasure against SE attack is to utilize randomization. In fact,
randomization of the data processed is essential in resisting other attacks such as
SPA and differential power analysis (DPA) attacks [28]. Another way to prevent
the SE attack is to use an algorithm that does not have dummy operations (e.g.,
the Montgomery ladder algorithm). Another countermeasure is to verify, even in
dummy operations, that an error has occurred. This approach will be utilized in
Chapter 5 for detecting errors during the ECSM using coherency check among the
involved variables.
2.5 Error detection strategies
In this section, we give an overview of some techniques that can be used for error
detection in ECSM. First, a method that is specific for applications using elliptic
curves, namely PV process, is described. Next we present general re-computation
and parallel computation schemes that can also be used for detecting errors in
ECSM. Additionally, we describe an error detection technique using coherency
check (CC) among the involved variables that can be utilized for having protec-
tions at the algorithm level.









Figure 2.1: Point verification (PV) module after the ECSM module
2.5.1 Error detection using point verification (PV)
For ECC, PV can be used to detect errors during the ECSM. This is a basic
countermeasure to prevent some fault attacks on ECC and it has been considered
by Biehl et al. [9], Ciet and Joye [21], Antipa et al. [6], Blömer et al. [14], and
Domı́nguez and Hasan [27]. A PV module takes a point Q as its input and checks
whether the point is in E(Fq) (see Figure 2.1). This checking is done simply by
verifying whether the coordinates of Q satisfy the governing elliptic curve equation,
e.g., Equation (2.3) for curves defined over binary fields and represented with affine






ok = 1 if Q ∈ E(Fq),
0 otherwise.
The PV process requires only a few finite field operations, and hence, its imple-
mentation is relatively easy. For example, for curves defined over the binary field
using affine coordinates it takes two finite field multiplications, two squarings, and
three additions3. If implemented in hardware as a separate module, assuming a
3Assume a = 1. If a = 0, one less addition is required. If a /∈ {0, 1}, one more multiplication
is needed.
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pipelined implementation i.e., while the PV module is verifying a current output,
the ECSM module executes the next operation, the finite field multiplier in PV
module could be designed to run at a much slower speed since PV is needed just
once for each scalar multiplication. On the other hand, the multiplier in the ECSM
module is often optimized for speed since its operation is repeated many times. For
instance, the ECSM using Algorithm 2.1 with affine coordinates over F2163 will need
approximately4 489 finite field multiplications, 244 squarings, 1630 additions, and
244 inverses, on average.
Although, PV is an important countermeasure against some ECC fault-based
attacks, this process alone is not sufficient for some cases, let us describe two
examples:
• SCF attack : The SCF attack is based on changing the sign into an targeted
intermediate point during the ECSM operation. Then, the faulty points never
leave the original elliptic curve E and the PV module alone cannot provide
resistance against this attack.
• SE attack : Let us assume that we have a PV module after the ECSM module
as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Consider that the ECSM algorithm uses dummy
instructions for having a uniform execution (e.g., Algorithm 2.4). If an SE
attack is mounted as described in previous section the attacker can perform
a similar oracle attack, i.e., kl = 1 if the final result is not given and kl = 0 if
the correct result is released by the PV module. Consequently, PV does not
provide the sufficient protection.
4Utilizing the addition formulas given by Avanzi et al. [22].
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Since some attacks are not prevented with PV module alone, it is necessary to add
other protections.
2.5.2 Error detection using re-computation and parallel
computation
For applications where the time required for error detection is not critical, it is
possible to compute the result twice (i.e., once at time t0 and then again at time t1)
and then compare the two results to detect a possible error. This technique and its
variants are used in various computing applications (e.g., integer multiplication);
however, to the best of our knowledge there has been no precedence of our extension
of these techniques to ECSM. Under this technique, a transient error occurring in
any one of the two ECSM computations (i.e., at time t0 or t1), but not in both will
be detected. However, if the computation module is permanently in a faulty state,
the errors produced will remain undetected. Because of this, the re-computation
at time t1 is better done with a different method.
A general re-computation based scheme that uses only one computing module is
shown in Figure 2.2. The compute module is multiplexed between the upper and the
lower data paths at time t0 and t1, respectively. The result of the upper data path
is stored in a register. The encoder in the bottom data path of the figure produces a
different set of inputs to the compute module and the decoder transforms the output
of the module back to the original domain for the final comparison. The encoding
and the decoding processes enable us to detect errors caused by a permanent fault in
the compute module. Encoding and decoding can be carried out through a number


























Figure 2.3: General parallel computation based scheme
alternating logic [74], re-compute with shifted operands [71] and re-compute with
swapped operands [45]. In Chapter 4, we provide encoding and decoding processes
that are suitable for ECSM.
Similar to re-computation, where we have one module that performs the compu-
tation twice, we can have two independent modules working in parallel. A general
parallel computation based scheme is given in Figure 2.3, where the register or the
delay unit synchronize the inputs to the comparator.
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2.5.3 Error detection using coherency check (CC)
Consistency or coherency check (CC) process verifies the intermediate or final re-
sults with respect to a valid pattern. In fact, this technique is widely used in
areas such as telecommunications, computers, and media storage. For example,
some computers use address and op-code coherence checking to avoid accessing an
invalid memory register or executing an invalid instruction.
In the context of public key cryptography, this technique has been used for de-
tecting errors during the RSA signature generation. As shown by Boneh et al. [15],
the RSA digital signature scheme using the CRT is particularly vulnerable to fault
attacks, i.e., with only one faulty signature and its corresponding error-free version
it is possible to efficiently factor the modulus used. A natural countermeasure for
this attack is to verify the signature utilizing the public exponent. However, in
some applications this value might not be available. Additionally, if the public
exponent is not small, then the verification could be costly. For these reasons, a
number of countermeasures that include protections inside the modular exponenti-
ation algorithm have been proposed in the literature (e.g., [81], [94], [13], [20], [37],
and [16]5). The countermeasures proposed by Giraud [37] and Boscher et al. [16]
use CC for detecting errors during the modular exponentiation operation. Let us
describe both approaches.
Giraud [37] has shown how the SPA-and-SE resistant algorithm published by
Joye and Yen [47] can be utilized to prevent fault analysis (FA) attacks. This
modular exponentiation algorithm is based on the Montgomery ladder method.
Let N be the product of two large primes. Let (dn−1 · · · d1 d0)2 be the binary
5Many of them have been shown vulnerable when they are analyzed under a different fault
model (e.g., [7], [88], [12], and [48]).
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representation of the exponent d. Consider that the signature S = md mod N
of a message m is computed with Giraud’s FA-resistant modular exponentiation
algorithm (Algorithm 2.9). The basic idea for detecting errors in this algorithm is
based on the fact that the pair (a0, a1) is of the form (m
β,mβ+1) after each iteration
during the loop. If there is an error in either the modular multiplication (Step 2.1)
or the squaring (Step 2.2), then the coherency between a0 and a1 will be lost. In
such a case, since for each iteration the values of a0 and a1 are used for obtaining
the next pair (a0, a1), it is expected that the final pair is not of the form (m
d,md+1).
In this way, a coherency verification step can be included after the main loop to
check if a0 ·m ≡ a1 (mod N). Whether or not the computed signature S is returned
depends on this test.
Recently, Boscher et al. [16] proposed a new FA-resistant modular exponenti-
ation algorithm (Algorithm 2.10). Their idea is very close to Giraud’s one. The
main difference is that they use the square-and-multiply-always method instead
of the Montgomery ladder. This algorithm permits the verification of coherency
among three variables, namely a0, a1, and A. At the end of the loop the expected








In fact, in an error-free computation this relation holds
a0 · a1 ·m = m2n = A.
In this way, errors can be detected at the end of the modular exponentiation if
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the above expression does not hold as illustrated in Step 3 of Algorithm 2.10. In
Chapter 5 we extend some of the concepts utilized by Giraud [37] and Boscher
et al. [16] for detecting errors in ECSM. For example, for the Montgomery ladder
ECSM we investigate the difference in terms of error detection between PV and
CC.
Algorithm 2.9. Giraud’s FA-resistant
modular exponentiation
Input: m 6= 0, d = (dn−1 · · · d1 d0)2, N .
Output: S = md mod N .
1. a0 ← 1, a1 ← m.
2. For i = n− 1 downto 0 do
2.1 adi ← adi · adi mod N.
2.2 adi ← a2di mod N.
3. t← a0 ·m mod N.





Input: m 6= 0, d = (dn−1 · · · d1 d0)2, N .
Output: S = md mod N .
1. a0 ← 1, a1 ← 1, A← m.
2. For i = 0 to n− 1 do
2.1 adi ← adi · A mod N.
2.2 A← A2 mod N.
3. t← a0 · a1 ·m mod N.




In this chapter, we have presented background related to ECC. This includes the
fundamental operation for elliptic curve cryptosystems, i.e., the scalar multiplica-
tion (ECSM). We have given some algorithms that can be utilized for computing
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this operation. Additionally, we have presented an overview of the recent ECC
fault-based attacks. Finally, we have introduced the error detection strategies that




In Section 2.4, we have presented important fault-based attacks reported in the
open literature for ECC. The invalid-curve attacks reported by Biehl et al. [9], and
Ciet and Joye [21] apply only to applications where parameter b is not utilized
for the group formulas. However, this is not the case for the Montgomery ladder
ECSM algorithm proposed by López and Dahab [58] (Algorithms 2.6 and 2.7) where
parameter b is considered specifically for point doubling formulas.
In this chapter, we present fault-based attacks that apply to Montgomery’s
ladder ECSM algorithm. First, we present some preliminary work with examples for
the NIST-recommended curves over the binary field. Next, we present two invalid-
curve based attacks on the target algorithm. Finally, we present some possible
countermeasures to the attacks presented in this chapter.
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3.1 Preliminaries
By Theorem 2.4 we can state that the number of isomorphism classes for elliptic
curves defined by Equation (2.3) is 2m+1− 2. The latter comes from the number of
possible values for parameter b (i.e., 2m − 1) times the possible values of the trace
function of parameter a (i.e., 2). With the last observation, for a fixed value of
parameter b there are only two isomorphic classes of curves, one for each value of
γ ∈ {0, 1}, where Tr(a) = γ. Let us define two representative elliptic curves, E0
and E1, one for each of these isomorphic classes:
E0 : y
2 + xy = x3 + b (a = 0), (3.1)
E1 : y
2 + xy = x3 + x2 + b (a = 1). (3.2)
Lemma 3.1 Let E0 and E1 be two elliptic curves over F2m defined by Equations
(3.1) and (3.2), respectively.
(i) The only points that E0(F2m) and E1(F2m) share are O and (0,
√
b).
(ii) Let (u, v) ∈ Ej(F2m), where u ∈ F∗2m , v ∈ F2m , and j ∈ {0, 1}. Then, there
does not exist any point in Ej(F2m) of the form (u,w) for any w ∈ F2m , where
j = 1− j.
(iii) There exist two points of the form (u, v) and (u, u + v) in either E0(F2m) or
E1(F2m) for each u ∈ F∗2m and some v ∈ F2m .
(iv) The orders of E0(F2m) and E1(F2m) satisfy the following
#E0(F2m) + #E1(F2m) = 2
m+1 + 2. (3.3)
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Proof First, if we solve the quadratic expressions resulting from Equations (3.1)
and (3.2) with x = 0, we obtain a unique solution y =
√
b. For x 6= 0, by Theorem
2.3 Equation (2.3) has a solution for y if and only if






Since the only difference between Equations (3.1) and (3.2) is the value of parameter
a, we can conclude from Equation (3.4) that if any value of x ∈ F∗2m does not have
a solution with a = j, then it does with a = j̄ for j = 0 or 1. Also this equation
shows that it is not possible to have a solution for both E0 and E1 with the same
x 6= 0.
Additionally, by Theorem 2.3 we know that for a given value of x 6= 0 we have
two distinct solutions that represent two elliptic curve points (i.e., a point and its
negative). To this end, for x 6= 0, #E0(F2m) + #E1(F2m) consider exactly 2m+1− 2
points on both curves. In addition, the points O and (0,
√
b) are common and are
counted twice in the sum of both orders, bringing the total up to 2m+1+2 as shown in
Equation (3.3).
Example 3.1 Let us consider F25 as represented by the irreducible polynomial
f(z) = z5 + z2 + 1. Let us represent the elements of F25 in hexadecimal form. Let
E0 and E1 be the curves y
2 + xy = x3 + 1 and y2 + xy = x3 + x2 + 1, respectively,
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(0x1A,0x0B),(0x1B,0x0F),(0x1B,0x14),(0x1C,0x09),(0x1C,0x15),(0x1F,0x06),
(0x1F,0x19),O}.





Example 3.2 Examples for NIST-recommended curves: Let E(a, b) be a NIST-
recommended elliptic curve defined over the binary field F2m with curve parameters
a and b. In Table 3.1 each NIST-recommended randomly chosen elliptic curve over
F2m is presented, where m = 163, 233, 283, 409 and 571. Then, for each of these
curves its corresponding curve Ê(â, b) is shown, where â = 1 − Tr(a). Similarly,
Table 3.2 gives the NIST-recommended Koblitz curves. For each curve the “values”
of m, f(z), a, b, and #E(F2m) are listed, where f(z) is the irreducible trinomial or
pentanomial used as the reduction polynomial. For the random curves, parameter
b is shown in hexadecimal form. For each case the group order #E(F2m) is given
in decimal, followed by its prime factorization.
We notice that for each listed NIST-recommended curve E, the group Ê(F2m) is
cryptographically weaker, i.e., all the prime factors of #Ê(F2m) are smaller than the
larger prime factor of #E(F2m), with only one exception for the case of m = 283 for
Koblitz curves, where the orders of both E(F2m) and Ê(F2m) are almost prime. In
Table 3.3, the size of each prime factor of the group orders of these elliptic curves is
presented. Additionally, it can be shown by Theorem 2.6 that E(F2m) and Ê(F2m),
where m ∈ {163, 233, 283, 409, 571}, are cyclic groups for all the curves in Tables
3.1 and 3.2.
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Example for m = 163: f(z) = z163 + z7 + z6 + z3 + 1,
b = 0x 00000002 0A601907 B8C953CA 1481EB10 512F7874 4A3205FD
Standard Curve B-163. a = 1
#E(F2163) = 11692013098647223345629484885752781378513686403174
= (2)(5846006549323611672814742442876390689256843201587)
Weaker Curve. â = 0
#Ê(F2163) = 11692013098647223345629472437707746935981234284444
= (2)2 (31)(907)(18908293)(192478327)(28564469476693963307545101353)
Example for m = 233: f(z) = z233 + z74 + 1,
b = 0x 00000066 647EDE6C 332C7F8C 0923BB58 213B333B 20E9CE42 81FE115F 7D8F90AD










Example for m = 283: f(z) = z283 + z12 + z7 + z5 + 1,
b = 0x 027B680A C8B8596D A5A4AF8A 19A0303F CA97FD76 45309FA2 A581485A F6263E31
3B79A2F5










Table 3.1: Examples for NIST-recommended randomly chosen curves over F2m
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Example for m = 409: f(z) = z409 + z87 + 1,
b = 0x 0021A5C2 C8EE9FEB 5C4B9A75 3B7B476B 7FD6422E F1F3DD67 4761FA99 D6AC27C8
A9A197B2 72822F6C D57A55AA 4F50AE31 7B13545F











Example for m = 571: f(z) = z571 + z10 + z5 + z2 + 1,
b = 0x 02F40E7E 2221F295 DE297117 B7F3D62F 5C6A97FF CB8CEFF1 CD6BA8CE 4A9A18AD
84FFABBD 8EFA5933 2BE7AD67 56A66E29 4AFD185A 78FF12AA 520E4DE7 39BACA0C
7FFEFF7F 2955727A














Table 3.1: (Contd.) Examples for NIST-recommended randomly chosen curves over
F2m
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Example for m = 163: f(z) = z163 + z7 + z6 + z3 + 1, b = 1
Standard Curve K-163. a = 1
#E(F2163) = 11692013098647223345629483507196896696658237148126
= (2)(5846006549323611672814741753598448348329118574063)
Weaker Curve. â = 0
#Ê(F2163) = 11692013098647223345629473816263631617836683539492
= (2)2(653)(6521)(34101072914026637)(20129541232727197849723433)
Example for m = 233: f(z) = z233 + z74 + 1, b = 1










Example for m = 283: f(z) = z283 + z12 + z7 + z5 + 1, b = 1










Table 3.2: Examples for NIST-recommended Koblitz curves over F2m
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Example for m = 409: f(z) = z409 + z87 + 1, b = 1










Example for m = 571: f(z) = z571 + z10 + z5 + z2 + 1, b = 1














Table 3.2: (Contd.) Examples for NIST-recommended Koblitz curves over F2m
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Case m Curve
Size of each prime factor of
#E(F2m) (in bits)
163 NIST B-163 E 2,163
Weaker curve Ê 2, 5, 10, 25, 28, 95
233 NIST B-233 E 2, 233
Randomly Weaker curve Ê 2, 3, 9, 10, 30, 70, 113
chosen 283 NIST B-283 E 2, 283
curves Weaker curve Ê 2, 3, 5, 33, 66, 86, 87
409 NIST B-409 E 2, 409
Weaker curve Ê 2, 4, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 69, 284
571 NIST B-571 E 2, 570
Weaker curve Ê 2, 3, 11, 47, 80, 82, 159, 191
163 NIST K-163 E 2, 163
Weaker curve Ê 2, 10, 13, 55, 85
233 NIST K-233 E 2, 232
Weaker curve Ê 2, 17, 27, 27, 63, 100
Koblitz 283 NIST K-283 E 2, 281
curves Other curve Ê 2, 284
409 NIST K-409 E 2, 281
Weaker curve Ê 2, 23, 37, 116, 234
571 NIST K-571 E 2, 569
Weaker curve Ê 2, 87, 89, 395
Table 3.3: Size of each prime factor of #E(F2m) and #Ê(F2m) (in bits) for the
examples of Tables 3.1 and 3.2
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3.2 Invalid-curve attacks on Montgomery’s lad-
der algorithm
Consider a cryptosystem that uses a strong elliptic curve E(a, b) defined over F2m
with curve parameters a and b (e.g., a NIST-recommended elliptic curve), where
m is an odd number. Assume that Ê(â, b) is a weaker curve defined over F2m
with curve parameters â and b, such that Tr(â) = 1 − Tr(a). Consider that the
attacker has the computational power for computing the EC discrete logarithm
using the Silver-Pohlig-Hellman algorithm in the cryptographically weaker group
Ê(F2m). Also consider that Ê(F2m) is a cyclic group, which implies that there are
φ(#Ê(F2m)) points of order #Ê(F2m). Additionally, for the attacks presented in
this section we need to obtain #Ê(F2m). Using Equation (3.3), this value can be
obtained from #E(F2m) which is usually public or can be obtained with some point
counting algorithms, e.g., [79] [77]. Consider that the underlying ECSM algorithm
is the Montgomery ladder (Algorithm 2.6 or 2.7). Since these algorithms do not
utilize the curve parameter a, depending of the input point the computation can be
carried out in either E(F2m) or Ê(F2m). Then, the idea behind the attacks presented
below is to produce an incorrect result from the computation being performed in
Ê(F2m) due to a fault.
3.2.1 Basic attack
Fault model. Let us assume that the adversary can inject a flip-fault (single or
multiple bit) into the x-coordinate of the input point P = (Px, Py) ∈ E(F2m) of a
device computing the ECSM utilizing either Algorithm 2.6 or 2.7. Suppose that
the resulting finite field pair after the fault injection is known and is P̃ = (P̃x, Py).
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Consider that the result Q̃ = kP̃ = (Q̃x, Q̃y) is released.
For a given P̃ = (P̃x, Py) we can verify if there exists a point in Ê(F2m) with the
same x-coordinate, i.e., if ∃ P̂ ∈ Ê(F2m) such that P̂ = (P̃x, P̂y) for some P̂y ∈ F2m .
In fact, by Lemma 3.1 we can expect that if we flip single or multiple bits of the x-
coordinate such a point exists with a probability of about 1/2. When P̂ ∈ Ê(F2m),
in a similar way we can obtain Q̂ = (Q̃x, Q̂y) ∈ Ê(F2m) for some Q̂y ∈ F2m .
Having P̂ , Q̂ ∈ Ê(F2m) one can obtain l = k or #Ê(F2m) − k mod n using
Algorithm 2.8, where n = ord(P̂ ). This would be possible because the computation
is performed in the weaker group Ê(F2m) and not in the original group E(F2m).
One can then exhaustively search for an integer k′ that satisfies (i) l = k′ mod n or
#Ê(F2m) − k′ mod n and (ii) Q̃ = k′P̃ . Thus, the idea of the basic attack is that
the adversary with only one pair (P̂ , Q̂) and some acceptable amount of exhaustive
search will be able to retrieve the secret scalar k with a probability of success ρ.
Let e be a parameter such that 2e is the maximum acceptable amount of exhaustive
search space. The complete attack procedure is presented as Algorithm 3.1.
In Step 8 of Algorithm 3.1, l = k or #Ê(F2m)− k mod n is obtained. The value
of l has only partial information about k. The remaining part of the scalar might
be obtained using an exhaustive search. The latter involves two main steps: (i)
solve a system congruences with a test candidate and the known part of the scalar
(Step 11.2.1), and (ii) perform a scalar multiplication to verify if the solution of the
system of congruences is the desired scalar (Step 11.2.2).
Let r be the exhaustive search space. This value depends on n and #Ê(F2m).
In Step 11.2.1, for having a unique solution mod #Ê(F2m) it is necessary that
lcm(n, r) = #Ê(F2m). (3.5)
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Algorithm 3.1. Basic invalid-curve attack on Montgomery’s ladder ECSM
algorithm
Input: E defined over F2m , access to either Algorithm 2.6 or 2.7, the base point
P = (Px, Py) ∈ E(F2m), the order #Ê(F2m), a parameter for acceptable amount of
exhaustive search e.
Output: Scalar k with a probability of ρ.
# Phase 1: Collect faulty output
1. Inject a fault in P = (Px, Py) for obtaining P̃ = (P̃x, Py).
2. Compute Q̃ = kP̃ = (Q̃x, Q̃y) using either Algorithm 2.6 or 2.7.
3. T ← Q̃x + b/Q̃2x + â.
4. If (Tr(T ) = 0) then
4.1 Q̂x ← Q̃x, Q̂y ← Q̃x · Ht(T );
5. Else
5.1 Go to Step 1.
# Phase 2: Obtain k partially using the Silver-Pohlig-Hellman algorithm
6. P̂x ← P̃x, P̂y ← P̃x · Ht(P̃x + b/P̃ 2x + â).
7. Obtain n = ord(P̂ ).
8. Utilize Algorithm 2.8 with (P̂ , Q̂, n) to obtain l mod n.
# Phase 3: Exhaustive search and verification
9. Find the smallest value of r for lcm(n, r) = #Ê(F2m) (see Equation (3.7)).
10. If (r = 1) then
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10.1 Compute R = lP̃ using either Algorithm 2.6 or 2.7.
10.2 If (R = Q̃) then return(l); else return(#Ê(F2m)− l).
11. Else if (r ≤ 2e) then
11.1 k′ ← 0.
11.2 While (k′ < r) do
11.2.1 Solve the system of congruences k′′ ≡ k′ (mod r) and k′′ ≡ l (mod n).
11.2.2 Compute R = k′′P̃ using either Algorithm 2.6 or 2.7.
11.2.3 If (R = Q̃) then return(k′′);
11.2.4 Else if (R = −Q̃) then return(#Ê(F2m)− k′′);
11.2.5 Else k′ ← k′ + 1.
12. Else return(“failure”).
For efficiency r should be selected as the minimum value that satisfies Equation
(3.5). Let #Ê(F2m) = 2
e0pe11 p
e2
2 · · · p
eu−1
u−1 be the prime factorization of #Ê(F2m),
where ej ≥ 1 for j ∈ [0, u − 1]. Let n = 2f0pf11 pf22 · · · p
fu−1
u−1 be the prime fac-
torization of n = ord(P̂ ), where 0 ≤ fj ≤ ej for j ∈ [0, u − 1]. Similarly, let
r = 2g0pg11 p
g2
2 · · · p
gu−1
u−1 be the prime factorization of r. Using notations similar to











2 · · · p
eu−1
u−1 . (3.6)





0 if ej = fj,
ej otherwise,
(3.7)
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for j ∈ [0, u− 1].
Note that if r > 2e, Algorithm 3.1 returns in Step 12 “failure”. This means
that from a specific pair (P̃ , Q̃) the exhaustive search space required to obtain
uniquely the value of k (i.e., r) is more than the maximum admissible exhaustive
search space (i.e., 2e). For example for a weaker group Ê(F2m) from the NIST-
recommended curves, as we show below, the probability of failure is quite low even
for small values of e. Moreover, in the case of not success with a particular pair
(P̃ , Q̃), the attacker can repeat the attack procedure until an inevitable success.
The probability of success of Algorithm 3.1 (i.e., ρ), depends on the maximum
acceptable amount of exhaustive search 2e and the order of point P̂ . Assume that
point P̂ is taken randomly from group Ê(F2m). In a cyclic group, it is well known
that the number of elements of order d is φ(d). Here #Ê(F2m) is not prime, and
consequently not all the points in Ê(F2m) have an order #Ê(F2m). Moreover, if
#Ê(F2m) has several prime factors (i.e., it is expected since Ê(F2m) is assumed to
be a weaker group), the order of the points could have any combination of those
prime factors or their respective prime powers. For example the number of points
with the full order #Ê(F2m) is φ(#Ê(F2m)). In contrast, there is only one point of
order two which corresponds to (0,
√
b).
Obtaining the probability of success ρ. Let #Ê(F2m) = 2
n0pn11 p
n2
2 · · · p
nu−1
u−1
be the prime factorization of #Ê(F2m), where nj ≥ 1 for j ∈ [0, u−1] and pj < pj+1
for j ∈ [1, u− 2]. Assume that point P̂ is taken randomly from the group Ê(F2m).
Here we will obtain the probability of success ρ, first for specific values and then
for an arbitrary value of e.
• Case 1: e = 0. If e = 0, then the attack will succeed when ord(P̂ ) =
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pnii (1− 1pi ),















Clearly this value is bounded to 1/2. If p1 >> 1, then ρe=0 would be close to
1/2 (e.g., all the Koblitz curves in Example 4.2).




































Secondly, if p1 = 3, then it is necessary to take into account points of order
#Ê(F2m)/h, with h ∈ [1, 3]. In this case ρe=2 is












































t+1 · · · p
nu−1
u−1 .
Assume that #Ê(F2m) splits completely in e bits such that
log2(2
n0pn11 · · · p
nt−1
t−1 ) ≤ e and log2(pt) > e.
If these conditions are satisfied, then the number of points whose order divides
pntt p
nt+1
























g = (n0 + 1)(n1 + 1) · · · (nt−1 + 1)
j0(i) = i mod (n0 + 1),










(n0 + 1)(n1 + 1)
⌋





(n0 + 1)(n1 + 1) · · · (nt−2 + 1)
⌋
mod (nt−1 + 1).















2 · · · p
nt−1
t−1
Since the function φ is multiplicative1 we can reduce Equation (3.12) and
obtain




t (pt − 1)pnt+1−1t+1 (pt+1 − 1) · · · p
nu−1−1
u−1 (pu−1 − 1).





(pt − 1)(pt+1 − 1) · · · (pu−1 − 1)
ptpt+1 · · · pu−1
. (3.13)
• Case 5: Arbitrary e. When we cannot split #Ê(F2m) in the form as in the
previous case we can proceed as follows. First, search for the smallest prime
factor such that log2(pi) > e. Let t be the index of such prime factor. Let
d = pntt p
nt
t+1 · · · p
nu−1
u−1 . From all the possible combinations of the prime factors
p0p1 · · · pt−1 and their respective powers, we need to consider only those whose
product with d have a value of r that satisfies Equation (3.5) and r ≤ e. The
1If gcd(m,n) = 1, then φ(mn) = φ(m)φ(n).
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complete procedure for this case is stated in Algorithm 3.2. This algorithm
also includes the computation of ρ for Cases 1-4.
Algorithm 3.2. Probability of success ρ for Algorithm 3.1
Input: The order #Ê(F2m) = 2
n0pn11 p
n2






t+1 · · · p
nu−1
u−1 , a parameter for
acceptable amount of exhaustive search e, where 0 ≤ e < log2 (pu−1).
Output: Probability of success ρ.
1. If (e = 0) then return(ρe=0) using Equation (3.8);
2. Else if (e = 1) then return(ρe=1) using Equation (3.9);
3. Else if (e = 2) then return(ρe=2) using Equation (3.10) or (3.11);
4. Else if #Ê(F2m) splits completely in e bits such that log2(2
n0pn11 · · · p
nt−1
t−1 ) ≤ e
and log2(pt) > e
4.1 Return(ρ) using Equation (3.13);
5. Else
5.1 Search for the smallest prime factor such that log2(pi) > e. Set t with
this index.




5.4 For jt−1 = 0 to nt−1 do
For jt−2 = 0 to nt−2 do
...
For j0 = 0 to n0 do
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Find the smallest value of r for lcm(d ·h, r) = #Ê(F2m).
If (r ≤ 2e) then
ρ← ρ + φ(h).
5.5 ρ← ρ(pt − 1)(pt+1 − 1) · · · (pu−1 − 1)/(2n0pn11 pn22 · · · p
nt−1
t−1 ptpt+1 · · · pu−1).
5.6 Return(ρ).
Probability of success ρ for Ê(F2m) from the NIST-recommended curves.
Table 3.4 presents the probability of success of Algorithm 3.1 for Ê(F2m) from
the NIST-recommended curves (see Example 3.2). This shows the probability of
obtaining the scalar k using a single faulty point P̃ ∈ Ê(F2m) and specific values
of parameter e. We notice that with the minimum amount of exhaustive search
(i.e., e = 0) the values are close to 1/2, especially for the Koblitz curve cases
where the relation between the two smallest prime factors of #Ê(F2m) is greater
(e.g., p1/2 ≈ 10.8 × 106 for the example of the Koblitz curve over F2409). Also for
the Koblitz curve examples, it can be noticed that with e = 2 their probabilities
are close to unity as shown in the fifth column of Table 3.4. In contrast, for the
randomly chosen curves, similar values close to the unity are obtained with e = 10
as illustrated in the right-most column of this table.
Table 3.5 shows the minimum value of parameter e for obtaining a probability
ρ smaller than some specific values. From this table it can be noticed that for
practical situations e could be quite small for an exhaustive search (e.g., say 14)
and still have a reasonably high probability of success ρ (e.g., ρ > 999
1000
).
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ρ
Case m e = 0 e = 1 e = 2 e = 5 e = 10
163 0.48333745 0.48333745 0.96667491 0.98278616 0.99943089
Randomly 233 0.39784981 0.39784981 0.79569963 0.99462453 0.99677211
chosen 283 0.40601504 0.40601504 0.81203008 0.94736842 0.96992481
curves 409 0.44966230 0.44966230 0.89932460 0.93679646 0.99732494
571 0.42819973 0.42819973 0.85639945 0.99913270 0.99913270
163 0.49915775 0.49915775 0.99831549 0.99831549 0.99908107
Koblitz 233 0.49999457 0.99998915 0.99998915 0.99998915 0.99998915
curves 409 0.49999991 0.99999982 0.99999982 0.99999982 0.99999982
571 0.49999999 0.99999999 0.99999999 0.99999999 0.99999999
Table 3.4: Probability of success ρ of obtaining k with Algorithm 3.1 for Ê(F2m)
from the NIST-recommended curves3 for a given parameter e
Cost of Algorithm 3.1. Most of the computational cost of Algorithm 3.1 is in-
volved in phases 2 and 3, i.e., obtaining k partially using the Silver-Pohlig-Hellman
algorithm (Algorithm 2.8) and the exhaustive search with verification process, re-
spectively. The cost of both phases depends on the order of P̂ , i.e., n, and the order
#Ê(F2m). Let us consider the cost of each phase:
• Silver-Pohlig-Hellman’s algorithm (phase 2 of Algorithm 3.1). Step 1.3.2 of
the Silver-Pohlig-Hellman algorithm (Algorithm 2.8), which is the only step
in this algorithm with significant cost, needs to compute one EC discrete log-
arithm. This operation can be performed with a fast algorithm for ECDLP
such as Pollard’s rho algorithm [73] with an expected number of point op-
erations of about 3
√
pt−1, where pt−1 is the largest prime divisor of n. This
3The case of m = 283 for Koblitz curves is omitted for this and any subsequent table since
there does not exist a cryptographically weaker group Ê(F2m).
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Parameter e (in bits)
Case m ρ < 1 − 1
100
ρ < 1 − 1
1000
ρ < 1 − 1
1×106
163 7 10 17
Randomly 233 5 12 20
chosen 283 11 14 14
curves 409 8 12 23
571 5 5 15
163 2 10 15
Koblitz 233 1 1 18
curves 409 1 1 1
571 1 1 1
Table 3.5: Minimum value of parameter e for obtaining a probability ρ smaller than
some given values for Ê(F2m) from the NIST-recommended curves
running time can be further reduced using a parallelized version of the Pol-
lard’s rho algorithm [86] to about (
√
πpt−1/2)/M point operations, where M
is the number of processors used for solving the ECDLP instance. Addition-
ally, as shown by Gallant et al. [35] if a Koblitz curve over F2m is utilized,




• Exhaustive search and verification (phase 3 of Algorithm 3.1). With n =
ord(P̂ ) and #Ê(F2m), the exhaustive search space r is obtained using Equa-
tion (3.5) (see Step 9 of Algorithm 3.1). Thus, assuming t ≈ m the phase 3
of Algorithm 3.1 will require r scalar multiplications in the worst case which
represents at most (3mr)/2 point operations if a binary method is utilized
(e.g., Algorithm 2.1).
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Example 3.3 Let us consider the cost of phases 2 and 3 of Algorithm 3.1 for
Ê(F2m) from the NIST-recommended curve K-163. For a single processor, the
cost of phase 2 is of about 3
√
p4 ≈ 243.6 point operations, where p4 is the largest
prime factor of #Ê(F2m) (see Table 3.2). Now, assume that we have M = 10, 000
computers for solving the instance of the ECDLP. In this case the expected number
of point operations for each processor is approximately (
√
πp4/163)/20000 ≈ 224.9.
For the phase 3 cost, from Tables 3.1 and 3.5 we can notice that with a probability
greater than 999
1000
the exhaustive search space will be less than 210, which implies a
number of point operations < 3(163)(210)/2 ≈ 217.9.
3.2.2 Attack with unknown faulty base finite field pair P̃
Fault model. Let us assume that the adversary can inject a single bit-flip fault
into the x-coordinate of the input point Pi = (Pi,x, Pi,y) ∈ E(F2m) of a device
computing the ECSM utilizing either Algorithm 2.6 or 2.7 for some i. Suppose that
the resulting finite field pair after the fault injection P̃i = (P̃i,x, Pi,y) is unknown.
Also, consider that the fault location is at a random position of the x-coordinate.
Consider that the result Q̃i = kP̃i = (Q̃i,x, Q̃i,y) is realized.
Under this scenario the attacker might retrieve the secret scalar as follows. First,
it is necessary to collect some faulty outputs of the form Q̃i = kP̃i = (Q̃i,x, Q̃i,y)
for which there exists a point Q̂i ∈ Ê(F2m) such that Q̂i = (Q̃i,x, Q̂i,y) for some
Q̂i,y ∈ F2m . In fact, with two different points Q̂i ∈ Ê(F2m), where i ∈ {0, 1}, and
some acceptable amount of exhaustive search it is possible to obtain k with a high
probability.
Let P̂i be a point in Ê(F2m) with the same x-coordinate as P̃i = (P̃i,x, Pi,y),


























Figure 3.1: Tables A0 and A1 with the output of the Silver-Pohlig-Hellman algo-
rithm for each (Ri,j, Q̂i, ni,j), where i ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ [0, ci − 1], and ni,j = ord(Ri,j)
i.e., P̂i = (P̃i,x, P̂i,y) ∈ Ê(F2m) for some P̂i,y ∈ F2m . Since P̃i (and consequently
P̂i) is unknown, we need to guess it among those finite field pairs that differ from
each Pi in only one bit of their x-coordinate. Let ci be the number of possible
candidates for P̂i, where i ∈ {0, 1}. Let Ri,j be a candidate for P̂i, where i ∈ {0, 1}
and j ∈ [0, ci − 1]. Initially, by Lemma 3.1 we can expect that ci is about m/2.
However, this amount could be further reduced depending on the order of Q̂i.
This is possible because we known that ord(Q̂i) ≤ ord(P̂i), and more precisely
ord(Q̂i)|ord(P̂i). Let ηi be the reduction factor due to the latter condition such
that ci ≈ ηi m2 .
After collecting the faulty outputs we can construct two tables Ai of ci en-
tries with the output of the Silver-Pohlig-Hellman algorithm for each (Ri,j, Q̂i, ni,j),
where i ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ [0, ci− 1], and ni,j = ord(Ri,j). These tables are illustrated in
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Figure 3.1. Thus, having li,j mod ni,j in each entry of Tables A0 and A1, we could
distinguish those that are likely to be equivalent to either k or #Ê(F2m)− k. The
idea is to search entry pairs v and w that satisfy either
l0,v ≡ l1,w (mod gcd(n0,v, n1,w)) or (3.14)
l0,v ≡ #Ê(F2m)− l1,w (mod gcd(n0,v, n1,w)). (3.15)
In practical situations where m ≥ 163 it is more likely to have a unique candidate
pair that satisfies either (3.14) or (3.15). The main reason is because it is expected
that ni,j >> ci for i ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ [0, ci − 1]. Nevertheless, even if there
is not a unique candidate pair it is possible to verify which one is equivalent to
k or #Ê(F2m) − k after performing an exhaustive search similarly to the attack
presented in the previous subsection. The complete attack procedure is presented
in Algorithm 3.3. Let e be a parameter such that 2e is the maximum acceptable
amount of exhaustive search per candidate pair found in Step 5 of Algorithm 3.3.
Also, let us define σ as the probability of success for retrieving the scalar k using
Algorithm 3.3.
Algorithm 3.3. Invalid-curve attack with unknown faulty base point P̃
Input: E defined over F2m , access to either Algorithm 2.6 or 2.7, base point Pi =
(Pi,x, Pi,y) ∈ E(F2m) with i ∈ {0, 1}, the order #Ê(F2m), a parameter for acceptable
amount of exhaustive search e.
Output: Scalar k with a probability of σ
# Phase 1: Collect faulty outputs
1. i← 0.
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2. While (i < 2) do
2.1 Inject a fault in Pi = (Pi,x, Pi,y) for obtaining P̃i = (P̃i,x, Pi,y).
2.2 Compute Q̃i = kP̃i = (Q̃i,x, Q̃i,y) using either Algorithm 2.6 or 2.7.
2.3 T1 ← Q̃i,x + b/Q̃2i,x + â.
2.4 If (Tr(T1) = 0) then
2.4.1 Q̂i,x ← Q̃i,x, Q̂i,y ← Q̃i,x · Ht(T1), i← i + 1.
# Phase 2: Construct tables
3. For i = 0 to 1 do
4. T2 ← 1.
4.1 For j = 0 to m− 1 do
4.1.1 Rx ← Pi,x + T2.
4.1.2 T3 ← Rx + b/Rx2 + â.
4.1.3 If (Tr(T3) = 0) then
(a) Ry ← Rx · Ht(T3).
(b) Obtain n = ord(R).
(c) If (ord(Q̂i)|n) then
(i) Utilize Algorithm 2.8 with (R, Q̂i, n) to obtain l mod n.
(ii) Store (l, n) in Table Ai.
4.1.4 T2 = T2  1.
# Phase 3: Searching for candidate pairs
5. For some entries v and w in tables Tables A0 and A1, respectively, search for
candidate pairs that satisfy lv ≡ lw (mod gcd(nv, nw)) or lv ≡ #Ê(F2m) −
lw (mod gcd(nv, nw)).
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6. For the candidate pairs where lv ≡ #Ê(F2m) − lw (mod gcd(nv, nw)) set
lw ← #Ê(F2m)− lw (mod nw) in Table A1.
# Phase 4: Exhaustive search and verification
7. For each candidate pair do
7.1 Solve the system of congruences l ≡ lv (mod nv) and l ≡ lw (mod nw).
7.2 n← lcm(nv, nw).
7.3 Find the smallest value of r for lcm(n, r) = #Ê(F2m).
7.4 If (r = 1) then
7.4.1 Compute R = lP̃ using either Algorithm 2.6 or 2.7.
7.4.2 If (R = Q̃) then return(l);
7.4.3 Else if (R = −Q̃) then return(#Ê(F2m)− l′′).
7.5 Else if (r ≤ 2e) then
7.5.1 k′ ← 0.
7.5.2 While (k′ < r) do
(a) Solve the system of congruences k′′ ≡ k′ (mod r) and k′′ ≡
l (mod n).
(b) Compute R = k′′P̃ using either Algorithm 2.6 or 2.7.
(c) If (R = Q̃) then return(k′′);
(d) Else if (R = −Q̃) then return(#Ê(F2m)− k′′);
(e) Else k′ ← k′ + 1.
8. Return(“failure”).
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Number of entries of Tables A0 and A1. Let #Ê(F2m) = 2
e0pe11 p
e2
2 · · · p
eu−1
u−1
be the prime factorization of #Ê(F2m). As stated before, the number of entries of
Table Ai, ci, depends on the reduction factor ηi. The latter in turn depends on the
order of Q̂i and the order of the candidate points for P̂i, Ri,j, where i ∈ {0, 1} and
j ∈ [0, ci − 1]. Assuming that the points Ri,j are taken randomly from the group
Ê(F2m), it can be shown that ηi depending on ord(Q̂i) has the following bounds





j=1 (1− 1pj ). The lower bound of the above expression correspond
for the case when ord(Q̂i) = #Ê(F2m). In this case the reduction factor is maximum
(i.e., ηmax), and consequently the number of entries of Table Ai is minimum (i.e.,
cmin ≈ ηmaxm2 ). On the other hand, theoretically the upper bound of ηi holds only
when ord(Q̂i) is the point of order two (0,
√
b). However, for the cases where p1 >>
2 (e.g., Ê(F2m) for the Koblitz curves of Table 3.2) if ord(Q̂i) = #Ê(F2m)/2
e0 , then
the reduction factor is close to unity. For these cases the number of entries of Table
Ai is maximum (i.e., cmax ≈ m2 ). In Table 3.6 the values of ηmax, cmin, and cmax are
given for each Ê(F2m) from the NIST-recommended curves. Also, this table shows
the average cases for ηi and ci (i.e., η and c, respectively).
Algorithm 3.3 needs to compute in total c0 + c1 EC discrete logarithms using
the Silver-Pohlig-Hellman algorithm. This number is fixed since the search for
candidate pairs and the exhaustive search phases are performed after the tables’s
construction. If we merge these three phases, a speedup on average can be achieved.
Let us describe two approaches one could take to combine these phases:
1. We can first completely construct Table A0. Then, each time an entry of
Table A1 is obtained we can verify whether this entry satisfies the congruence
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163 0.483 0.665 39.4 81.5 54.2
Randomly 233 0.398 0.574 46.3 116.5 66.9
chosen 283 0.406 0.573 57.5 141.5 81.1
curves 409 0.450 0.623 92.0 204.5 127.3
571 0.428 0.603 122.2 285.5 172.1
163 0.499 0.686 40.7 81.5 55.9
Koblitz 233 0.499 0.749 58.2 116.5 87.4
curves 409 0.499 0.749 102.2 204.5 153.4
571 0.499 0.749 142.7 285.5 214.1
Table 3.6: Minimum, maximum and average number of entries of Tables Ai for
Ê(F2m) from the NIST-recommended curves
in (3.14) or (3.15) with any entry of A0. For each candidate pair found (if
any) we proceed with the exhaustive search and verification process. If the
verification fails, then we continue to obtain the next entry of Table A1 and
repeat the process until the scalar is obtained. Even when using this approach
the number of EC discrete logarithms in the worst case is the same as that




2. Another approach is to construct Tables A0 and A1 in alternate way. Each
time an entry in Ai is obtained, we can search Table Ai for candidate pairs that
satisfy either Congruence (3.14) or (3.15) for i ∈ {0, 1}. For each candidate
pair found (if any) we proceed with the exhaustive search and verification
process. This process is repeated until a candidate pair passes the verification
process, i.e., the scalar is found. Let Tables A0 and A1 be of the same size,
i.e., c0 = c1. For this case the average number of EC discrete logarithms
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is ≈ 4
3
c0. In Appendix A we show how the latter value is obtained. This
appendix also includes the case where c0 6= c1.
Obtaining the probability of success σ. The probability of success σ of Al-
gorithm 3.3 depends on parameter e and the order of both P̂0 and P̂1. Consider
that the latter two points are taken randomly from the group Ê(F2m). For each trio
(P̂i, Q̂i, ni), the Silver-Pohlig-Hellman algorithm provides li mod ni, where i ∈ {0, 1}
and ni = ord(P̂i). Utilizing these values, a system of congruences is solved and a
solution mod n is obtained, where n = lcm(n0, n1) (see Step 7.2). This “combina-
tion” of modulus ni might reduce the exhaustive search space in comparison with
the individual case of n0 or n1. This observation permits us to obtain a relation be-
tween the probabilities of success ρ and σ for Algorithms 3.1 and 3.3, respectively.
In this case ρ is the probability that from an individual pair (li, ni), i = 0 or 1, we
could obtain the scalar using exhaustive search for a given value of e. Then we can
express σ as follows:
σ = 2ρ− ρ2 + λ. (3.16)
The first two terms represent the probability that for a given e we could obtain
the scalar from at least one of the two pairs. The third term, λ, is the probability
that the “combination” does succeed in obtaining the scalar with exhaustive search
when neither pair individually does so for a given value of e. Equation (3.16) gives
an explicit lower bound for σ, i.e., σ ≥ 2ρ − ρ2. In fact, for the cases of Ê(F2m)
from the NIST-recommended curves we notice that σ ≈ 2ρ− ρ2 for e ≥ 2.
For obtaining a more precise value of σ one can check, from all the possible
order values of two points (i.e., P̂0 and P̂1), which ones provide sufficient scalar
information for obtaining the rest using exhaustive search for a given parameter e.
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Additionally we need to consider the probability of occurrence of every point order
combination. The complete procedure is put together in Algorithm 3.4.
Algorithm 3.4. Probability of success σ for Algorithm 3.3
Input: The order #Ê(F2m) = 2
n0pn11 · · · p
nu−1
u−1 , a parameter for acceptable amount
of exhaustive search e, where e ≥ 0.
Output: Probability of success σ.
1. σ = 0
2. For Ju−1 = 0 to nu−1 do
For Ju−2 = 0 to nu−2 do
...
For J0 = 0 to n0 do




For ju−1 = 0 to nu−1 do
For ju−2 = 0 to nu−2 do
...
For j0 = 0 to n0 do




Find the smallest value of r for lcm(n, r) = #Ê(F2m).
If (r ≤ 2e) then
σ ← σ + N · φ(d).
3. σ = σ/(#Ê(F2m))
2
4. Return(σ).
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σ
Case m e = 0 e = 1 e = 2 e = 5 e = 10
163 0.74921865 0.74921865 0.99895820 0.99973864 0.99999970
Randomly 233 0.71998855 0.71998855 0.95998473 0.99998410 0.99999555
chosen 283 0.73265871 0.73265871 0.97687829 0.99722992 0.99926508
curves 409 0.74515657 0.74515657 0.99354209 0.99797754 0.99999814
571 0.73469332 0.73469332 0.97959110 0.99999925 0.99999925
163 0.74999822 0.74999822 0.99999763 0.99999763 0.99999939
Koblitz 233 0.74999999 0.99999999 0.99999999 0.99999999 0.99999999
curves 409 0.74999999 0.99999999 0.99999999 0.99999999 0.99999999
571 0.74999999 0.99999999 0.99999999 0.99999999 0.99999999
Table 3.7: Probability of success σ of obtaining k with Algorithm 3.3 for Ê(F2m)
from the NIST-recommended curves for a given parameter e
Probability of success σ for Ê(F2m) from the NIST-recommended curves.
Table 3.7 presents the probability of success of Algorithm 3.3 for Ê(F2m) from the
NIST-recommended curves. This shows the probability of obtaining the scalar k
for specific values of parameter e. These values were obtained using Algorithm 3.4.
We notice that the probability of success is better in comparison with the basic
attack. In fact, for e ≥ 2 the relation between the probability of success of both
attacks is σ ≈ 2ρ− ρ2. In Table 3.8, we list the minimum value of parameter e for
obtaining a probability σ smaller than some specific values. This table shows that
even with small values of e (e.g., say 14) the probability of success is quite high
(e.g., σ > 999,999
1,000,000
).
Cost of Algorithm 3.3. The most significant computational cost of Algorithm
3.3 is involved in phases 2 and 4, i.e., construction of tables and the exhaustive
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Parameter e (in bits)
Case m σ < 1 − 1
100
σ < 1 − 1
1000
σ < 1 − 1
1×106
163 2 5 10
Randomly 233 5 5 12
chosen 283 3 9 14
curves 409 2 6 12
571 3 5 5
163 2 2 10
Koblitz 233 1 1 1
curves 409 1 1 1
571 1 1 1
Table 3.8: Minimum value of parameter e for obtaining a probability σ smaller
than some given values for Ê(F2m) from the NIST-recommended curves
search with verification process, respectively. Let us consider the cost of each
phase:
• Construction of tables (phase 2 of Algorithm 3.3). Comparing with the ba-
sic attack presented in the previous subsection (Algorithm 3.1), Algorithm
3.3 needs to perform c0 + c1 instances of the Silver-Pohlig-Hellman algorithm
(Algorithm 2.8) instead of one, where ci is the size of Table Ai for i ∈ {0, 1}.
Similar to the cost of phase 2 of Algorithm 3.1, the cost to construct the
tables with a single processor is about 3(c0 + c1)
√
pt−1 point operations,
where pt−1 is the largest prime divisor of #Ê(F2m). If M processors are
used, then about (c0 + c1)
√
πpt−1/2/M point operations are required. If a
Koblitz curve over F2m is utilized, then this cost can be reduced to about
(c0 + c1)(
√
πpt−1/m)/(2M) point operations. These costs clearly depends di-
rectly on values of ci which depends on the order of Q̂i and the order of the
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candidate points for P̂i. As discussed earlier, the bounds for ci are approxi-
mately ηmaxm
2
≤ ci ≤ m2 , where ηmax is the maximum reduction factor which
depends on #Ê(F2m).
• Exhaustive search and verification (phase 4 of Algorithm 3.3). In phase 3
of Algorithm 3.3 using Tables A0 and A1, a search for candidate pairs that
satisfy either (3.14) or (3.15) is performed. As discussed earlier, for today’s
applications where m ≥ 163 it is expected to have a unique candidate pair.
In this way, in phase 4 an exhaustive search is performed in order to obtain
the full value of the scalar. Here, the exhaustive search space r is obtained in
Steps 7.2 and 7.3. Thus, assuming t ≈ m the phase 4 of Algorithm 3.3 will
require r scalar multiplications in the worst case which represents at most
(3mr)/2 point operations if a binary method is utilized (e.g., Algorithm 2.1).
Example 3.4 Let us consider the cost of phases 2 and 4 of Algorithm 3.3 for
Ê(F2m) from the NIST-recommended curve K-163. Let us use the minimum and
maximum values of ci form Table 3.6 to give an interval for each cost. For a single





[249.9, 250.9] point operations, where p4 is the largest prime factor of #Ê(F2m) (see
Table 3.2). Now, assume that we have M = 10, 000 computers for solving the
instances of the ECDLP. In this case the expected number of point operations











[231.2, 232.2]. For the phase 4 cost, from Tables 3.1 and 3.5 we can notice that with
a probability greater than 999
1000
the exhaustive search space will be r ≤ 4. Here the
cost of phase 4 is negligible.
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3.3 Countermeasures
The attacks presented in the previous section only need one or two faulty outputs
to break the given instance of ECSM with a high probability of success. Hence, this
may constitute a threat to cryptosystems using the Montgomery ladder ECSM for
elliptic curves over the binary field. Therefore, some countermeasures are needed.
In the following, we will describe possible protections against the attacks presented
in this chapter.
Group formulas change. A possible countermeasure is to use alternative group
formulas that include both elliptic curve parameters a and b. However, such for-
mulas are likely to require more computations and hence cause a degradation in
terms of performance. Additionally, if this approach is the only protection used, no
errors due to faults are detected and this might constitute a risk for other attacks
such as the DFA attack presented by Biehl et al. [9].
Curve selection. The attacks presented in this chapter assume that Ê(F2m) is a
cryptographically weaker group where the ECDLP could be solved in a reasonable
period of time for a given E(F2m). However, this assumption is not true if both
#E(F2m) and #Ê(F2m) are almost prime. From the NIST-recommended curves,
the only curve that satisfies this condition is referred to as K-283. Although, this
curve selection criteria is an effective countermeasure against the fault-based attacks
presented in this chapter, it might be too restrictive from the practical point of view.
Moreover, the following two countermeasures represent a possible solution without
limiting the use of particular group E(F2m) even when the order of Ê(F2m) is not
an almost prime number.
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Point verification (PV). It is important to verify that the input point is in
E(F2m). In the case that this checking could be bypassed, it is more important to
verify whether or not the output is on the original elliptic curve. This countermea-
sure not only prevents from the attacks presented in this chapter, but also others
such as those described by Biehl et al. [9], Ciet and Joye [21], and Antipa et al. [6].
It is important to note that this verification needs to be implemented in a secure
environment. Otherwise the attacker might bypass this protection and carry out
an invalid-curve attack such as one of those described earlier in this chapter.
Coherency check (CC). In addition to PV that could be applied to any ECSM
algorithm, the Montgomery ladder ECSM algorithm permits us to have another
way to detect errors in scalar multiplication using coherency check (CC). We can
use the fact that the temporary pair (Q0, Q1) is of the form (l ·P, (l+1)P ) for some
integer l at any value of i during the loop of Algorithms 2.5-2.7. Since the difference
between Q1 and Q0 should be P at any iteration, one can check this during and
after the ECSM operation. Note that if the attacker is able to modify the input
point P in the way described in Algorithms 3.1 and 3.3, the operation Q1−Q0 needs
to be implemented using group formulas that include both curve parameters, a and
b, or at least parameter a for avoiding that this checking operation is performed
in Ê(F2m). This approach for error detection will be presented in more detail in
Chapter 5.
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3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented two invalid-curve attacks that apply to the Mont-
gomery ladder ECSM algorithms proposed by López and Dahab [58]. These attacks
exploit the fact that parameter a is not used in the group formulas for these partic-
ular algorithms. In this way, if Ê(F2m) is a weaker group with the same parameters
than the original group E(F2m) except for parameter a and we are able to inject
a fault in the input point as described in Algorithms 3.1 and 3.3, then we would
retrieve the scalar k with a high probability of success. For the purpose of the
NIST-recommended curves, we have shown that there exists a weaker group for
nine of the ten cases that include the randomly chosen and Koblitz curves. The
only exception is the curve K-283 for which #E(F2m) and #Ê(F2m) are almost
prime. Also, we have obtained the theoretical probability of success for each of the
presented attacks. Additionally, we have determined numerical values of the prob-
abilities of success for Ê(F2m) from the NIST-recommended curves. And finally,
we have presented some countermeasures to prevent the attack described in this
chapter.
Chapter 4
Robust ECSM Using Repeated
and Parallel Computations
In this chapter we present some structures that permit detection of errors in ECSM
without modifying the curve parameters. These are based on re-computation and
parallel computation. We use a number of encoding techniques that rely on the
properties of elliptic curves and provide a high probability of detection of errors
caused by faults that occurred naturally or injected deliberately by an attacker.
In addition, we consider fault-tolerant ECSM. While error detection is a suffi-
cient countermeasure for preventing fault-based attacks, fault-tolerant characteris-
tic enables a system to perform its normal operation in spite of faults. For certain
fault models, we propose structures that can perform correct ECSM operations
in the presence of faults that may occur in a limited number of ECSM modules,
primarily due to natural causes such as abnormal temperature, electromagnetic in-
terference, or power supply changes. An attacker who is not able to inject faults at
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precise time and locations (i.e., “less sophisticated” attacker) is assumed to have
an effect similar to that of natural causes. On the other hand, a “sophisticated”
attacker is able to inject faults at precise locations in arbitrary number of ECSM
modules. For provide resistance against a sophisticated attacker, the encoding tech-
niques used with the inputs can essentially prevent such structures from outputting
incorrect results due to faults. Most of the work presented in this chapter has been
presented by Domı́nguez and Hasan [26] [27].
The organization of the remainder of this chapter is given as follows: In Section
4.1, we present encoding schemes for error detection for ECSM and probability of
undetected errors. In Section 4.2, we give fault-tolerant ECSM structures. We
present overhead costs and experimental results for the probability of undetected
errors in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. Finally, we make some concluding
remarks in Section 4.5.
4.1 Encoding/decoding and error detection for
ECSM
In this section, we propose error-detecting structures for ECSM. Here, we consider
a high-level design, where the ECSM module is the main block implemented in
hardware to accelerate some ECC applications and may become faulty either by
natural causes or by deliberate attacks from an adversary. Other modules used in
our structures are much less complex1 than the ECSM module and are assumed to
be implemented in a secure environment – either in software or hardware.
1In Section 4.3, area and time complexities of these modules are given for F2163 .
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For practicality of the above-mentioned assumption, one can consider a scenario
where ECC is to be implemented in an embedded system that stores the secret key
in a tamper-resistant memory and allows the key to be available to ECC operations
via a protected bus. If the memory and the bus for the secret key are not secure
enough to begin with, then these two would likely become an adversary’s first
points of attacks for easily extracting the key. The embedded system is likely to
have a general-purpose processor or microcontroller, which avoids being tied up or
attempts to improve system performance by off-loading the time consuming scalar
multiplication operations to the ECSM module. The latter acts much like a co-
processor and may have been acquired from a commercial vendor as an ASIC or
even as an IP core for other implementation choices, such as field programmable
gate arrays. In our work, the adversary is assumed to be able to inject faults only
into the ECSM module, where the sensitive information (i.e., secret key) is utilized
for the cryptographic computation.
The party responsible for the implementation of ECC may have no access to
or lack proper knowledge of the internal circuit design of the ECSM module, and
hence, deploys the module without any modification. The ECSM module does
not have built-in encoder/decoder, comparator/voter or PV units. These can be
implemented using dedicated hardware or the general purpose processor that the
embedded system has in it. However, they require considerably less computation
than a scalar multiplier does and, hence, can be implemented in a fault-tolerant
manner, say by applying the triple modular redundancy (TMR) technique, without
requiring excessive resources in terms of silicon area and/or computation time.
Throughout the rest of the document, we use the following assumptions:
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• The input point P is verified by the cryptosystem which uses the ECSM
module to be on the valid elliptic curve before each ECSM computation.
This validation is especially important for preventing the attacks described
in Chapter 3 and those proposed by Biehl et al. [9] and Antipa et al. [6].
• The order of a selected point P is a sufficiently large prime. This check
guarantees that P is not in a small subgroup of E(Fq) of order dividing the
cofactor h [40].
• An appropriate elliptic curve has been selected (e.g., using the guidelines of
a recognized standard such as FIPS 186-2 [32]).
• The input and output of the ECSM are given in projective coordinates.
4.1.1 Encoding/decoding for ECSM
The encoding/decoding process in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 plays an important role
in the detection of errors caused by faults in the compute (i.e., ECSM) module.
For example, without the encoding/decoding the re-computation based scheme in
Figure 2.2 would fail to detect errors produced in two cases: (i) the errors are
produced by permanent errors and (ii) the same transient fault is present for both
‘runs.’ In both cases, the erroneous results at times t0 and t1 will be the same and
the comparator would not detect such errors. Similarly, for the parallel computation
based scheme in Figure 2.3, if the two ECSM modules have the same permanent
and/or transient faults, in the absence of the encoding/decoding the two modules
generate erroneous but the same results. Again, such errors are not detected by
the comparator.
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Below, we present encoding/decoding schemes suitable for ECSM operations.
These schemes are primarily based on properties of elliptic curves. For a given
input pair k and P , a ‘good’ encoding scheme will produce input representations
that are different for the lower and the upper data paths (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3),
and hence, faults – whether or not identical on the two data paths – are likely to
affect the two ECSM operations differently. Consequently, the two values to be
compared by the comparator are also likely to be different.
Encoding for input point P
Taking advantage of the simplicity of negating an EC point, it is possible to use
the negative of a point as the encoded input. For a point P given in the affine
coordinate system, it is well known that the point negation is simply




(x, x + y) x, y ∈ F2m ,
(x,−y) x, y ∈ Fp.
(4.1)
For projective coordinates, namely the López and Dahab system for curve E over
F2m and the Jacobian system for E over Fp, the point negation is




(X,XZ + Y, Z) X,Y, Z ∈ F2m ,
(X,−Y, Z) X,Y, Z ∈ Fp.
(4.2)
In Figure 2.2, if the input is point P , then the encoder performs the point negation
in accordance with Equation (4.1) or (4.2). For the encoded input, the output of
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the ECSM module is k(−P ) = −kP. Hence, the decoder in Figure 2.2 also performs
a point negation to generate the expected output kP.
Although, the encoding (and decoding) using point negation is simple – for pro-
jective coordinates, one multiplication and one addition for E over F2m , and only
one addition for E over Fp – it is important to note that such an encoding scheme
changes only the y-coordinate of the input point, while the x- and, if applicable, the
z-coordinate remain unchanged. As a result, even in the presence of some faults in
the ECSM module, it is possible that the comparator in Figure 2.2 gets two equal
but incorrect points at its input and generates an ‘ok’ signal. This is illustrated in
Appendix B.
To change all the coordinate values of the input point, we can use a property of
projective coordinate systems, which consists of having multiple representations for
a given point. This principle is known as point randomization [23] and is applicable
to all the projective coordinate systems [46]. For the López and Dahab and the
Jacobian projective systems, Equations (2.3) and (2.4) become
Y 2 + XY Z = X3Z + aX2Z2 + bZ4 (4.3)
and
Y 2 = X3 + aXZ4 + bZ6, (4.4)
respectively. It is easy to verify that trios (γX, γ2Y, γZ), where γ ∈ F∗2m , satisfy
Equation (4.3) and have the same affine representation as that of (X,Y, Z). Thus,
these trios can give different projective representations of a single point on the
curve defined by Equation (2.3). Similarly trios (γ2X, γ3Y, γZ), where γ ∈ F∗p,
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have different projective representations of a single point in the curve defined by
Equation (2.4).
Based on the above discussion, a single projective representation (X,Y, Z) can
be encoded, in some random way, to one of the q − 1 possible projective represen-
tations (γcX, γdY, γZ), where for the López and Dahab system, c = 1, d = 2, and
γ ∈ F∗2m ; and for the Jacobian system c = 2, d = 3 and γ ∈ F∗p. Since (X,Y, Z)
and (γcX, γdY, γZ) correspond to the same point, the two ECSM operations, i.e.,
k(X,Y, Z) and k(γcX, γdY, γZ), result in the same point on the curve, i.e.,
k(X,Y, Z) ∼ k(γcX, γdY, γZ). (4.5)
One implication of (4.5) is that if the encoder in Figure 2.2 or 2.3 is only for
the mapping
(X,Y, Z) 7→ (γcX, γdY, γZ), (4.6)
then the decoder is not needed.
Encoding for scalar k
It is well known that the order of any point P divides the order of the group #E(Fq),
i.e., #E(Fq)P = O. Let k′ = #E(Fq)− k. Then
k′P = (#E(Fq)− k)P ≡ −kP.
Thus, k can be simply encoded to k′, which can be viewed as some kind of scalar
negation operation, and the corresponding decoding process involves a point nega-
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tion to convert −kP to kP . However, this decoding process can be omitted if
the corresponding input point P is also negated in the encoding process (i.e.,
k′(−P ) = kP ).
For the scalar k, more complex encoding schemes are possible. When k is fixed,
in order to resist differential power analysis attacks, it has been suggested [23] to
randomize k by the following mapping:
k 7→ k′′ = k + j#E(Fq), (4.7)
where j is a random integer of at least 20 bits long2. Such randomization can also
be used as an encoding scheme, since
k′′P = (k + j#E(Fq))P ≡ kP.
Such an encoding requires an integer multiplication; however, no computations are
needed for decoding. We assume that the bus of the scalar input is wide/flexible
enough to carry the encoded scalar k + j#E(Fq), where k is the secret key.
Among other possible encoding schemes, the binary unsigned representation of
k can be converted into one of the many binary signed representations of k. This
conversion/encoding can be done in a random way. For an m-bit integer k, there
are O(3bm2 c) different binary signed digit representations on average [29]. This
however requires the ECSM module to support the double-and-add/sub algorithm
and is not considered here.
2For today’s applications, a 20-bit random integer j is recommended by Coron in order to
resist the DPA attack [23].
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4.1.2 Error-detecting structures and probability of unde-
tected error
As stated before, for the purpose of encoding, one can map input pair k and
P = (X,Y, Z) to k + j#E(Fq) and (γ
cX, γdY, γZ), respectively. These encod-
ing schemes produce different representations of inputs that are equivalent to the
original input and do not require the decoding process. In addition, as shown in
Section 4.4 with experimental results, these two encoding schemes lead to a lower
probability of undetected errors when compared with other encoding schemes dis-
cussed earlier, namely P 7→ −P alone or combined with k 7→ k′ = #E(Fq) − k.
As a result, in this work, we use these two encoding schemes for error detection in
ECSM. In particular, for re-computation based error detection, at t0 we compute
the ECSM with (k, j0, P, γ0) as inputs, and then at t1 compute another ECSM with
(k, j1, P, γ1), where j0 and j1 are two random integers of appropriate length (say 20
bits for a 160 bits long k), and γ0 and γ1 are two random non-zero elements of the
underlying finite field.
In the comparator unit, the outputs of the two ECSM operations that are in
projective representation need to be compared. For this matter, below we apply an
idea originally presented by Meloni [63] in a different context, namely to speed up
ECC scalar multiplication. Assume that Q0 = (X0, Y0, Z0) and Q1 = (X1, Y1, Z1)
are the two input points of the comparator. Then, similar to (4.5), we can transform
each Q0 and Q1 with γ = Z1 and Z0, respectively, i.e.,
Q0 ∼ (X0Zc1, Y0Zd1 , Z0Z1),
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Q1 ∼ (X1Zc0, Y1Zd0 , Z0Z1),
where for the López and Dahab system c = 1 and d = 2, and for the Jacobian system
c = 2 and d = 3. If Q0 and Q1 map to the same affine representation, then the new
X- and Y -coordinates of Q0 and Q1 must be equal since the new Z-coordinates
are the same. Thus, the cost of comparison of these two points is four finite field
multiplications and two squarings for the López and Dahab system, and six finite
field multiplications and two squarings for the Jacobian system. In addition, two
dlog2 qe-bit comparators are needed. The main advantage of this comparison scheme
is that an explicit transformation from projective to affine coordinates is not needed
resulting in the elimination of expensive field inversion operations.
Finally, if the compared points are the same, one of them is produced as the
final output. Otherwise, no final output is given. This scheme is shown in Figure
4.1, and we refer to it as full re-computation based scheme or RC for short.
Because of random γi and ji for i = 0 and 1, one can assume that in the presence
of faults – whether identical or not – the ECSM module’s output Qi is a random trio
(Xi, Yi, Zi) of finite field elements. If the fault makes the ECSM module produce an
incorrect result, then Qi 6= kP . Since the number of elements in the finite field is q
and Qi has q− 1 different projective representations, the probability that Q0 = Q1







For many of today’s security applications , where q ≈ 2160, the above probability
of undetected error is quite small. The counterpart of RC that uses parallel com-



































Figure 4.1: ECSM using full re-computation with point and scalar randomization
(RC)
putation is shown in Figure 4.2. This parallel computation based scheme (or PC
for short) can detect any error confined in one module. Additionally, if both ECSM
modules have errors, since they use different input representations, the probability
of having equal erroneous outputs from these modules is low as given in Equation
(4.8).
4.1.3 Error detection using partial re-computation
The main penalty of using full re-computation (i.e., using RC) is that it doubles
the running time of ECSM. In applications where the ECSM module is subject to
only permanent faults injected by an attacker or caused naturally, the running time

























Figure 4.2: Parallel computation based ECSM with point and scalar randomization
(PC)
can be reduced by performing a partial re-computation (RC partial) as discussed
below.
Under RC partial, input point P is encoded twice using point randomization
described in (4.6) so that it has different representations at t0 and t1. Input scalar
k is encoded to k′′ using (4.7) for ECSM at t0, but no encoding is done for t1 and
only a few bits (say, least significant l bits, where 0 ≤ l ≤ m) of the encoded k are
used. Let these l bits correspond to integer ks =
∑l−1
i=0 2
ik′′i , where k
′′
i ∈ {0, 1} .
Based on the above discussion, at time t0, an ECSM is computed with (k, j0, P, γ0).
Let us denote the output of this computation as Q0. As part of the computation,
assuming a left-to-right double-and-add algorithm, ksP is expected to be generated
after l iterations of the algorithm. This value (i.e., point ksP ) or an erroneous ver-
sion of it – in case there are errors due to faults – is saved for a later comparison.
Let us denote the saved value as Q0, partial.
At time t1, an ECSM is computed with (ks, 1, P, γ1). Since ks is l bits long, this
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computation requires l − 1 point doublings and H(ks) − 1 point additions, where
H(ks) denotes the Hamming weight of ks. Let us define the output of this ECSM as
Q1. If the affine representations of Q1 and Q0, partial are the same, then Q0 computed
at t0 is produced as the final result.
The probability of undetected errors in the RC partial scheme depends on the
value of l. If l takes the maximum value i.e., l = m, then RC partial is the
same as RC discussed earlier and doubles the running time, but the probability
of undetected errors is very low as given in Equation (4.8). On the other hand, if
l is minimum i.e., 0, then there is no re-computation at all and no errors will be
detected unless other techniques such as PV are used. For practical purposes, l may
be taken as a small fraction, say 10%, of the number of bits in k and still achieve
a low probability of undetected error since the point encoding technique described
in (4.6) produces two random projective representations of the point at t0 and t1.
4.1.4 Error detection under faults injected by a sophisti-
cated attacker
In this subsection, we discuss scenarios where a sophisticated adversary could mount
an attack using the principles of today’s best known fault attacks for ECC. Here, two
attacks are considered. First, like the scenario given by Biehl et al. [9], the attacker
is able to flip a single bit in a register that holds an intermediate point during the
ECSM operation. Second, the attacker exploits the possibility of changing the sign
of an intermediate point in order to mount the SCF attack as described by Blömer
et al. [14]. For details on these attacks, the reader is referred to [9] and [14].
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1) ECC differential fault attack: Suppose that the attacker can inject a fault
at a random state in a register that holds partial results during the ECSM operation
as described by Biehl et al. [9]. In such a case, the point operations result in normal
additions before the fault and pseudo-additions [9] after the fault. The latter, in
turn, represents an operation that leaves the original group structure. Thus, after
the fault a random finite field trio is obtained at the ECSM output and the PV
process can detect such errors with a probability of
Pr(Qi ∈ E(Fq)) =
(#E(Fq)− 1)(q − 1) + 1








Therefore, for large q, PV after the ECSM (Figure 2.1) might represent a counter-
measure against this attack. However, that is not the case for all ECC fault attacks
as shown in the following scenario.
2) SCF attack: Consider a cryptosystem based on an elliptic curve over prime
field where a sign change in a point implies only a change in the Y -coordinate.
Assume that the attacker is able to change this sign in an intermediate point during
the ECSM operation as described by Blömer et al. [14]. In such a case, the erroneous
results, which are valid points on the original elliptic curve, would be undetectable
by the PV process. Hence, the probability of undetected error under this attack
for the scheme of Figure 2.1 would be equal to unity. Now, let us consider the
RC scheme under this attack where the adversary would need to inject an SCF
into both ECSM runs. Here, the original assumption that a random finite field
trio is generated after the fault is bypassed. The reason is that the output is now
restricted only to the set of points on the curve. Due to random input point and
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scalar, if we consider that the output is now a random point on the curve, then the
probability of undetected error is about 1/q. The same probability applies for the
PC scheme if the attacker is able to inject an SCF to each ECSM module. Both
schemes, RC and PC, can be utilized as a countermeasure to the SCF attack. The
extra cost for these schemes in terms of time and area will be presented in Section
4.3.
4.2 Fault-tolerant structures for ECSM
From the cryptographic point of view, while error detection is a sufficient counter-
measure for preventing fault-based attacks, fault-tolerant characteristic enables a
system to perform its normal operation in spite of faults. This will result in more
reliable systems where faults may occur due to deliberate attacks or due to nat-
ural causes such as abnormal temperature, electromagnetic interference, or power
supply changes.
In this section, we present methods for fault tolerance for ECSM. Here, we
assume static redundancy only. This means that the system can tolerate faults
using masking; in fact, such faults are bypassed without any reparability or recon-
figuration capabilities. First, a classical example of hardware redundancy, triple
modular redundancy (TMR), is considered for ECSM. Then, by taking advantage
of the simplicity of PV operation, we present a double modular redundancy (DMR)
based fault-tolerant scheme, namely DMR PV. Finally, by combining parallel com-
putation with re-computation, we present another ECSM fault-tolerant structure
that is as robust as TMR, and achieves an area efficiency close to DMR PV. For
each of the fault-tolerant schemes, we also give its reliability, which is defined as
100 Robust ECSM Using Repeated and Parallel Computations
its characteristic expressed by the probability that it will perform its function [85].
Finally, we provide a reliability comparison among these schemes.
4.2.1 TMR based fault-tolerant ECSM
Traditional TMR utilizes three elements performing the same operation [87]. In
the context of the work presented here, these elements would correspond to ECSM
modules as shown in Figure 4.3. In this TMR scheme, as long as two or all three
ECSM modules yield correct results, the majority voter produces a correct final
output. When two or more ECSM modules become faulty by natural causes or by
some simple malicious action by a less sophisticated attacker, then the faulty mod-
ules are likely to produce different but incorrect results, and the majority voter will
produce no final output. However, when a sophisticated attacker can deliberately
inject faults that may cause two or more ECSM modules to generate the same but
incorrect result, then the majority voter will produce an erroneous output and the
TMR scheme will fail.
In an attempt to reduce the chance of TMR producing an erroneous result, we
proceed as follows: Scalar k and point P , which are inputs to the ECSM modules,
are encoded using the randomization techniques discussed in Section 4.1, as illus-
trated in Figure 4.4. The ECSM outputs are connected to a secure majority voter
implemented in either software or hardware.
Like the comparator unit, the majority voter needs to process their inputs in
projective coordinates. Assume that Q0 = (X0, Y0, Z0), Q1 = (X1, Y1, Z1), and
Q2 = (X2, Y2, Z2) are the three input points of the majority voter. Then, similar
to (4.5), we can transform each Q0, Q1, and Q2 with γ = Z1Z2, Z0Z2, and Z0Z1,














Figure 4.3: Traditional TMR based ECSM
respectively, i.e.,
Q0 ∼ (X0(Z1Z2)c, Y0(Z1Z2)d, Z0Z1Z2),
Q1 ∼ (X1(Z0Z2)c, Y1(Z0Z2)d, Z0Z1Z2),
Q2 ∼ (X2(Z0Z1)c, Y2(Z0Z1)d, Z0Z1Z2),
where c and d are as defined earlier. With this new transformed points, a normal
voting process can be performed that will produce a final result QTMR, which is the
majority of these points. If there is no majority, then no final output is generated.
Clearly, if errors occur in only one of the ECSM modules, then their effects can be
masked and a correct final output can be obtained.
Assume that an attacker can inject the same fault, transient or permanent, in
two or all three modules in an attempt to make the faulty modules produce the
same but incorrect result. In such circumstances, the point and scalar encodings



































Figure 4.4: TMR based ECSM
help to keep the risk of giving an incorrect result to a low level. This is explained
as follows: Because of the encoding of inputs, in the presence of faults, each ECSM
module is expected to produce a random projective representation, which maps
to one of the q2 affine coordinates representations. An erroneous final result is
produced by the majority voter if two or all three outputs represent the same but
incorrect points. Thus, the probability that the final result has an error is







q2 × q2 × q2 +
q2









(for large q). (4.10)
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Figure 4.5: DMR PV fault-tolerant ECSM
We note that TMR can be viewed as a special case of an N -modular redundant







4.2.2 DMR PV fault-tolerant ECSM
In applications where it is important to reduce silicon area, perhaps at the expense
of increases in the probability of an incorrect result, instead of using the TMR
based scheme discussed earlier, one can use the dual modular redundant (DMR)
system combined with PV, namely DMR PV, as shown in Figure 4.5. As it can
be clearly seen, compared to TMR, DMR PV uses one less ECSM module. An
important aspect is that this scheme is only appropriate for elliptic curves over the
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binary finite field F2m . For elliptic curves over the prime field Fp, the PV module
is not sufficient for detecting errors produced by the SCF attack. However, for the
case of elliptic curves over F2m , where the SCF attack does not apply, we can use
the PV module to validate the ECSM operations.
As shown in Figure 4.5, the two ECSM modules operate in parallel and their
outputs are verified by PV modules. The F block is used to stop the system output
if Q0, Q1 /∈ E(F2m); or when Q0 6= Q1, and Q0, Q1 ∈ E(F2m). The final output of





Q1 (or Q0) if PV(Q0 or Q1) = ok and Q0 = Q1,
Qi if Qi ∈ E(F2m) and Qi /∈ E(F2m),
no output otherwise,
where i = 1− i.
The DMR PV scheme can clearly tolerate any faults confined in only one of the
two modules and can produce the correct final output. Additionally, the scheme
can detect some situations where errors exist in the outputs of both modules and
hence helps to avoid producing erroneous results at the final output. However,
there are two cases of reasonably low probability when this scheme fails and gives
an incorrect result: first, if Q0 = Q1 and Q0, Q1 ∈ E(F2m) \ kP ; secondly, when
Q0 6= Q1, Qi ∈ E(F2m)\kP , and Qi /∈ E(F2m) for i = 0 or 1. Then, the probability
of giving an incorrect result when both ECSM modules are in error is
















(for large q). (4.11)
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4.2.3 Parallel and re-computation based fault-tolerant
ECSM
The above DMR PV scheme reduces the silicon area requirement but increases the
probability of an incorrect result. It is possible to have a fault-tolerant ECSM sys-
tem that is as area efficient as DMR PV and has the same low probability of incor-
rect result as TMR. To this end, one can use a parallel and re-computation3 (PRC)
based scheme shown in Figure 4.6. In PRC, at time t0, with input (k, j0,t0 , P, γ0,t0)
and (k, j1,t0 , P, γ1,t0) the two ECSM modules produce Q0,t0 and Q1,t0 , respectively.
These two points are then compared using the technique on page 94. If the points
are the same, then one of them is produced as the final output QPRC . Otherwise, the
ECSM modules perform re-computations with (k, j0,t1 , P, γ0,t1) and (k, j1,t1 , P, γ1,t1)
and produce Q0,t1 and Q1,t1 . If errors are confined in only one of the ECSM mod-
ules, then for only one of the two values of i, i.e., either i = 0 or i = 1, Qi,t0 and
Qi,t1 are the same after their Z-coordinates are made equal and one of them can
be produced as the final output QPRC .
An erroneous final QPRC may be produced in the following two cases: (i) the
ECSM modules produce the same but incorrect result at t0, and (ii) any of the
two ECSM modules gives an incorrect but same result at both t0 and t1. For the
PRC operation described above, the probability that an erroneous final result is
produced is













(for large q) (4.12)
3The combination of time and hardware redundancy for fault-tolerant system design has been
considered in other contexts, e.g., Lima et al. [55] have used this combination for having fault-
tolerance on FPGAs.





































































Figure 4.6: Parallel and re-computation (PRC) based fault-tolerant ECSM
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which matches (4.10) for TMR.
We note that the re-computation in the PRC based scheme is performed when
one or both ECSM modules generate incorrect results and hence doubles the run-
ning time under such situations. If both ECSM modules are properly working, then
the running time of PRC is the same as that of TMR and DMR PV.
4.2.4 Effect on reliability
The reliability comparison between several fault-tolerant systems has been consid-
ered in the literature [83] [54]. In the context of this work, note that compared to
the ECSM module, each of the other modules in Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6, namely
the majority voter, the point and the scalar randomization modules, PV modules,
comparators, registers, and multiplexors would require a lot less hardware in prac-
tice. Thus, these small components can be implemented such that each of those
will have a reliability factor that is close to unity. Then, for the case of TMR
based ECSM, i.e., a correct result is obtained when at least two out of three ECSM





ECSM(1− rECSM) = 3r2ECSM − 2r3ECSM , (4.13)
where rECSM is the reliability factor of a single ECSM module. On the other hand,
for both DMR PV and PRC based ECSM schemes their reliability RDMR PV/PRC is
related to the probability that at least one of the two ECSM modules work without
errors. The resulting expression for RDMR PV/PRC is:
RDMR PV/PRC ≈ r
2
ECSM + 2rECSM(1− rECSM) = 2rECSM − r2ECSM . (4.14)
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If we subtract Equation (4.13) from (4.14), we obtain
RDMR PV/PRC −RTMR
= 2rECSM − r2ECSM − (3r2ECSM − 2r3ECSM)
= 2rECSM(1− rECSM)2.
Since 0 < rECSM < 1, RDMR PV/PRC − RTMR is always positive, i.e., we can state
that the reliabilities of DMR PV and PRC based schemes are greater than that
of the TMR based system (see Figure 4.7). The improved reliability of DMR PV
and PRC schemes is primarily due to their ability to mask out errors confined in
one module with fewer number of ECSM modules compared to the TMR. The use
of the reduced number of ECSM modules is possible due to the PV modules in
DMR PV and the re-computation in PRC.
4.3 Overhead cost
The error-detecting and fault-tolerant ECSM structures presented in Sections 4.1
and 4.2 require a number of extra modules, namely PV module, point randomiza-
tion module, scalar randomization module, register, comparator, majority voter,
and multiplexor. In this section, we give costs of these components based on hard-
ware implementation using FPGAs. We also give the time impact on the ECSM
operation, in terms of number of clock cycles, due to the inclusion of these extra
components. We also note that these components must be implemented in a secure
environment so that they are not vulnerable against faults.
For ECSM operation, we use the performance results given by Lutz [59], where
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Figure 4.7: Reliability comparison among TMR, DMR PV and PRC schemes
a NIST-recommended elliptic curve over F2163 has been used. The performance
results are based on a Xilinx Virtex 2000E FPGA implementation, and the ECSM
operation uses a finite field multiplier, a squaring unit, and an adder. The area and
timing results of these arithmetic units are:
Multiplier: 2364 slices and 4 cycles
Squaring unit: 165 slices and 1 cycle
Adder: 94 slices and 0 cycles.
The entire module, which performs ECSM, with input and output points in pro-
jective coordinates, requires 5009 slices and 17160 clock cycles for each scalar mul-
tiplication.
For implementing the extra modules (i.e., PV module, point and scalar random-
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Element Slices Cycles
ECSM module 5009 17160
PV module 760 824
Point randomization module 528 653
Scalar randomization module1 815 18
Register 245 1
Comparator 549 656
Majority voter 824 1476
Multiplexor 245 0
1Size of j = 20 bits.
Table 4.1: Cost and performance for the ECSM and other extra modules used for
error-detecting and fault-tolerant structures
ization modules, register, comparator, majority voter, and multiplexor), we have
used the same FPGA to be consistent with the ECSM module implemented by
Lutz [59]. For some modules, namely PV, point randomization, comparator, and
majority voter, in order to optimize the area requirement we have used a low speed
multiplier which occupies 286 slices and 163 cycles for each finite field multipli-
cation. The results of performance and cost for these extra modules are given in
Table 4.1.
Incorporating the extra modules with the ECSM modules as shown in the error-
detecting structures of Section 4.1, we obtain the time and space complexity results
given in Table 4.2. The corresponding results for the fault-tolerant structures of
Section 4.2 are shown in Table 4.3.
The clock cycle data in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 correspond to the time needed to
produce a final ECSM output given input pair k and P . In applications where
many such ECSM operations are to be performed, a more important measure of
4.3. Overhead cost 111
ECSM with Figure No. Slices Latency Throughput
(Cycles) ratios1
no error detection NA 5009 17160 1
PV 2.1 5769 17984 1
RC 4.1 7146 35795 1
2
RC partial2 NA 7146 20319 1
1+l/m
PC 4.2 11910 19452 1
1With respect to the ECSM with no error detection.
2Size of l = 16 bits.
Table 4.2: Performance and cost for error-checking systems over F2163
Scheme Figure No. Slices Latency Throughput
(Cycles) ratios1
TMR based fault-tolerant ECSM 4.4 17194 21090 1
DMR PV ECSM 4.5 12916 19452 1
PRC ECSM 4.6 13136 194522 12 or 1
2
1With respect to the ECSM with no error detection.
2If no error is detected at t0, otherwise the running time is doubled/throughput is halved.
Table 4.3: Performance and cost for fault-tolerant systems over F2163
performance is the throughput, which can be defined as the number of ECSM
outputs per unit of time. In the rightmost column of Table 4.2, we give ratios of
the throughput with no error detection to that with various error detection schemes,
such as PC, RC, and RC partial. Similarly, in Table 4.3, we give such ratios for
fault-tolerant schemes. In determining the ratios, we assume that the operations of
an ECSM module and comparator/PV can be overlapped. The ratio results show
a number of trade-offs one can consider between area and throughputs.
For the FPGA implementation described here, the clock frequency is 66 MHz.
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At this speed, the ECSM with the PV module, as shown in the second row of
Table 4.2, will require 17984/(66 × 106) ≈ 272.48 µsec. On the other hand, if all
modules are implemented in software, then using the results reported by Hankerson
et al. [39] for finite field arithmetic units, an ECSM unit with the PV module will
require approximately 5.38 msec. These results may vary depending on the target
platform and the level of optimization used; nevertheless, they show the speed
advantage of using hardware over software.
4.4 Experimental results for undetected errors
with a small prototype
As discussed earlier, when an error occurs due to a fault in the ECSM module, it is
possible that the error remains undetected by the schemes presented in Section 4.1.
Whether or not a fault causes an undetected error depends on a number of factors
including the input pair k and P , the implementation, and the fault itself. The
latter, in turn, could be characterized by some parameters that include location,
type (e.g., stuck-at, bit flip, or bit set or reset), number of bits affected (e.g.,
single or multiple), and duration (e.g., permanent or transient). In this section, we
present experimental results of undetected error probabilities based on an exhaustive
generation of faults for a small prototype ECSM module. The prototype is modeled
using VHDL with a Xilinx Spartan 3 1000 FPGA as the hardware target.
An exhaustive generation of faults at finite field level is chosen in order to ob-
tain average numbers that do not depend only on a specific fault location. For the
experiments, we also included all the possible input pairs (k, P ) to avoid the de-
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pendability of the results for a specific input pair. Clearly, these exhaustive fashion
experiments limit the maximum feasible finite field size that the system can han-
dle. However, the main factor for this limitation is the number of ECSM operations
needed for finding errors in structures where the probabilities of undetected errors
are expected to be very low (e.g., 1/q, 1/q2).
In order to have experiments with the above description in a reasonable amount
of time, we have selected the prototype to be based on the finite field F211 . For
this small prototype, the simplest experiment that involves only the PV module,
the number of ECSM operations is approximately 0.5 billion4 requiring roughly
2.5 hours to complete in the actual hardware. Other experiments involve much
more operations, for example in each parallel computing scheme the number of
ECSM operations is approximately 35 billions5 and about seven days to complete.
Although this ECSM prototype is small for a real application, it allows us to perform
experiments in an exhaustive way, which in turn permits us to illustrate the error
detection coverage for the schemes presented earlier.
4.4.1 Parameters, fault model, and process
For efficient implementation, the irreducible binary trinomial z11 + z2 + 1 of degree
11 has been selected to construct the finite field F211 . The elliptic curve used is E:
y2 + xy = x3 + x2 + 1, which has an order of 1982 = 2× 991, where 991 is prime.
The double-and-add algorithm has been used for obtaining the ECSM with the
López and Dahab projective coordinates. For finite field operations, the methods
illustrated in Table 4.4 have been utilized. In total, 134 gates have been used for
41980(input points)×134(fault locations)×989(input scalars)×2(fault types).
51980(input points)×1342(fault locations)×989(input scalars) for each fault type.
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implementing the finite field operations (117, 6 and 11 for finite field multiplication,
squaring and addition, respectively) over F211 . The fault model used is a permanent
stuck-at-0 or stuck-at-1 fault in these gates, and only one gate can be faulty at a
time.
Faults have been injected in a similar way as described by Zarandi et al. [95].
The idea is to add a multiplexor to each gate to be tested, such that we can select
if the gate will work normally or with a stuck-at-0 or stuck-at-1 fault at its output
(see Figure 4.8). Presence or absence of a fault is controlled by the fault injection
signal (FIS). The fault selector signal (FSS) chooses a stuck-at-0 or stuck-at-1





Multiplication Look-up table-based group level
Multiplication [41] 1
117 2
Squaring Modified look-up table-based
group level Multiplication [59] 1
6 3
Inversion Itoh & Tsujii [44]. With 4 multi-
plications and 10 squarings.
0
Addition Bit-wise XOR 11 3
1Group size = 6. 281 2-input AND gates, 20 2-input XOR gates, 11 5-input
XOR gates, and 5 2-input OR gates. 32-input XOR gates.
Table 4.4: Methods utilized for finite field operations over F211
The elliptic curve utilized has 1980 points on it that are of order either 1982
or 991. In our experiments, these 1980 points6 are input for each value of scalar k
in the range of 2 to 990. For each fixed set of input point and scalar, a fault-free
6The remaining two points include the point at infinite and (0x00,0x01). The latter has the
order of two. Both of these points are not considered suitable for cryptographic applications.
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Inputs








Figure 4.8: Stuck-at-0 or 1 fault injection method
computation is performed to obtain kP . Then a stuck-at-0 or stuck-at-1 fault is
injected for each individual gate used for the finite field operations and the ECSM
operation is repeated. The result is then compared with the fault-free case to
determine if the fault has produced an erroneous result.
For the case of PV, the experiment consists of obtaining, after a single fault
(stuck-at-0 or 1), the probability that an erroneous result is in E(F211). For the
re-computation based schemes, after the injected fault, two scalar multiplications
with their respective encoding process are performed (at t0 and at t1) and then the
results are compared. Additionally, in order to show the importance of the choice
of the encoding/decoding processes, to each re-computation scheme presented in
Section 4.1 (i.e., RC and RC partial), we include other types of encoding/decoding
processes in the experiment.
Similar to the re-computation case, an experiment is performed for the PC
scheme presented in Section 4.1. In this scheme, there are two ECSM modules. In
one set of experiments, we inject faults in only one of the two modules at a time.
In another set of experiments we consider the case where each of the two ECSM
modules has a single fault at the same time (at the same or different location).
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4.4.2 Results obtained
Encoding schemes
As we stated in Section 4.1, the encoding/decoding process plays an important role
for error detection capability for schemes shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3. To see
their relative effectiveness, we ran experiments for different encoding techniques
for ECSM re-computation based schemes. Table 4.5 shows their probabilities of
undetected errors. The results of the table imply that the combination of the
encoding schemes (4.6) and (4.7) i.e., (k, P ) 7→ (k′′, P ′) yields the least probability
of undetected errors, and this is why we have earlier presented our theoretical results
using this encoding technique. In the following discussions, we present experimental




















1Point negation is needed for decoding. 2k′ = #E(F211) − k.
3P ′ = (γX, γ2Y, γZ), γ ∈ F∗
2m
. 4k′′ = k + j#E(F211).
Table 4.5: Probabilities of undetected errors for re-computation based schemes
using different encoding in the experiment over F211
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Error detection schemes
For each error-detecting scheme presented in Section 4.1, the probability of unde-
tected error was obtained. Table 4.6 shows these probabilities for the stuck-at-0
and stuck-at-1 fault models. The PV alone gives the worst error detection coverage
for these schemes (i.e., 1
217
for the stuck-at-0 fault model).
Our experiment for scheme RC shows values that are close of the value from
Equation (4.8) if an average of the stuck-at-0 and stuck-at-1 results is considered
(i.e., q2 = 4, 194, 304 vs. 4,297,550). For the PC scheme, if the faults are confined in
only one of the two ECSM modules, then there are no undetected errors as shown
in the fourth row of Table 4.6. The results for the case where both ECSM modules
had a fault each are shown in the last row.
Pr(undetected error) Pr(Q = O, P |undetected error)
Scheme Stuck-at-0 Stuck-at-1 Stuck-at-0 Stuck-at-1
fault fault fault fault





































1Modifying the PV module to exclude O and P as valid outputs. 2Injecting faults only to one ECSM module.
3l = 3. 4Injecting faults to both ECSM modules.
Table 4.6: Probabilities of undetected errors for our experiment over F211
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4.4.3 Comments
We have noticed that for both types of faults and especially for the stuck-at-0 fault
model, the probability of obtaining two special points, namely O and P is relatively
high. The following two scenarios contribute to these higher probabilities. First,
if the projective Z-coordinate QZ of the ECSM result Q is zero, then irrespective
of the values of X- and Y -coordinates the result is the O point. Second, consider
the case where the Z-coordinate of the variable representing Q is zero in the last
iteration of the loop in the double-and-add algorithm for ECSM. In such a case,
assuming a left-to-right version of the algorithm, the final result will be O or P
depending of the value of the least significant bit of k.
With the above observations, it is useful that the PV module does not consider
O or P as a valid output of ECSM. In fact, from the cryptographic point of view, if
P and k are selected as a non trivial value (i.e., k 6= {0, 1, ord(P )}), a valid result
will not be either O or P . If we assume that the PV module is modified such that
O and P are not considered as a valid ECSM output, the resulting probabilities are






in the second row of Table 4.6.
Another interesting observation of this experiment is that it is more likely to
obtain a result equal to O with faults that are stuck-at-0 than those with stuck-
at-1. For our experiments, stuck-at-0 faults tend to reduce the Hamming weight
of the Z-coordinate of the output as shown in Table 4.7. In contrast, on average
stuck-at-1 faults produce results with more binary 1s. For this reason, the stuck-at-
0 faults have more cases with QZ = 0, and consequently, the resulting point on the






Table 4.7: Average Hamming weight of the Z-coordinate of the result for our
experiment over F211





As stated earlier, the error detection capability depends on various factors in-
cluding the actual inputs, the faults and implementation architecture. For our
experiments, the architecture might have considerable impact on the numerical re-
sults, since the finite field arithmetic unit was invoked several times during each
ECSM operation. In addition, the fault type (stuck-at or bit-flip), fault location,
etc. might have affected our experiments.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented error-detecting and fault-tolerant structures for
ECSM. For the purpose of error detection, the concepts of re-computation and
parallel computation have been used. In order to have a higher probability of er-
ror detection during the ECSM operation, we have presented encoding/decoding
schemes suitable for ECSM computation. Schemes are based on the concepts of
scalar and point randomization. These schemes provide resistance to attacks where
fault-induced operations do not leave the original elliptic curve (e.g., the SCF at-
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tack). By generating single stuck-at faults exhaustively for a small ECSM prototype
we have given experimental results that show the probabilities of undetected errors
for the proposed error-detecting schemes.
Traditionally, the concept of having only two modules working in parallel has
been associated with error-detecting systems only. However, for ECSM, we have
shown that with only two ECSM modules along with either PV (i.e., the proposed
DMR PV based scheme) or re-computation (i.e., PRC based scheme), it is possible
not only to detect but also correct errors due to faults. These fault-tolerant schemes




In Chapter 4 we have presented error detection and fault tolerance in ECSM at the
module level. That is, we have added external elements to the ECSM module in
order to detect errors and/or tolerate faults, where the underlying scalar multiplica-
tion algorithm is not modified. In contrast, this chapter presents error detection at
the algorithm level. Here, we add protections inside the ECSM algorithm in order
to detect errors caused either by natural causes or deliberately by faults injected by
an attacker. For this purpose, we use point verification (PV) and coherency check
(CC) among selected variables utilized for the ECSM. The CC functions that we
define in this chapter are algorithm specific. On the contrary, PV can be applied
to any ECSM method.
In this chapter we investigate the error detection capability of different methods
in ECSM. For the remainder of this chapter, the following assumptions are made:
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• Any variable utilized in the ECSM can be a target of natural faults or faults
injected by an attacker. For simplicity in the analysis we assume that variables
such as the loop counter i and scalar k can be checked for integrity in order
to prevent disturbance of their values.
• Faults might occur directly in the registers containing the variables using a
flip-bit fault model or at a finite field arithmetic level. In the latter, any error
might spread into one or more variables.
• In Sections 5.1 and 5.2 we assume that decisional tests (e.g., “if (PV(Q) = 1)
then”) are not susceptible to faults. This might be the case for secure mi-
crocontrollers utilized in today’s smart cards where hardware protections are
added for not permitting fault injection into sensitive registers (e.g., CPU’s
status register). In Section 5.3 we relax this assumption considering the dou-
ble-fault attack proposed by Yen et al. [94] and refined by Kim and Quisquater
[48] for RSA cryptosystems.
• In this chapter a number of algorithm specific functions for CC are defined.
These are labelled as CCi, where i ∈ [1, 4] (i.e., CC1-CC4).
Let us define a vector (V0, V1, . . . Vj−1) which is composed of the variables utilized
in the ECSM algorithm. As a consequence of faults produced naturally or injected
by an attacker the vector might be changed to (Ṽ0, Ṽ1, . . . Ṽj−1). Depending on
the resultant vector, the error-detecting scheme may detect the presence of an
error caused by the fault. Whether or not the error is detected depends on the
rules utilized for error detection (e.g., PV(Q)) and the actual values of the specific
variables to be tested. We can see this by analogy as a binary code of coding
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theory. For this case the length of the code n is the size (in bits) of the vector
(V0, V1, . . . Vj−1). The codewords are those cases where no error is detected, i.e., the
error-detecting scheme cannot distinguish between an error-free computation and
a faulty one. For comparing the error-detecting schemes presented in this chapter
we use the following definition [56]:
Definition 5.1 The ratio cR = log2(r)/n is called the code rate, where r and n are
the number of codewords and length of the code, respectively.
The error detection capability of a particular coding scheme is correlated to
its code rate. A higher code rate can be seen as high information content and low
coding overhead. However, the fewer bits used for coding redundancy, the less error
protection is provided [90].
The organization of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. In Section 5.1,
we consider error detection in the Montgomery ladder ECSM. Section 5.2 presents
error detection in the double-and-add-always method. In Section 5.3, we give a
countermeasure that can be used against the double-fault attack. Finally, we make
some concluding remarks in Section 5.4.
5.1 Error detection in the Montgomery ladder
algorithm
In this section we present our work on error detection in the Montgomery ladder
ECSM algorithm for non-supersingular elliptic curves over the binary finite field
proposed by López and Dahab [58]. First, we consider the case where a PV process
is placed at the end of the ECSM. Then, we use CC among the involved variables
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for error detection. We give a comparison between both approaches that suggests
the use of an integrity check (IC) with either a PV or CC process.
Let k = (kt−1 · · · k1 k0)2 and Q = kP be the scalar and the ECSM result,
respectively, where P = (x, y) ∈ E(F2m) and n = ord(P ). First, let us define the
“exceptional” cases for the ECSM result be Q = ±P , Q = O, and Q = (0,
√
b). In
the Montgomery ladder algorithm (Algorithm 2.5), for fault-free computations the





n + 1 (i.e., Q0 = P , Q1 = 2P ),
n− 1 (i.e., Q0 = −P , Q1 = O),
n (i.e., Q0 = O, Q1 = P ),
n/2 (i.e., for n even Q0 = (0,
√
b)).
In the algorithms presented in this section let us restrict these exceptional cases for
error-free computations, i.e., simply by restricting the input k being n ± 1 and n,
and n/2 if n is even.
5.1.1 PV process at the end of the ECSM
The Montgomery ladder algorithm in affine coordinates proposed by López and
Dahab [58] (Algorithm 2.6) is shown in Algorithm 5.1 with a PV process at the
end of the ECSM. This algorithm restricts the occurrence of the exceptional cases
described above. In Step 3.1, as defined by Equation (2.11), the y-coordinate of
the output (i.e., Q0y) is computed using the following function:
g(Q0x , Q1x , x, y) =
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For Algorithm 5.1 let us obtain the cases where PV(Q0) = 1 in Step 3.2, i.e.,
where Q0 is released as the ECSM output. Clearly this occurs always in an error-free
computation. However, this is not likely to be the case when errors are produced
by faults occurring naturally or injected deliberately by an attacker. Let us assume
that an adversary can induce fault(s) during the execution of the ECSM. Consider
that this produces an incorrect result Q̃ 6= Q which will be checked by the PV
process.
Algorithm 5.1. Montgomery’s ladder ECSM with PV at the end
Input: P = (x, y) ∈ E(F2m) of order n, where n is an odd prime. A positive integer
k = (kt−1 · · · k1k0)2, where kt−1 = 1, k 6= n, and k 6= n± 1.
Output: Q = kP .
1. Q0x ← x, Q1x ← x(2P ).
2. For i = t− 2 downto 0 do
2.1 If (ki = 0) then
2.1.1 Q1x ← x(Q0 ]Q1), Q0x ← x(2Q0);
2.2 Else
2.2.1 Q0x ← x(Q0 ]Q1), Q1x ← x(2Q1).
3. If ((Q0x 6= x) and (Q0x 6= 0) and (x 6= 0)) then
3.1 Q0y = g(Q0x , Q1x , x, y).
3.2 If (PV(Q0) = 1) then return(Q0x , Q0y);
3.3 Else return(“Error detected”).
4. Else return(“Error detected”).
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Let us consider that any variable utilized by the ECSM algorithm can be affected
by errors due to faults. For the case of Algorithm 5.1 instead of having an error-
free vector (Q0x , Q1x , x, y) we have the erroneous vector (Q̃0x , Q̃1x , x̃, ỹ). From now
on, let us refer to Q0x , Q1x , x, and y as the final value of these variables after
the main loop. Assume that the adversary is able to inject faults during the main
loop, i.e., where the sensitive information (i.e., scalar k) is utilized. With the above
considerations let us obtain the cases where PV(Q̃0) = 1. We can substitute the
point (Q̃0x , Q̃0y) in the governing elliptic curve equation (Equation (2.3)) to obtain:




0x + b. (5.2)
Using Equation (5.1), in Step 3.1 Q̃0y is computed as a function of Q̃0x , Q̃1x , x̃, and
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+b = 0.





















(Ht(w1) + 1). (5.5)
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If Tr(w1) = 0 and the relation among Q̃0x , Q̃1x , x̃, and ỹ satisfies either Equation
(5.4) or (5.5), then PV(Q̃0) = 1. In this scenario PV fails to detect such errors.
Lemma 5.1 For an arbitrary vector (Q̃0x , Q̃1x , x̃, ỹ), the number of combinations
where PV(Q̃0) = 1 in Step 3.2 of Algorithm 5.1 is about 2
3m.
Proof For this case for each possible value of Q̃0x (i.e., #E(F2m)/2− 2) there are
two solutions for Q̃1x . For fixed Q̃0x and Q̃1x , the number of possible values for x̃
and ỹ is 2m − 2 and 2m, respectively (i.e., x̃ 6= Q̃0x , and x̃ 6= 0). Thus, the number
of combinations where PV(Q̃0) = 1 in Step 3.2 of Algorithm 5.1 is
2m(#E(F2m)− 2)(2m − 2) ≈ 23m.
Using Lemma 5.1 we can obtain the code rate cR for this case as
cR =
log2(2





In Step 3.1 of Algorithm 5.1 Q0y is obtained as a function of Q0x , Q1x , x, and
y. This computation assumes that the difference between Q1 and Q0 is P . If due
to a fault this difference is lost, then presumably the corresponding Q̃0 will become
a finite field pair that does not rely on E(F2m). Then PV process at the end of
ECSM will detect such errors. This is not the case for the combinations obtained
in Lemma 5.1.
5.1.2 CC process at the end of the ECSM
Instead of obtaining Q0y assuming that Q1 − Q0 = P , we can verify first if the
coherency among Q0x , Q1x , x, and y does exist. Only if it does, the correspond-









Figure 5.1: Multiples of point P of order n
ing ECSM output is released. For checking the coherency among a given vec-
tor (Q0x , Q1x , x, y) we can proceed as follows. First, we can search for a point
Q̂0 ∈ E(F2m) of the form (Q0x , Q̂0y) for some Q̂0y ∈ E(F2m). This step involves
the solution of a quadratic equation for Q̂0y from the elliptic curve equation. Let
us consider an error-free computation for which Q̂0 will always exist. In fact, for
Q0x 6= 0 there are two solutions of the quadratic equation. Let us set Q̂0y to one
of these solutions. In this way, Q̂0 will be either Q0 or −Q0, depending on which
solution is selected. With Q̂0, we can perform Q̂0 ] P which will result in either
Q1 = (k + 1)P or (n − k + 1)P , where n = ord(P ) (see Figure 5.1). Adding also
−Q̂0 ] P permits identifying which one of Q̂0 or −Q̂0 corresponds to Q0. For CC
purposes, since the only information available about Q1 is its x-coordinate, we can
perform only x(Q̂0 ]P ) and x(−Q̂0 ]P ) and compare the results with Q1x . Let us
define the CC function that defines the error detection rules for this scheme as:




ok = 1 if x(Q̂0 ] P ) = Q1x or x(−Q̂0 ] P ) = Q1x ,
0 otherwise.
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Algorithm 5.2 implements this function. Additionally, if the CC passes, then
the corresponding Q0y is also returned. This algorithm utilizes the group formulas
given on pages 17-18.
Algorithm 5.2. Computing CC1 and Q0y
Input: Q0x , Q1x , x, y.
Output: CC1(Q0x , Q1x , x, y), Q0y .
1. If ((Q0x 6= x) and (Q0x 6= 0) and (x 6= 0)) then
1.1 w2 ← Q0x + b/Q20x + a.
1.2 If (Tr(w2) = 0) then
1.2.1 Q̂0y ← Q0x · Ht(w2)
1.2.2 T1 ← 1/(Q0x + x).
1.2.3 T2 ← T1 · (Q̂0y + y).
1.2.4 T2 ← T 22 + T2 + Q0x + a.
1.2.5 If (T2 = Q1x) then return(1, Q̂0y);
1.2.6 Else
T2 ← T1 · (Q0x + Q̂0y + y).
T2 ← T 22 + T2 + Q0x + a.
If (T2 = Q1x) then return(1, Q0x + Q̂0y);
Else return(0, “Error detected”).
1.3 Else Return(0,“Error detected”).
2. Else return(0, “Error detected”).
The Montgomery ladder ECSM algorithm that uses function CC1 at the end for
error detection is presented as Algorithm 5.3. Now let us examine the cases where
Algorithm 5.3 releases Q0, i.e., CC1(Q0x , Q1x , x, y) = 1. This is always the case for
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error-free computations. Similar to PV in Algorithm 5.1, let us assume an erroneous
vector (Q̃0x , Q̃1x , x̃, ỹ). Let us define εP ∈ F2m as εP = ỹ2 + x̃ỹ+ x̃3 +ax̃2 +b. Based
on this definition, P̃ ∈ (F2m) iff εP = 0. By Theorem 2.3, Q̂0 = (Q̃0x , Q̂0y) ∈ E(F2m)
exists if and only if Tr(w2) = 0, where




In such a case, Q̂0y is set to one of the two quadratic equation solutions, i.e.,
Q̂0y = Q̃0xHt(w2). Utilizing the same group formulas as Algorithm 5.2, we can
obtain x(Q̂0 ] P̃ ) and x(−Q̂0 ] P̃ ). Whenever any of these results is equal to Q̃1x ,
function CC1 will fail to detect such errors. The corresponding values for Q̃1x ,


























Algorithm 5.3. The Montgomery ladder ECSM in affine coordinates with CC
Input: P = (x, y) ∈ E(F2m) of order n, where n is an odd prime. A positive integer
k = (kt−1 · · · k1k0)2, where kt−1 = 1, k 6= n, and k 6= n± 1.
Output: Q = kP .
1. Q0x ← x, Q1x ← x(2P ).
2. For i = t− 2 downto 0 do
2.1 If (ki = 0) then
2.1.1 Q1x ← x(Q0 ]Q1), Q0x ← x(2Q0);
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2.2 Else
2.2.1 Q0x ← x(Q0 ]Q1), Q1x ← x(2Q1).
3. Use Algorithm 5.2 to compute c = CC1(Q0x , Q1x , x, y) and Q0y .
4. If (c = 1) then return(Q0x , Q0y);
5. Else return(“Error detected”).
It can be shown that for an arbitrary (Q̃0x , Q̃1x , x̃, ỹ) the count of combinations
where Algorithm 5.3 fails to detect errors is the same as Algorithm 5.1 obtained
in Lemma 5.1. Consequently, cR for Algorithm 5.3 is also ≈ 3/4. In the next
subsection we compare the error detection coverage of these two algorithms.
5.1.3 Error detection comparison between PV and CC1
In the following lemmas we show some similarities and differences in terms of error
detection between PV(Q0) and CC1(Q0x , Q1x , x, y). In particular, the next lemma
shows that if one of these error-detecting approaches fails to detect a vector with a
specific value of Q̃0x , then the other approach also fails to detect some vectors with
the same Q̃0x .
Lemma 5.2 Let (r, s, u, v) be a particular vector of (Q̃0x , Q̃1x , x̃, ỹ), where r, u ∈
F
∗
2m , s, v ∈ F2m , and r 6= u (i.e., not considering the exceptional cases). Let Q̃0y = l
be the value obtained by function g in Step 3.1 of Algorithm 5.1 as function of
r, s, u, and v.
(i) If PV((r, l)) = 1, then there exists a vector (r, s′, u′, v′) for which CC1(r, s′,
u′, v′) = 1 for some s′, v′ ∈ F2m , and u′ ∈ F∗2m .
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(ii) If CC1(r, s, u, v) = 1, then there exists a pair (r, l′) for which PV((r, l′)) = 1,
for some l′ ∈ F2m .
Proof For PV(Q̃0), to obtain solutions to Q̃1x using Equations (5.4) and (5.5)
we should have Tr(w1) = 0, where w1 is defined by Equation (5.3). Similarly for
CC1(Q0x , Q1x , x, y), Q̂0 ∈ E(F2m) exists if and only if Tr(w2) = 0, where w2 is




















which corresponds to Tr(w2), i.e., Tr(w1) = Tr(w2). Then (i) and (ii) are true since
Tr(w1) (and Tr(w2)) depends on Q̃0x and not on Q̃1x , x̃, or ỹ.
In some cases, these error-detecting approaches fail to detect the same vectors.
As illustrated in Figure 5.2, this happens in about 22m+1 of the possible combina-
tions of arbitrary (Q̃0x , Q̃1x , x̃, ỹ). This is explained in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.3 Let l, r, s, u, and v be defined as in Lemma 5.2.
(i) There exists a vector (r, s, u, v) for which PV((r, l)) = 1 and CC1(r, s, u, v) =
1, i.e., cases where both Algorithms 5.1 and 5.3 fail in detecting the same
vector (Q̃0x , Q̃1x , x̃, ỹ) (the overlapping area in Figure 5.2).
(ii) For all cases where (i) is satisfied, εP is either 0 or r · u (i.e., 0 or x̃Q̃0x).
(iii) The number of combinations that satisfies (i) is about 22m+1.
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Figure 5.2: Error detection coverage for arbitrary (Q̃0x , Q̃1x , x̃, ỹ)
Proof For having the same vector (Q̃0x , Q̃1x , x̃, ỹ) for which both PV(Q̃0) = 1 and
CC1(Q̃0x , Q̃1x , x̃, ỹ) = 1, it is necessary from Equations (5.4-5) and (5.8-9) that
either
Q̃1x(a)PV = Q̃1x(a)CC1 or Q̃1x(a)PV = Q̃1x(b)CC1.
Clearly, if one of these conditions is satisfied, then either Q̃1x(b)PV = Q̃1x(a)CC1 or
Q̃1x(b)PV = Q̃1x(b)CC. If we equate Equations (5.4) and (5.8), and Equations (5.4)




















= εP , (5.11)
respectively. Depending on the value of Tr(Q̃0x +
ỹ
x̃
+ x̃), Equations (5.10) and
(5.11) are reduced, one to
εP = 0, (5.12)
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and the other to
εP = x̃Q̃0x , (5.13)
which shows that (i) and (ii) are true. In summary, for a given vector (Q̃0x , Q̃1x , x̃, ỹ),
if Q̃0x , Q̃1x , x̃, and ỹ satisfy either Equation (5.4) or (5.5), and either Equation
(5.12) or (5.13), then PV(Q̃0) and CC1(Q̃0x , Q̃1x , x̃, ỹ) do not detect such an erro-
neous vector. Now let us obtain the number of combinations that satisfies (i). Let
us consider separately the cases where εP = 0 from those with εP = x̃Q̃0x :
• Case 1: εP = 0. Here P̃ ∈ E(F2m), where x̃ 6= Q̃0x , and x̃ 6= 0. For each P̃
there are (#E(F2m)/2− 1) possible values of Q̃0x with two solutions for each
one. Accordingly, for this case there are (#E(F2m)− 2)(#E(F2m)− 4) ≈ 22m
combinations.
• Case 2: εP = x̃Q̃0x. From the definition of εP we have:
ỹ2 + x̃ỹ + x̃3 + ax̃2 + b + x̃Q̃0x = 0. (5.14)
The resultant quadratic expression for ỹ will have a solution if and only if:
Tr
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For arbitrary x̃, where x̃ ∈ F∗2m and x̃ 6= Q̃0x the left side of Equation (5.15) is 0
in #E(F2m)−4 cases, i.e., it is the same condition for solving the quadratic on
the elliptic curve equation (Equation (2.3)). On the other hand, for arbitrary
Q̃0x and x̃ the right side of this equation is expected to be 0 for one half of
the cases and 1 for the other half. As a consequence, Equation (5.15) will
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be satisfied in about half of the combinations for which two solutions for ỹ
are obtained for arbitrary Q̃0x and x̃. Accordingly, for each possible value of
Q̃0x we can have about 2
m pairs of (x̃, ỹ) that satisfy Equation (5.14). Then
the number of combinations for which both Algorithms 5.1 and 5.3 fail when
εP = x̃Q̃0x is (#E(F2m)− 2)2m ≈ 22m.
Adding the counts obtained when εP = 0 and εP = x̃Q̃0x we obtain the value given
in (iii) (i.e., ≈ 22m+1).
From Lemma 5.3 we can deduce that if we combine PV(Q0) and CC1(Q0x , Q1x ,











However, from this lemma we can also see that if εP = 0 both error detection
approaches have the same error detection coverage. This means that if we add
a point verification process to P (i.e., PV(P )), we can use either PV(Q0) or
CC1(Q0x , Q1x , x, y) and have an improved cR of about ≈ 12 . This code rate of
about 0.5 means that the number of redundant bits utilized for error detection is
about half of the length of the code.
5.1.4 PV and integrity check (IC) at the end of the ECSM
In the previous two subsections we have provided an analysis of two different ap-
proaches to detect errors in the Montgomery ladder ECSM. The first consists of
only verifying whether or not the result Q0 lies on E(F2m) which is a basic coun-
termeasure against fault-based attacks and has been considered by Biehl et al. [9],
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Figure 5.3: Error detection utilizing PV and IC processes
Ciet and Joye [21], Antipa et al. [6], Blömer et al. [14], and Domı́nguez and Hasan
[27]. The second approach consists of checking the coherency between the involved
variables which is an extension of the work presented by Giraud [37] in the context
of RSA cryptosystems. Even when both approaches (and their combination) give
a very good code rate, it is possible to have a further improvement with practically
no cost. The idea is to have an integrity check (IC) of P . That is, a verification
after the main loop to check whether or not the register containing P = (x, y)
corresponds to the original input point. Hence, IC does not involve computations
with other variables as required for CC. This idea is illustrated in Figure 5.3. The
IC process can be implemented using duplication and/or the well-known cyclic re-
dundancy check. Let us assume that this mechanism permits the detection of any
alteration on the register containing P .
Let us obtain the cases where the error-detecting scheme presented in Figure 5.3
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will not detect an erroneous output Q̃0 6= kP . Using function g, Q̃0y is computed
as a function of Q̃0x , Q̃1x , x, and y. Replacing this value of Q̃0y in Equation (5.2)
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(Ht(w3) + 1) . (5.19)
































+ x + Tr(x) + 1
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. (5.21)






+a. Here for each possible value of Q̃0x (i.e., (#E(F2m)/2−2))
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there are two solutions to Q̃1x . Thus, the number of combinations where this scheme
fails in detecting an erroneous Q̃0 is #E(F2m)− 4.
For an arbitrary (Q̃0x , Q̃1x , x̃, ỹ), IC verifies any change in the register that







which represents the best value of cR obtained so far. This is mainly based on
the simple observation of checking the integrity of P . The overhead of this error-
detecting mechanism is quite low in comparison with the main ECSM procedure.
Assuming a random vector (Q̃0x , Q̃1x , x̃, ỹ), a code rate of 0.25 is equivalent of having
a theoretical probability of undetected error of 1/23m which is zero for any practical
scenario. However, the assumption of having a random vector of (Q̃0x , Q̃1x , x̃, ỹ)
might not be true for faults injected by a sophisticated attacker (e.g., SCF attack
for applications using elliptic curves defined over Fp).
5.1.5 Basic Montgomery’s ladder ECSM algorithm
We have shown that by using simple techniques such as PV and IC it is possible
to detect errors efficiently in the involved variables. Now, let us consider the basic
Montgomery ladder ECSM (Algorithm 2.5). As discussed in Subsection 2.3.1 this
algorithm uses the y-coordinate of the intermediate points Q0 and Q1 during the
ECSM computation. Thus, after the main loop we have all the point coordinates
of Q0 = kP and Q1 = (k+1)P . Let us add a PV process for Q0 and one IC process
to P at the end of the ECSM, i.e., PV(Q0) and IC(P ). Now let us define a CC
function as
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ok = 1 if Q0 ] P = Q1,
0 otherwise.
Since Q0, Q1, P ∈ E(F2m), for each pair (Q0, P ) there is only one value of Q1 for









Even when this approach theoretically has an improved error detection capabil-
ity, it has an important drawback in terms of performance as illustrated in Table
5.1. This table compares the operation counts for ECSM among the Montgomery
ladder algorithms proposed by López and Dahab [58] (Algorithms 2.6 and 2.7),
the Montgomery ladder with PV at the end, the basic Montgomery ladder (Algo-
rithm 2.5), and the basic Montgomery ladder (Algorithm 2.5) with PV(Q0) and
CC2(Q0, Q1, P ). This table shows that the basic Montgomery ladder with PV(Q0)
and CC2(Q0, Q1, P ) requires about double the number of finite field multiplications
in comparison with the Montgomery ladder with PV at the end for the algorithms
that use the affine system, i.e., 4tM vs. (2t + 4)M . For the case of algorithms
that use the projective coordinate system, the basic Montgomery ladder algorithm
with PV(Q0) and CC2(Q0, Q1, P ) requires about the triple more finite field mul-
tiplications than the Montgomery ladder with PV at the end, i.e., (18t − 6)M vs.
(6t + 6)M .
5.1.6 Security discussion on Montgomery’s ladder method
In this section we have considered error detection in Montgomery’s ladder methods
for non-supersingular elliptic curves over the binary finite field. Note that the SCF
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Coordinate
system
ECSM Method Operations required for the
ECSM
Montgomery ladder 1 (2t− 1)I + (2t + 2)M + 2tS
Affine Montgomery ladder with PV(Q0)
1,2 (2t− 1)I +(2t+4)M +(2t+2)S
(A) Basic Montgomery ladder 3 (2t− 2)I +(4t− 4)M +(2t− 2)S
Basic Montgomery ladder with
PV(Q0) and CC2(Q0, Q1, P )
3,4
(2t− 1)I + 4tM + (2t + 1)S
Montgomery ladder 5 1I + (6t + 4)M + (5t− 2)S
Projective Montgomery ladder with PV(Q0)
5,2 1I + (6t + 6)M + 5tS
(LD) Basic Montgomery ladder 3 1I + (18t− 18)M + (9t− 9)S
Basic Montgomery ladder with
PV(Q0) and CC2(Q0, Q1, P )
3,4
1I + (18t− 6)M + (9t− 1)S
1Using Algorithm 2.6. 2With error detection scheme of Figure 5.3. 3Using Algorithm 2.5.
4With PV(Q0) and CC2(Q0, Q1, P ). 5Using Algorithm 2.7.
Table 5.1: Operation counts for computing the ECSM utilizing error detection at
the algorithm level for Montgomery’s ladder method
attack proposed by Blömer et al. [14] only applies to applications using curves over
Fp, and not for those using curves defined over F2m . Additionally, because of its
uniformity this method is resistant to attacks based on timing [52] and simple power
analysis [53].
For invalid-curve attacks, including those discussed in Chapter 3, verifying if
the output is in E(F2m) is crucially important. For all the approaches presented
in this section that utilize PV and/or CC the output always relies on the original
elliptic curve. In DFA, the attacker needs to inject faults in a given location during
a number of runs during the ECSM algorithm and obtain erroneous results. How-
ever, as we have shown in this section the error detection coverage of the methods
presented is quite high. This makes DFA impractical. However, “a security sys-
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tem is only as strong as its weakest link. It doesn’t matter how strong the other
parts are” [31]. For applications utilizing elliptic curves over F2m , from the attacker
point of view, PV (or CC1 or CC2) can be seen as a strong protection that does
not permit producing any faulty results as output. Then, the question is how this
type of protections can be bypassed. And, in such a case what protections should
be added against these strong adversaries. In Section 5.3 we consider the scenario
where the attacker can inject a fault in the main algorithm and then bypass an
error detection mechanism based on decisional tests (e.g., “if (PV(Q) = 1) then”).
5.2 Error detection in ECSM by double-and-add-
always
In this section we consider error detection in the double-and-add-always ECSM
method proposed by Coron [23] for preventing the SPA attack. This method is
based on adding dummy instructions to make the number of point operations con-
stant during the main loop. However, Yen and Joye [91] and Yen et al. [92] have
shown that adding dummy instructions makes possible an SE attack.
Here we first present a left-to-right version of the double-and-add-always that is
resistant to attacks such as SE and DFA attacks. As we discussed in Chapter 2, for
applications utilizing projective coordinates the left-to-right version permits the use
of mixed coordinates. Thereafter, we present an extension of the right-to-left version
presented in the context of RSA cryptosystems by Boscher et al. [16] (Algorithm
2.10). For this approach we use the concepts of PV, CC, and IC presented in the
previous section. We show that this ECC version of this Algorithm can prevent not
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only SE and DFA attacks but also the SCF attack. This is an interesting result,
since to the best of our knowledge the only countermeasures proposed against SCF
attack are to use a called combined curve [14], utilizing the Montgomery ladder
algorithm without the y-coordinates, and those that use scalar randomization [27].
For this section, let us consider elliptic curves defined over either F2m or Fp, i.e.,
Fq.
5.2.1 Left-to-right ECSM by double-and-add-always
Compared to Algorithm 2.1, Algorithm 2.3 adds a dummy instruction in Step 2.3
whenever the scanned bit of the scalar is 0, i.e., if kl = 0 Step 2.3 becomes Q0 ← Q0
for any l ∈ [0, t − 1]. Since the value of Q1 is not utilized when kl = 0 and it is
overwritten at i = l + 1 with Q1 ← Q0 ] P , it can be target of the SE attack.
The idea is to modify this algorithm in such a way that even during dummy
instructions the alteration of the related registers could be detected. The resultant
method is presented as Algorithm 5.4. Here, Q0 follows the same sequence of oper-
ations as the original double and add method (Algorithm 2.1), i.e., each interaction
Q0 is doubled and if ki = 1 then it is added with P . On the other hand, Q1 will
change only during the dummy instructions, i.e., whenever ki = 0, Q1 will be added
to P . In this way at the end of the loop Q1 = H(k)P , where H(k) denotes the
Hamming weight of the binary complement of k, i.e., k = 2t− k− 1. Note that the
output Q0 does not depend on Q1. However, for defending against an SE attack





ok = 1 if Q1 = H(k)P,
0 otherwise.
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Since H(k) ∈ [0, t − 1], in the worst case the scalar multiplication H(k)P takes
2dlog2(t−1)e point operations. For example, for an elliptic curve defined over F2163
and t = m, H(k)P takes at the most 16 point operations. If P is known a priori,
we can precompute jP for j ∈ [2, t − 1] and store those results in a table. Since
k and P are verified for integrity, and assuming that the computation of H(k)P is
error free, CC3 function will detect any alteration in Q1 resulting in an effective
defense against the SE attack.
Algorithm 5.4. Left-to-right double-and-add-always ECSM with PV and CC
Input: P = (x, y) ∈ E(F2m) of order n, where n is an odd prime. A positive integer
k = (kt−1 · · · k1k0)2.
Output: Q = kP .
1. Q0 ← O, Q1 ← O.
2. For i = t− 1 downto 0 do
2.1 Q0 ← 2Q0.
2.2 Qki ← Qki ] P.
3. If ((PV(Q0) = 1) and (IC(P ) = 1) and (CC3(Q1, k, P ) = 1)) then
3.1 Return(Q0);
4. Else return(“Error detected”).
In addition to the SE attack protections, Algorithm 5.4 includes PV and IC
processes. This permits for an arbitrary vector (Q̃0, Q̃1, P̃ ) to have a code rate
equivalent to the basic Montgomery ladder ECSM, i.e., from Equation (5.23) cR ≈
1
6
. Even when this code rate might be quite good for some cases (e.g., random
errors), for curves defined over Fp Algorithm 5.4 is insecure against the SCF attack.
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In a similar way as described by Blömer et al. [14], if the attacker can change the
sign of the register containing the intermediate value of Q0 at random values of
i, then the attacker can retrieve the scalar. The problem of Algorithm 5.4 is that
PV is not sufficient to avoid the SCF attack, i.e., faulty points never leave E(Fp).
Additionally, the CC3 function does not verify alterations in Q0, i.e., CC3 verifies
alterations in Q1 that permits to resist the SE attack. In the next subsection we
show that using another CC function it is possible to resist the SCF attack for the
right-to-left version of ECSM by double-and-add-always.
5.2.2 Right-to-left ECSM by double-and-add-always
Similar to the left-to-right version, Algorithm 2.4 performs a dummy instruction
during the main loop (i.e., Q0 ← Q0) when kl = 0 at Step 2.3, for l ∈ [0, t − 1].
Extending to ECC the idea from Boscher et al. [16], it is possible that Q1 could
hold a computation, different than kP , that could be checked at the end of the
ECSM. The resultant method is presented as Algorithm 5.5. After the main loop





where k = 2t − k − 1. Note that if we add Q0, Q1, and P we obtain
Q0 ]Q1 ] P = kP ] (2t − k − 1)P ] P = 2tP = Q2.
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Hence, for verifying the coherency among these points we can use the following CC
function




ok = 1 if Q2 = Q0 ]Q1 ] P,
0 otherwise.
In addition to CC, Algorithm 5.5 includes PV and IC processes. This permits for
an arbitrary vector (Q̃0, Q̃1, Q̃2, P̃ ) to have a code rate cR ≈ 14 .
Algorithm 5.5. Right-to-left double-and-add-always ECSM with PV and CC
Input: P = (x, y) ∈ E(F2m) of order n, where n is an odd prime. A positive integer
k = (kt−1 · · · k1k0)2.
Output: Q = kP .
1. Q0 ← O, Q1 ← O, Q2 ← P.
2. For i = 0 to t− 1 do
2.1 Qki ← Qki ]Q2.
2.2 Q2 ← 2Q2.
3. If ((PV(Q0) = 1) and (PV(Q1) = 1) and (CC4(Q0, Q1, Q2, P ) = 1) and
(IC(P ) = 1)) then
3.1 Return(Q0);
4. Else return(“Error detected”).
Security Analysis on Algorithm 5.5
As we discussed earlier, a DFA attack becomes impractical when PV of the output
is performed. However there are two attacks, namely SE and SCF, for which PV
does not provide enough protection. Let us consider these two attacks on Algorithm
5.5.
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SE Attack: Let us assume that the attacker can inject one fault, single or
multiple-bit, in one variable during the ECSM. In fact, since the output Q0 does
not depend on intermediate values of Q1, the register holding the latter point might
be exploited for mounting the SE attack. Suppose that the attacker injects a fault
in Q1 at a specific iteration i, i.e., Q1,i becomes Q̃1,i. This error will propagate
for subsequent values of the variable Q1. At the end the main loop we will have
Q̃1 6= kP . Here Algorithm 5.5 provides a two-level protection. The first is with
PV of variable Q1. For a random error in the corresponding coordinates of Q1,i,
PV(Q1) might be sufficient to make SE impractical. However, suppose the attacker
can inject a fault in such a way that Q̃1,i ∈ E(Fq) (e.g., SCF attack). For this case
PV(Q̃1) = 1 and CC4 provides a second protection. Here, CC4 will compute
Q0 ] Q̃1 ] P = (k + 1)P + Q̃1.
The latter value will be equal to Q2 (i.e., CC4(Q0, Q̃1, Q2, P ) = 1) if, and only if,
Q̃1 = (2
t − k − 1 + jn)P, (5.24)
where j is an integer and n = ord(P ). For these exceptional cases PV and CC4
will fail detecting such errors. However in our opinion this is unlikely to happen in
practice for the following reasons. First, the only known attack where Q̃1 ∈ E(Fq)
is the SCF attack. Secondly, even if an SCF is injected on Q1,i, the attacker is
unlikely to have the precision for obtaining a final result Q̃1 that satisfies Equation
(5.24) since he/she does not know k. As a result, Algorithm 5.5 can be considered
as SE resistant.
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SCF Attack: Let us assume that the attacker can inject one SCF into an in-
termediate point of Algorithm 5.5 at some random and unknown loop iteration
i ∈ [0, t−1]. This fault model is similar to the assumed by Blömer et al. [14]. Since
the intermediate values of Q0 and Q2 are used for computing the final result of the
ECSM, these two points might be susceptible to an SCF attack. From Equation
(2.6), we can obtain the output of Algorithm 5.5 Q0 = kP as
Q0 = kt−12








where Q0,i is the intermediate value of Q0 during some loop iteration i ∈ [0, t −
1], i.e., Q0,i =
∑i
j=0 kj2
jP. Now, let us consider separately an SCF attack on
intermediate values of Q0 and Q2.
• SCF attack targeting Q0 in Step 2.1. Assume that the attacker mounts an
SCF attack on Q0 at some loop iteration i ∈ [0, t−1], such that Q̃0,i = −Q0,i.














The above expression can be rewritten as





Note that if the attacker knows Q̃0 and Q0, and i is small enough for doing
an exhaustive search, then he/she can obtain the i+1 least significant bits of
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k. This can be repeated for different and ascending values of i utilizing the
known bits of k until the retrieval of the complete scalar. However, CC4 does
not permit to release any Q̃0 6= Q0 since





which does not match with Q2 = 2
tP for
∑i
j=0 kj 6= 0. Hence, CC4 protects
Algorithm 5.5 for the SCF attack in Q0,i.
• SCF attack targeting Q2 in Step 2.2. For this case the SCF attack is on Q2 at
some loop iteration i ∈ [0, t− 1], such that Q̃2,i = −Q2,i. Since Q2,i = 2i+1P,
Q̃2,i = −2i+1P, and at the end of the loop we have
Q̃2 = −2tP .
From Equation (5.25) we can obtain the faulty value Q̃0 at the end of the
loop as


















jP − kP .





jP − kP .
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Then, with these values CC4 will compute












2jP ] 2P − 2tP,
= 2i+2P − 2tP,
which matches Q̃2 = −2tP if, and only if,
2i+2P = O.
The latter cannot be true if the order of P is prime. As a result, CC4 will
detect any SCF attack in Q2,i.
Under the same fault model as the utilized by Blömer et al. [14], Algorithm 5.5 is
SCF attack resistant. This is an interesting result because this algorithm does not
use a combined curve [14] or randomization as RC and PC schemes presented in
Chapter 4. This protection is based on CC among the involved variables and it
resists both the SE and the SCF attacks.
5.2.3 Costs for ECSM by double-and-add-always
In this section we have presented double-and-add-always ECSM methods that are
resistant to both DFA attack and SE attack. The former is prevented simply by
performing a PV of the output. For the algorithms presented in this section the SE
attack is prevented with a CC of the variables involved. In Table 5.2 we present
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Double-and-add- Coordinate SE-DFA- Operations required for the
always method system resistant ECSM
Left-to-right 1 A No 2tI + 4tM + 2tS
LD No 1I + (12t + 2)M + (10t + 1)S
Right-to-left 2 A No 2tI + 4tM + 2tS
LD No 1I + (18t + 2)M + (9t + 1)S
Left-to-right with A Yes 2t′I + (4t′ + 2)M + (2t′ + 2)S 5
PV and CC 3 LD Yes 1I + (12t′ + 4)M + (10t′ + 3)S 5
Right-to-left with A Yes (2t+2)I +(4t+8)M +(2t+6)S
PV and CC 4 LD Yes 1I + (18t + 31)M + (9t + 18)S
1Using Algorithm 2.3. 2Using Algorithm 2.4. 3Using Algorithm 5.4 to obtain kP and Algorithm
2.3 for H(k)P. 4Using Algorithm 5.5. 5t′ = t + dlog2(t − 1)e.
Table 5.2: Operation counts for the double-and-add-always ECSM method for
curves defined over F2m
the cost in terms of finite field operations for the double-and-add-always algorithms
utilizing elliptic curves defined over F2m . The first four rows present the cost of
Algorithms 2.3 and 2.4 which do not include any error-detecting processes. In
contrast, the last four rows shows their counterparts that includes PV and CC (Al-
gorithms 5.4 and 5.5). Table 5.3 shows estimates of these costs for a specific value
of t = m = 163. In this table we can notice an overhead in terms of finite field oper-
ations for the algorithms that include PV and CC for error detection in comparison
with the algorithms without error detection. For affine coordinates, these overheads
are approximately 4.91%I +5.06%M +5.32%S and 0.61%I +0.92%M +1.23%S for
Algorithms 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. On the other hand, for the projective coordi-
nates case, the overheads are of about 4.95%M +5.08%S and 1.00%M +1.07%S for
Algorithms 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. Additionally, we can notice a speed advantage
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Double-and-add-always method Coordinate Field operations
system I M S
Left-to-right 1 A 326 652 489
LD 2 1 1959 1142
Right-to-left 3 A 326 652 489
LD 1 2611 1305
Left-to-right with PV and CC 3 A 342 685 515
LD 2 1 2056 1200
Right-to-left with PV and CC 5 A 328 658 495
LD 1 2637 1319
1Using Algorithm 2.3. 2Using mixed coordinates for point addition. 3Using Algorithm
2.4. 4Using Algorithm 5.4 to obtain kP and Algorithm 2.3 for H(k)P, assuming H(k) =
dt/2e = 82. 5Using Algorithm 5.5.
Table 5.3: Number of finite field operations for the double-and-add-always ECSM
method for t = m = 163 for curves over F2163
of using the left-to-right versions over a their right-to-left counterparts when using
projective coordinates, e.g., 1I +1959M +1142S vs. 1I +2611M +1305S for Algo-
rithms 2.3 and 2.4, respectively; and 1I +2056M +1200S vs. 1I +2637M +1319S
for Algorithms 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. This is mainly for the use of mixed coor-
dinates.
Similarly, Table 5.4 shows the count of finite field operations for the double-and-
add-always algorithms utilizing elliptic curves defined over Fp. In addition, Table
5.5 gives estimates of these costs for a specific value of t, i.e., t = 192. For the
case of affine coordinates, in this table we can notice an overhead of approximately
4.17%I+4.30%M +4.51%S and 0.52%I+0.78%M +1.04%S for Algorithms 5.4 and
5.5, respectively. For the projective coordinates case, the overheads are of about
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4.20%M +4.31%S and 0.85%M +0.91%S for Algorithms 5.4 and 5.5, respectively.
Additionally, we have shown that the right-to-left version of the double-and-add-
always ECSM can be equipped with PV and CC in order to resist the SCF attack.
The overhead if the ECSM is computed in affine coordinates is of about 0.53%1.
For the case of Algorithm 5.5 utilizing projective coordinates, let us compare it
with the left-to-right version without error detection. The main reason is due to
the penalty for not using mixed coordinates. With this consideration, the overhead
of Algorithm 5.5 utilizing projective coordinates is about 27.4%1. This contrasts
with the 30− 40% reported by Blömer et al. [14] or about the 100% for RC or PC
schemes.
Double-and-add- Coordinate SE-DFA- SCF- Operations required for the
always method system resistant resistant ECSM
Left-to-right 1 A No No 2tI + 4tM + 3tS
J No No 1I + (12t + 3)M + (7t + 1)S
Right-to-left 2 A No No 2tI + 4tM + 3tS
J No No 1I + (16t + 3)M + (8t + 1)S
Left-to-right with A Yes No 2t′I + (4t′ + 1)M + (3t′ + 2)S 5
PV and CC 3 J Yes No 1I + (12t′ + 4)M + (7t′ + 3)S 5
Right-to-left with A Yes Yes (2t+2)I +(4t+6)M +(3t+6)S
PV and CC 4 J Yes Yes 1I + (16t + 29)M + (8t + 15)S
1Using Algorithm 2.3. 2Using Algorithm 2.4. 3Using Algorithm 5.4 to obtain kP and Algorithm 2.3 for H(k)P.
4Using Algorithm 5.5. 5t′ = t + dlog2(t − 1)e.
Table 5.4: Operation counts for the double-and-add-always ECSM method for
curves defined over Fp
1We assume that I = 80M and S = 0.85M as [40].
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Double-and-add-always method Coordinate Field operations
system I M S
Left-to-right 1 A 384 768 576
J 2 1 2307 1345
Right-to-left 3 A 384 768 576
J 1 3075 1537
Left-to-right with PV and CC 3 A 400 801 602
J 2 1 2404 1403
Right-to-left with PV and CC 5 A 386 774 582
J 1 3101 1551
1Using Algorithm 2.3. 2Using mixed coordinates for point addition. 3Using Algorithm
2.4. 4Using Algorithm 5.4 to obtain kP and Algorithm 2.3 for H(k)P, assuming H(k) =
dt/2e = 96. 5Using Algorithm 5.5.
Table 5.5: Number of finite field operations for the double-and-add-always ECSM
method for t = 192 for curves over Fp192
5.3 Double-fault attack resistant ECSM
Yen et al. [94] noted that error detection schemes based on decisional tests should
be avoided. Their observation relies on the fact that decisional tests depend on the
use of the zero flag of the CPU. Then, if the attacker can inject a fault in this bit of
the status register, the conditional test may be bypassed. Today’s smart cards are
equipped with countermeasures that protect sensitive registers with robust mech-
anisms [37]. In such a case this attack might not be possible. However, Kim and
Quisquater [48] showed that general propose microcontrollers can be target of a so
called double-fault attack, i.e., one attack to the RSA signature generation and the
other to status register (i.e., zero flag). Since there is a growing use of portable and
embedded systems that may not be protected for this type of attack, some protec-
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tions should be added. In this section we present algorithm level countermeasures
against this type of attacks for ECSM.
Fault Model. The attacker can mount two attacks during one run of the ECSM
algorithm. The first to the main algorithm in order to corrupt operations that
depend on sensitive information (i.e., scalar k). The second to any decisional test
used even on those with error detection procedures (e.g., “if (PV(Q) = 1) then”).
Let us base our countermeasure on Montgomery’s ladder ECSM for non-super-
singular elliptic curves over the binary finite field proposed by López and Dahab
[58] (Algorithm 2.6). However, these concepts can generally be extended to the
corresponding Montgomery’s ladder ECSM for prime fields presented by Brier and
Joye [17]. Since SCF attack does not apply to Montgomery’s ladder ECSM methods
that do not use the y-coordinate for computing the ECSM, under this double-fault
model the most dangerous threat is the DFA attack. An effective defensive measure
against this attack can be achieved adding randomness to the computation in such
a way that the attacker cannot obtain useful information from a faulty output. In
fact, if a projective coordinate system is utilized one can simply apply base point
randomization [23] for making DFA impractical. However, for the affine system we
can use the concept of point “blinding” presented by Coron [23]. The idea is to add
a random point R to the initial values of Q0 and Q1. Let r be defined as r = logP R,
i.e., R = rP . Using Equation (2.7), the original Montgomery ladder algorithm sets
Lt−1 = 1 and Mt−1 = 2 (i.e., Q0 = P and Q1 = 2P ), and we use Equation (2.8)
repeatedly for i from t − 2 to 0 to obtain Q0 = kP and Q1 = (k + 1)P . Now, we
can set Lt−1 = 1 + r and Mt−1 = 2 + r (i.e., Q0 = P ] R and Q1 = 2P ]R). Note
that since R is added initially to both Q0 and Q1, at each iteration during the loop
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their corresponding part dependent on R is doubled. Thus, after the main loop the
following is obtained:
Q0 = kP ] 2t−1R,
Q1 = (k + 1)P ] 2t−1R.
Then, to obtain Q = kP we need to compute Q = Q0 − 2t−1R. This is depicted in
Figure 5.4. The complete procedure that implements this version of Montgomery’s
ladder is presented as Algorithm 5.6. In this way, if the attacker can inject a
fault to avoid the conditional test of Step 10, then the output’s finite field pair
will be released regardless of whether it is or not in E(F2m). However, if the
attacker also injects a fault during the main loop, where the sensitive information
is utilized, the output might be not useful since he/she does not know R. In fact,
a requirement for mounting the DFA proposed by Biehl et al. [9] is to know the
details of the implementation, such as the parameters, the algorithm utilized, and
the representation of internal variables. The latter is not satisfied by adding a
random point R to the initial values of Q0 and Q1. The overhead of Algorithm 5.6
in comparison with Algorithm 2.6 that does not include any fault attack protections
is about 50% more field multiplicative inverses and squarings, and about 100% more
field multiplications, i.e., (3t + 3)I + (4t + 6)M + (3t + 7)S vs. (2t + 1)I + (2t +
1)M + (2t + 1)S.
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Figure 5.4: Blinding point P for the Montgomery ladder ECSM
Algorithm 5.6. Double-fault attack resistant Montgomery ladder ECSM
Input: P = (x, y) ∈ E(F2m) of order n, where n is an odd prime. A positive integer
k = (kt−1 · · · k1 k0)2, where kt−1 = 1, k 6= n, and k 6= n± 1.
Output: Q = kP .
1. Pick a random point R = (Rx, Ry) ∈ E(F2m) with odd prime order.
2. Q2 ← −R.
3. T ← (y + Ry)/(x + Rx).
4. Q0x ← T 2 + T + x + Rx + a.
5. T ← x/(x + Q0x).
6. Q1x ← T 2 + T + Rx
7. For i = t− 2 downto 0 do
7.1 T ← x(Q0 ]Qki), Q1x ← x(Q1 ]Qki), Q0x ← T , Q2 ← 2Q2.
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8. Q0y = g(Q0x , Q1x , x, y).
9. Q0 ← Q0 ]Q2.
10. If ((PV(Q0) = 1) and (PV(Q2) = 1) and (IC(P ) = 1) and (Q0x 6= 0) and
(Q0x 6= x)) then
10.1 Return(Q0);
11. Else return(“Error detected”).
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented error-detecting schemes at the algorithm level
for ECSM. We have used PV in conjunction with CC functions that are algorithm
dependent. In the Montgomery ladder algorithm, we have considered the use of PV
of the output and the concept of CC. In fact, we have shown that if we verify the
integrity of the input point P (i.e., IC(P )), these two approaches are equivalent with
respect to their error detection coverage. In this way, we can use PV of the output
along with IC of P to have an improved error detection coverage with negligible
cost. The double-and-add-always ECSM method presented by Coron [23] have
been shown to be susceptible to the SE attack [91] [92]. In this chapter, we have
presented the left-to-right and the right-to-left methods which provide resistance
to the SE attack by utilizing CC among selected variables. Additionally, we have
shown that for the right-to-left ECSM by double-and-add-always it is possible to
resist the SCF attack presented by Blömer et al. [14]. This result is interesting since
this algorithm do not use the combined curve [14], or the use randomization as RC
and PC schemes. For applications utilizing affine coordinates it has a negligible cost
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in terms of additional finite field operations needed (i.e., less that 1% for t ≥ 192).
And even, for the case of projective coordinates, we have noted that the cost is of
about 27.4% for t = 192. This value is less than the 30− 40% reported by Blömer
et al. [14], or about 100% for schemes like RC or PC. Finally, we have considered
the case where an attacker could mount a double-fault attack. Even with this
strong fault model, it is possible to avoid fault attacks by utilizing some type of
randomization. In this case we have utilized the concept of point blinding on the
Montgomery ladder ECSM method.
Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, several aspects of fault-based attacks and countermeasures for ECC
have been studied. We have presented a new fault-based attack against a popular
algorithm, namely the Montgomery ladder ECSM for curves over the binary field.
In addition, we have presented error-detecting schemes for ECSM at both module
and algorithm levels.
In Chapter 3, we have introduced an invalid-curve attack on the Montgomery
ladder ECSM algorithm proposed by López and Dahab. This attack is based on
the fact that curve parameter a is not utilized for point operation formulas in this
ECSM method. From an original group E(F2m), we have assumed that there exists
a weaker group with the same parameters except for a. We have shown that this
assumption is true for nine of the ten NIST-recommended elliptic curves over the
binary field. Under a specific fault model, we have presented two versions of this
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attack with their respective probabilities of success. This attack underlines the
importance of verifying the correctness of the ECSM operation.
Error detection is an essential task for protecting against fault-based attacks.
Applying some properties of elliptic curves, it is possible to detect errors during
the ECSM operation utilizing different techniques. The most obvious is to verify
if the output relies on the original elliptic curve. However, it has been shown that
in some cases this protection is not sufficient. Other techniques utilized to detect
errors during the ECSM computation have been presented in Chapters 4 and 5.
In Chapter 4, we have used the concepts of re-computation and parallel com-
putation to achieve error detection and fault tolerance on ECSM. By means of
this we have introduced encoding/decoding schemes suitable for ECSM which are
based on scalar and point randomization. The proposed structures permit us to
detect errors with high probability. Additionally they resist attacks such as the
SCF attack without modifying the curve parameters. This might be important for
crypto-processors that have fixed parameters (e.g., those recommended by NIST).
Also, utilizing a small ECSM prototype, we have presented experimental results for
the probability of undetected errors for the error-detecting structures presented.
We have also shown that, with two ECSM modules working in parallel, it is possi-
ble to have fault-tolerant schemes that will not only detect but also correct errors.
This contrasts with the three modules needed for the TMR based systems. Using
an FPGA as hardware target with an NIST-recommended elliptic curve over F2163 ,
we have shown that the savings in terms of area with respect to TMR based ECSM
is about 24.8% for DMR PV and 23.6% for PRC.
In Chapter 5, we have presented error detection at the algorithm level for ECSM.
We have utilized the concepts of PV, CC, and IC. The idea of CC has been carried
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out by algorithm specific functions CC1-CC4. For the Montgomery ladder ECSM
algorithm for elliptic curves over the binary field, we have demonstrated that PV has
the same error detection coverage as CC1 if an IC of the input point is performed.
We have shown that using PV and IC it is possible to have improved error detection
without degrading the performance. This contrasts with the notable error detec-
tion coverage of the basic Montgomery ladder ECSM algorithm where the penalty
in performance might be unacceptable. Utilizing CC as error-detecting technique,
we have proposed two versions of the double-and-add-always ECSM method (Algo-
rithms 5.4 and 5.5). We have shown that both algorithms resist the SE attack. In
addition, we have proved that the right-to-left version (Algorithm 5.5) resists the
SCF attack. This is the first countermeasure against the SCF attack reported in
the literature that does not use a combined curve [14] or randomization as RC and
PC schemes presented in Chapter 4. For today’s applications, where t ≈ 192, we
have shown that our countermeasure has a overhead in terms of finite field opera-
tions of about 0.8% when using the affine coordinate system and about 27.4% for
applications utilizing the projective coordinate system. These values contrast with
the overhead utilizing a combined curve (i.e., 30− 40% [14]) or re-computation or
parallel computation (i.e., about 100% for RC and PC schemes).
6.2 Future work
In Chapter 4, we have presented experimental results for probabilities of undetected
errors with a small prototype. The fault model utilized was based on single-bit
stuck-at faults into the gates used for finite field operations. It would be interesting
to obtain results for other fault models such as flip-bit faults in registers holding
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partial results of the ECSM and/or multiple-bit faults. Additionally, it would
also be interesting to obtain experimental results for the ECSM with protections
at the algorithm level described in Chapter 5. Also we are interested to have
some experimental results for a real size system, e.g., m = 163, used in practical
applications.
A basic assumption for the error-detecting and fault-tolerant structures for
ECSM presented in Chapter 4 is that all modules except the ECSM module are
implemented in a secure environment. It would be interesting to design those extra
modules using error detection and/or fault tolerant techniques and show that this
assumption can be carried out in practice.
In Chapter 5 we have considered algorithms that do not use precomputation. It
is well known that if P is fixed the ECSM can be speeded up by precomputing some
data that depends exclusively on P . Some ECSM methods that use this principle
are: fixed-base windowing, fixed-base comb, and interleaving. It would be interest-
ing to study protections for fault attacks on algorithms that use precomputation.
With some results of Chapter 5, we have noted the advantages of including
countermeasures against fault-attacks at the algorithm level. It would be interesting
to extend these concepts to fault-tolerance in ECSM.
Finally, it would also be interesting to extend some of the concepts of the re-
search work presented in this thesis to hyperelliptic curves.
Appendix A
Average Number of EC Discrete
Logarithms for Algorithm 3.3
In this appendix we include the computations of the average number of EC discrete
logarithms for Algorithm 3.3 using the second improved approach described on page
75. As assumed in Subsection 3.2.2, the fault location is at a random position of
the x-coordinate of the base point P . This assumption implies that the value of
k mod ni is at a random position in Tables Ai, where ni = ord(P̂i) and i ∈ {0, 1}.
Let us define the random variable w as the number of entries needed for having
k mod ni in both tables. The order of the possible values of w is shown in Figure
A.1 for the case c0 < c1.
Case: c0 = c1. In this case the accumulative probability distribution F (w) for
some given values is as follows:
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Figure A.1: Values of the random variable w according to entries of Tables A0 and
A1 considering c0 < c1
F (1) = 0 F (2) = 1/c20
F (3) = 2/c20 F (4) = 4/c
2
0
F (5) = 6/c20 F (6) = 9/c
2
0





F (2c0 − 1) = (c0 − 1)/c0 F (2c0) = 1





(w2 − 1)/(4c20) w odd, and 1 ≤ w ≤ 2c0 − 1,
w2/(4c20) w even, and 2 ≤ w ≤ 2c0.
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(w − 1)/(2c20) w odd, and 1 ≤ w ≤ 2c0 − 1,
w/(2c20) w even, and 2 ≤ w ≤ 2c0.





After performing a change of variables (i.e., y = w−1
2
and y = w
2
for the odd and

















c0 (for c0 >> 1). (A.1)
Case: c0 < c1. Similar to the previous case we can write F (w) for some given
values as follows
F (1) = 0 F (2) = 1/(c0c1)
F (3) = 2/(c0c1) F (4) = 4/(c0c1)
F (5) = 6/(c0c1) F (6) = 9/(c0c1)
...
...
F (2c0 − 1) = (c0 − 1)/c1 F (2c0) = c0/c1
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F (2c0 + 1) = (c0 + 1)/c1 F (2c0 + 2) = (c0 + 2)/c1
...
...
F (c0 + c1 − 1) = (c1 − 1)/c1 F (c0 + c1) = 1





(x2 − 1)/(4c0c1) x odd, and 1 ≤ x ≤ 2c0 − 1,
x2/(4c0c1) x even, and 2 ≤ x ≤ 2c0,
(x− c0)/c1 2c0 + 1 ≤ x ≤ c0 + c1.





(x− 1)/(2c0c1) x odd, and 1 ≤ x ≤ 2c0 − 1,
x/(2c0c1) x even, and 2 ≤ x ≤ 2c0,
1/c1 2c0 + 1 ≤ x ≤ c0 + c1.





After performing a change of variables (i.e., y = x−1
2
and y = x
2
for the odd and



















3c21 − c20 + 6c0c1 + 3c1 + 1
6c1
. (A.2)
Case: c0 > c1. This case is vary similar to the previous case. In fact, from
Equation (A.2) we can perform the changes of variables c0 ← c1 and c1 ← c0 to
obtain the mean for this case:
µ =




Example of Undetected Errors
with Point Negation
Encoding/Decoding
Suppose we compute the ECSM using re-computation (Figure 2.2) and point nega-
tion as encoding and decoding process using the affine coordinate system. Let the
elliptic curve utilized be E(a, b) and be defined over F2m . Assume that this scheme
is implemented in hardware with one fault in the ECSM module. For simplicity
assume that we have a stuck-at-1 fault, and it is located at the gate that gets bit i
of the y-coordinate ypi as shown in Figure B.1. Let the elliptic curve points that are
input to the ECSM module at time t0 and t1 be P = (xp, yp) and −P = (xp, yp),
respectively, where xp = xp and yp = xp + yp. The input y-coordinates passing
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Figure B.1: Stuck-at-1 fault at the gate that gets bit i of the y-coordinate
through the faulty gate are as follows:
ỹp = yp | (00 . . . 010...00),
ỹp = (xp + yp) | (00 . . . 010...00),
where the vector (00 . . . 010...00) has 0s in all its bits with the exception of bit
position i, and the operator | is a bit-wise OR.
If ypi = 1 and xpi +ypi = 1, this fault does not produce any error in either of the
two ECSM runs (see Table B.1). This is because the i-th bit of both y-coordinates
is 1 and the fault does not change this bit’s value. Any other combination of ypi and
xpi + ypi gives a different value as shown in Table B.1. For the second (respectively
third) case we can see that an original input point, P (respectively −P ), is present
at time t0 (respectively t1). For these two cases the results will be different. This
is because it is necessary to have complementary points at both input modules in
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ypi xpi + ypi ECSM input at t0 (after the fault)
1 1 (xpi = 0) (xp, ỹp), where ỹp = yp (i.e., P )
1 0 (xpi = 1) (xp, ỹp), where ỹp = yp (i.e., P )
0 1 (xpi = 1) (xp, ỹp), where ỹp 6= yp (i.e., 6= ±P )
0 0 (xpi = 0) (xp, ỹp), where ỹp 6= yp (i.e., P1)
ypi xpi + ypi ECSM input at t1 (after the fault)
1 1 (xpi = 0) (xp, ỹp), where ỹp = yp (i.e., −P )
1 0 (xpi = 1) (xp, ỹp), where ỹp 6= yp (i.e., 6= ±P )
0 1 (xpi = 1) (xp, ỹp), where ỹp = yp (i.e., −P )
0 0 (xpi = 0) (xp, ỹp), where ỹp 6= yp (i.e., P2)
Table B.1: Possible alteration of the input coordinates
order to have the two outputs to match. For the fourth case, the input points are
different from P and −P , say P1 and P2. The resultant finite field element pairs
are the negative of each other, say P1 = −P2. Furthermore, they are not part of
the original elliptic curve E(a, b), but they are part of another elliptic curve, say
Ẽ(a, b̃). Because the point addition and doubling might not use the parameter b,
the two ECSM runs will be performed over Ẽ(F2m). When the computations are
complete, the two results will be the same but incorrect. In this particular case the
system will fail by accepting an erroneous result. Similar analysis and results can
be obtained for a stuck-at-0 fault at the same bit position of the y-coordinate (i.e.,
ypi), or if the fault is located at the gate that gets the i-th bit of the x-coordinate
(i.e., xpi).
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